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Abstract 
 
Ireland experienced two critical junctures when its economic survival was threatened: 1958/9 
and 1986/7. Common to both crises was the supplanting of long established practices,  that 
had become an integral part of the political culture of the state, by new ideas that ensured 
eventual economic recovery. In their adoption and implementation these ideas also 
fundamentally changed the institutions of state – how politics was done, how it was organised 
and regulated. The end result was the transformation of the Irish state.    
   
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that at those critical junctures the political and 
administrative elites who enabled economic recovery were not just making pragmatic 
decisions, their actions were influenced by ideas. Systematic content analysis of the published 
works of the main ideational actors, together with primary interviews with those actors still 
alive, reveals how their ideas were formed, what influenced them, and how they set about 
implementing their ideas.  
 
As the hypothesis assumes institutional change over time historical institutionalism serves as 
the theoretical framework. Central to this theory is the idea that choices made when a policy is 
being initiated or an institution formed will have a continuing influence long into the future. 
Institutions of state become ‘path dependent’ and impervious to change – the forces of inertia 
take over. That path dependency is broken at critical junctures. At those moments ideas play a 
major role as they offer a set of ready-made solutions.  
 
Historical institutionalism serves as a robust framework for proving that in the transformation 
of Ireland the role of ideas in punctuating institutional path dependency at critical junctures 
was central. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
 
In an address to the American Bar Association at the Law Society of Ireland, Blackhall Place, 
Dublin on 21 July 2000, Tánaiste Mary Harney posited that whereas Ireland was 
geographically closer to Berlin than Boston, spiritually it was nearer to Boston. That affinity 
to Boston was, in her view, evident in an Irish tax system that was based on the American 
rather than the European model - low tax rates, particularly, on capital and corporate profits. 
This new, low tax regime was proving very successful in attracting American industry to 
Ireland and, for Harney, a founding member of the Progressive Democrats, a party wedded to 
economic liberalisation, this was a matter of considerable pride. Furthermore, these changes 
had been achieved without dismantling the welfare state or increased social exclusion – very 
much a cornerstone of the ‘Berlin’ model. What she did not say was that the introduction of 
this low tax policy coincided with the adoption of neocorporatism in the first social 
partnership agreement. Ireland had, Janus like, adopted two models of governance that were, 
in theory at least, mutually exclusive. A low tax economy presupposes ‘small’ government 
whereas social partnership grants the state a central role in economic and business activity.  
 
The adoption of a low tax policy and neocorporatism in the period 1986/87 was in response to 
an economic crisis. A previous crisis in 1958/59 had resulted in the abandonment of 
protectionism and the adoption of free trade and foreign direct investment – in reality a new 
model of state that embraced Keynesianism and implemented an Irish version of it through a 
combination of indicative planning and the establishment of a number of key state-sponsored 
bodies. Common to both crises was the supplanting of long established practices that had 
become an integral part of the political culture of the state, by new policies that ensured 
eventual economic recovery. In their adoption and implementation these ideas also 
fundamentally changed the institutions of state – how business was done, how it was 
organised and regulated. The end result was the transformation of Ireland.  
 
When looking at the evolution of the Irish state a noticeable feature is how little institutional 
change took place for almost forty years after independence. All the historians listed below 
comment on this fact and attribute it to the longevity of the political and administrative 
leadership that emerged at the birth of the state and continued in office until there was 
intergenerational handover of power in the late 1950s. Even 1932, and the coming to power of 
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Fianna Fáil, did not lead to any appreciable institutional change. The emphasis was on 
continuity and self-sufficiency which was reinforced by protectionist economic policies and 
isolationism during and after World War II. The result was ongoing budgetary difficulties and 
falling further and further behind the rest of the developed world. Only with the coming to 
power of a new breed of political and administrative elites in the late 1950s did Ireland 
experience real change. The abandonment of protectionism in favour of free trade and foreign 
direct investment radically altered the institutions of state. In political science such a time of 
radical alteration is referred to as a critical juncture. This thesis contends that the events of 
1958/9 were the first critical juncture in the Irish state. The policies adopted did lead to a 
measure of economic prosperity and development and hereafter the state continued those 
policies until the mid 1980s when a combination of factors led to another economic crisis and 
another critical juncture in 1986/87 – Garvin (2004: xiii) refers to both periods as ‘key cusp 
dates’. At the second critical juncture Ireland adopted a low tax economy and neocorporatism 
as the new ideas to implement change. A noted feature of both critical junctures is that the 
policies implemented continued long after they had outlived their usefulness and contributed 
to the next critical juncture. (The probability is that Ireland is now experiencing another 
critical juncture that can be directly attributable to the policies adopted at the second critical 
juncture – a ‘Boston’ model that featured low taxes and light touch regulation; a ‘Berlin’ 
model that adopted social partnership). 
 
Much has been written about the events surrounding each critical juncture by political 
scientists such as Garvin (2004) and Murphy (2009), historians such as Ferriter (2004), 
Coogan (2004), Keogh (1994) Lee (1989), and economic commentators such as Kennedy 
(1981, 1993), FitzGerald (1959, 1968, 1991, 2003, 2008) and the Economic and Social 
Research Institute. There is also a wealth of political biography and memoirs written about the 
relevant periods. All of the foregoing very effectively describe, from their perspectives, the 
events of the time, identify the causes of economic and/or political failure and describe what 
steps were taken to remedy the situation. What emerges from the literature is that at each 
crisis point the solution involved a radical change in public policy, the jettisoning of old 
orthodoxies that had been found wanting  and their replacement with something new – an idea 
that had not been tried before. These ideas were seen as heretical by many of the political and 
administrative elites; they vigorously opposed them and this opposition is well documented. 
In fact the impression from much of the literature was that Irish public life was an ‘ideas free’ 
zone. And yet the more one interrogates the literature the more obvious it becomes that new 
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ideas did gain credence and were accepted and implemented.  They worked their way into the 
public consciousness and seemed to offer a solution for the problems of the day. In time the 
heretical became orthodox. From a review of the literature it appeared that no study had been 
completed on the role of ideas in transforming the Irish state – the provenance of those ideas, 
their promulgation, dissemination, acceptance and implementation.   
 
A whole range of questions arose: from where did the new ideas, implemented by the political 
and administrative elites, come? What inspired those elites? What were their influences? How 
did they set about ensuring acceptance of the new ideas? What obstacles did they encounter 
and how did they overcome them? How did they implement those new ideas? Were there 
unintended consequences? Were there other ideas circulating at the time that could have been 
adopted and, if so, why were they discarded in favour of the ideas that were adopted? Could 
the change that appeared to flow from the adoption of new ideas be measured? How did the 
relevant actors now view their part in the change process? And even if all of these questions 
could be answered would the findings have any relevance for other polities – were they 
generalisable?  
 
The main hypothesis of this thesis is that at both critical junctures the political and 
administrative elites who enabled economic recovery were not just making pragmatic 
decisions: their actions were influenced by ideas. Furthermore, the ideas adopted to resolve 
the crises of 1958/59 and 1986/87 resulted in major institutional change that led ultimately to 
the transformation of the state. To establish what ideas were in circulation at the relevant 
times would necessitate a search of the literature. Perusal of the published works of the main 
ideational actors, and where possible interviews with those authors, would establish how their 
ideas were formed, what their influences were and how they set about implementing those 
ideas.  
 
To test the hypothesis also requires a theoretical framework. As the hypothesis assumed 
institutional change ensued from the implementation of new ideas then institutionalism as a 
theory seemed a good starting point. Institutionalism is concerned with the central role of law 
in governing; structures/institutions not only matter, they govern behaviour; how the political 
system is embedded in its historical development as well as its socio-economic and cultural 
present is important; and whole system analysis is required for an understanding of how states 
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function. Several sub-disciplines of institutionalism have developed, one of which is historical 
institutionalism.  
 
For historical institutionalists history really matters because the present and the future are 
connected to the past by the continuity of a society’s institutions.   At the heart of historical 
institutionalism is the idea that policy choices made when a policy is being initiated or an 
institution formed will have a continuing influence long into the future. Not only that, the path 
chosen may often be sub-optimal due to compromise and political expediency. Once 
governments make their initial institutional formations and policy selections these choices 
will persist and become ‘path dependent’ – the forces of inertia take over. That path 
dependency is broken at critical junctures. At those critical junctures ideas play a major role 
as they offer a set of ready-made solutions. Timing and sequencing are also important – the 
order in which things happen shapes the outcome.  
 
Critics of historical institutionalism point out that its value only lies in postdicting changes in 
the equilibria. A further problem is, that with its emphasis on structure, how to explain human 
agency?   The counter argument of historical institutionalists is that no other theory can 
reliably predict change and that human agency can be explained by their use of a ‘calculus’ or 
a ‘cultural’ approach. Overall, historical institutionalism seemed to offer the most suitable 
framework to test the hypothesis and to offer an understanding of this thesis - The 
Transformation of Ireland, 1958-1993: the role of ideas in punctuating institutional path 
dependency at critical junctures. 
   
The theoretical framework is explored in Chapter 2. It looks briefly at rational choice theory 
and behaviouralism before settling on institutionalism as the most suitable theoretical 
framework. March and Olsen (1984, 1989) brought institutionalism back into fashion in the 
1980s and sparked a new wave of research in the genre. Political scientists such as Skocpol 
(1979, 1985, 1992, 1994, 1995), Thelen, (1992, 1999, 2000), Steinmo (1992), Pierson, (2000, 
2002, 2004), Bulmer and Burch (1998, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2009) have written extensively on 
historical institutionalism, as a sub-set of institutionalism, and this is the framework chosen 
because it concentrates on the relationship between institutions and individual behaviour; the 
asymmetrical nature of power; the path dependency of social causation; socio-economic 
factors and the diffusion of ideas and beliefs. It also offers the possibility of looking at change 
over time. Drawing on the work of the above mentioned political scientists, together with that 
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of Arthur (1989, 1994), North (1990), Campbell (2004), Hall (1986, 1989, 1992, 1996), what 
is meant by ‘institution’ is explored as is ‘path dependency’. Central to an understanding of 
path dependency is the idea that initial choices made at institutional foundation become 
‘locked in’ and difficult to change especially if they exhibit ‘positive feedback’, i.e. each 
action confirms the validity of the previous choice. The institution then becomes ‘path 
dependent’ and difficult to change from that course, even when there is a demonstrably more 
effective and efficient course available. ‘Path dependency’ is only broken at a ‘critical 
juncture’ when change becomes inevitable. At those ‘critical junctures’ ideas matter and offer 
ready solutions to economic and /or political crises. How those ‘ideas’ are transposed from 
‘foreground concepts and theories’ to ‘background underlying assumptions’ that become 
embedded in the ‘public sentiment’ is traced using a Typology of Ideas developed by 
Campbell (2004). Hall (1989) developed a Framework to show that for a new idea to gain 
viablility it has to first achieve economic, administrative and political acceptability. To track 
the process of change following the adoption of a new idea Bulmer and Burch (2001) devised 
a Template that measures change at the systemic, organisational, regulative and procedural 
levels. Campbell’s Typology of Ideas, Hall’s Framework and Bulmer and Burch’s Template 
will be used when looking at both critical junctures. 
 
In examining the first critical juncture 1958/59 Chapter 3 traces the symptoms of failure 
through the use of economic and social data and then looks at the causes of failure. These 
were deemed to be: continuing reliance on a theory of ‘self-sufficiency’, supported by 
protectionist economic policies, long after it had become obvious that it was a failed entity; 
‘the official mind’, epitomised in the gerontocratic political and administrative elites that had 
become path dependent and firmly wedded to structures and budgetary policies put in place 
by the British prior to the handover of power at independence; ‘the Catholic Church’ which 
controlled the education and health systems and the agenda for any change in social policy; 
and ‘the political culture’  which was reflective of a conservative agrarian society that was 
largely happy with de Valera’s ‘frugal comforts’. 
 
To establish what ‘ideas’ were in circulation at the time the three leading journals, 
Administration, Studies and the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland, were 
researched. Tuairim, a quasi think-tank established in University College Dublin in 1954, and 
many of whose members went on to play leading roles in Irish political, administrative, 
judicial and academic life, also offered an influential forum for the dissemination of ideas. 
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The main ideational actors to emerge were Professor Carter, who held the chair of applied 
economics at The Queen’s University of Belfast; Professor Lynch, who held the chair of 
economics at University College Dublin; Professor Ryan, who held the chair of economics at 
Trinity College, University of Dublin; Dr. Garret FitzGerald, who was an economic 
consultant in the 1950s, and subsequently served as Minister for Foreign Affairs and 
Taoiseach; and Dr. T. K. Whitaker, who served as Secretary of the Department of Finance and 
subsequently as Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland. The ‘new ideas’ offered for the 
economic salvation of Ireland were ‘free trade’ and ‘foreign direct investment’. These ‘ideas’ 
received an economic imprimatur from the above named and in so doing conformed to the 
first leg of Hall’s framework. To become viable they would also need administrative and 
political acceptability. 
 
How that acceptability was achieved is traced in Chapter 4. Whitaker, as Secretary of the 
Department of Finance, produced a forensic analysis of the Irish economy. Economic 
Development (1958) proved to be a seminal document. He bluntly stated that ‘self-
sufficiency’ was a failed entity and that the new ‘ideas’ offered the only salvation. How he 
sold those ideas to the administrative and political elites is fully explored. The role of Lemass 
as Taoiseach, and his relationship with Whitaker, was to prove crucial. Interviews were 
conducted with Whitaker and T. O Cofaigh, the only two surviving authors of Economic 
Development.
1
 Dr. Garret FitzGerald, economic commentator in the 1950s and subsequently 
to become Taoiseach, and Dr. Miriam Hederman-O’Brien, who served as Secretary of 
Tuairim, also offered some fascinating insights into what happened at the first critical 
juncture. 
 
The new ‘ideas’ of free trade and foreign direct investment had received acceptability on all 
three axis of Hall’s Framework. Proving that ‘ideas’ mattered, and became background 
underlying assumptions that effected change on all four levels of Bulmer and Burch’s 
framework, is demonstrated in Chapter 5. Lemass and Whitaker effected major institutional 
change through the creation and/or reconstitution of a plethora of state-sponsored bodies and 
the putting in place of a quasi-corporatist framework that linked unions and employers to the 
policy process. A government white paper, based on Economic Development, set out the 
targets to be achieved in the agricultural, fisheries, tourism and industrial areas. Agricultural 
                                                          
1
 The literature on the spelling of Irish names can be ambiguous. Throughout this text the spelling of names is as 
found in correspondence from the individuals concerned, specifically O Cofaigh, O hUiginn and Mac Sharry.                                                                                                                                                                                                                
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produce accounted for the bulk of exports in the 1950s and the main developmental effort was 
to be in this sector. The establishment of An Foras Talūntais (the Agricultural Institute) and 
An Bord Bainne (the Milk Board) proved to be major catalysts for the transformation of the 
agricultural sector. On the industrial front the Commission on Industrial Organisation effected 
similar transformation. Bulmer and Burch’s template is used to prove that transformation took 
place at the systemic, organisational, regulative and procedural levels.  All the targets set out 
in the first real effort at economic planning were achieved through the acceptance and 
implementation of the ideas of free trade and foreign direct investment.  
 
Within a generation Ireland faced a second critical juncture. Chapter 6 traces the symptoms of 
failure and shows that, with the exception of ‘self-sufficiency’ the same causes applied: the 
‘official mind’, the Catholic Church and political culture. It seemed that few, if any, lessons 
had been learned and the institutions of state had again become path dependent. The ideas that 
emerged for economic deliverance were monetarism and neocorporatism, or to give them 
their more acceptable names in an Irish context – a low tax economy and social partnership. 
To establish how these ideas emerged the journals of the day were again researched. The 
work of the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) and the Economic and Social 
Research Institute (ESRI) was highly influential. To establish the influences of the leading 
actors interviews were also conducted with the following: Ray Mac Sharry and Alan Dukes, 
former Ministers for Finance; Bertie Ahern, former Taoiseach; Des O’Malley, former 
Minister for Industry and Commerce and founder of the Progressive Democrats; Padraig O 
hUiginn, former Secretary General of the Department of the Taoiseach; Seán Cromien, former 
Secretary General of the Department of Finance;  Peter Cassells, former General Secretary of 
the Irish Congress of Trade Unions; and John Dunne, former Director General of the Irish 
Business Employers Conference. Interviews were also conducted with a number of other 
serving and retired public servants who wished to remain anonymous but nevertheless 
provided valuable background information. 
 
On his return to power in 1987 Haughey concentrated power in his own hands and in that of 
his department where O hUiginn was Secretary General. How these two men, more than ably 
abetted by Mac Sharry as Minister for Finance and Cromien as Secretary General in that 
department, broke the path dependency of the institutions of state is examined in Chapter 7. 
The National Economic and Social Council, chaired by O hUiginn produced A Strategy for 
Development 1986 – 90 which had been agreed by the social partners. It proposed tax reform 
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in return for industrial peace and wage moderation in the context of addressing the public 
finances. On his first day in office in March 1987, Haughey had lunch with Mac Sharry and O 
hUiginn where the economic strategy was agreed. Mac Sharry was given authority to cut 
public expenditure, a complete volte face for the governing party, and O hUiginn, who said 
that he could deliver the main thrust of the NESC document, was instructed to do so. The end 
result was Mac Sharry, and his Secretary General Cromien, implementing swingeing cuts in 
public expenditure and, against the odds, O hUiginn delivering the first social partnership 
agreement. The ideas of a low tax economy and social partnership had achieved economic, 
political and administrative acceptability.  
 
How the new ideas were actually implemented is traced in Chapter 8. A change of 
government in 1989, when the Progressive Democrats and Fianna Fáil, formed a coalition 
government reinforced the application of monetarism. Incremental tax reform was introduced 
in successive budgets and the social partners largely complied with the terms of the first social 
partnership agreement. Benefits began to flow fairly quickly and a second agreement was 
implemented in 1990. At the Second Critical Juncture state-sponsored bodies were little used 
with one notable exception: the establishment of the International Financial Services Centre 
(IFSC). While enormously successful in both employment and tax revenue generated for the 
state, the regulatory framework put in place facilitated ‘light touch regulation’ which was to 
become a major cause of the present banking crisis. All of the above contributed to a major 
transformation of the state in the years following 1987.  
 
Chapter 9 summarises the changes that took place at both critical junctures, the similarities 
and the differences in the response to the crises, the importance of timing and sequencing and 
concludes that, whereas economic, political and administrative acceptability do indeed lead to 
the viability of a new idea, other factors also come in to play.  
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Chapter 2: Theoretical Framework 
 
Central to this thesis is state transformation and the role of ideas in that transformation.  
Given the variation in size (geographically and population-wise), development and maturity, 
the myriad systems of government that exist, a review of all states would be well beyond the 
scope of this research. Ireland is being taken as an example of a modern state that is a 
relatively mature liberal democracy and a case study will be conducted of the transformation 
that has taken place in that polity. This chapter sets out the theoretical framework to be used 
to assess that transformation. 
The State 
The state has become the ubiquitous form of social organisation and there are now over 200 
states, up from 74 at the end of World War II (Colomer, 2007). Strayer (1970: 3) has no doubt 
about the reason for that ubiquity:  
A man can lead a reasonable full life without a family, a fixed local residence, or a 
religious affiliation, but if he is stateless he is nothing. He has no rights, no security, 
and little hope for a useful career. There is no salvation on earth outside the 
framework of an organized state (1970: 3).  
For Miller: ‘Just as we know a camel or a chair when we see one, so we know a sovereign 
state. It is a political entity which is treated as a sovereign state by other sovereign states’ 
(1981: 16). Nevertheless, what is understood by ‘state’ needs to be examined.  
The formation of the nation state in western Europe has been shaped by three key processes: 
the building of managerial capacity to politically administer a territory through institutions 
staffed by ‘civil’ servants; the use of military power to not just wage war but to extract 
taxation and impose the rule of law within the territory; and economic processes that 
standardise exchange relationships and sustain contract and property relationships (King and 
Kendall, 2004). The Renaissance and the Reformation further ensured an increasing role for a 
centralised state, a decreasing role for the Catholic Church, and the idea of a neutral political 
authority. The peace treaties of Westphalia in 1648 established a new concept of international 
law that recognised sovereign territorial states, with these states recognising no superior 
authority to their own. Furthermore, these states had absolute power within their territory to 
make laws and settle disputes. The concept of sovereignty continues to dominate the 
international order and has two dimensions: ‘internally, it means that there are no authorities 
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higher than the state’ (Gill, 2003: 5); externally it means ‘that other states recognize the 
authority of the state within its borders and accept that the state can speak for its citizens in 
international affairs’ (ibid.). For Hay and Lister the modern state is ‘an institutional complex 
claiming sovereignty for itself as the supreme political authority within a defined territory for 
whose governance it is responsible’ (2006: 4).  
The rise of nationalism and liberalism through the nineteenth century further ensured that the 
concept of the state came to be seen as a distinct form of authority independent of those who 
exercised power within the territory. This concept of the state continues to dominate discourse 
on the subject and was most famously framed by the German sociologist, Max Weber, who 
defined the state by its institutions and modus operandi rather than its functions. He explained 
it as a ‘compulsory political organization with continuous operations will be called a “state” 
insofar as its administrative staff successfully upholds the claim to the monopoly of the 
legitimate use of physical force in the enforcement of its order’ (Weber, 1921/1978: 54). It 
possessed a legal and administrative order subject to change by legislation. ‘This system of 
order claims binding authority, not only over the members of the state, the citizens, ... but also 
to a very large extent over all action taking place in the area of its jurisdiction’ (ibid.: 56). The 
bureaucratic organization at the core of the state is run by an official hierarchy (civil service) 
on formal rules designed to ensure efficiency and social order.  
Concepts and theories of state are critical to how the state is viewed. Whether one pursues a 
pluralist, elitist, Marxist, public choice, institutionalist, feminist, green or poststructuralist 
theory – there is universal acceptance that the concept of the sovereign state is under attack. 
For ‘state-centric’ scholars (realists), the state is still the principal player in world affairs and 
even if there are new challenges, such as globalisation, states’ capacity for responding to these 
challenges has increased dramatically. For ‘retreat’ scholars the power and autonomy of the 
state is in decline vis-à-vis other actors such as transnational corporations and capital markets 
– a view largely associated with liberals. Sørensen   (2004) cogently argues that it does not 
have to be either/or as argued by the ‘state-centric’ and ‘retreat’ scholar but offers the ‘critical 
view’ which emphasizes the coexistence of sovereign states with a global economic system 
based on capitalism. Ireland is an example of a relatively mature liberal democracy - a multi-
party system; free and fair elections on a regular basis with universal suffrage; a written 
constitution; the rule of law; and a clear separation of powers. It coexists within a global 
economic system, and specifically a European Union framework. This thesis contends that it 
is a state in transformation and that transformation can be best understood by utilising 
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Weber’s concept of the state – the state understood through the operation of its institutions 
and its bureaucracy.  
 
For this writer the following quotation from Schmitter neatly summarises the modern state:  
Despite its manifest policy incompetence, its multiple institutional entanglements, its 
burgeoning economic interdependence, its increasingly challenged status, its 
diminished capacity for unitary action, its ineffectual claims to sovereignty and even 
its demonstrable irrelevance in solving many of the problems that preoccupy its 
citizen/subjects, the state malingers on (1996: 211). 
 The state malingers on - in transformation.  
Perspectives on the State 
The theoretical frameworks that can be applied are many and varied but, in the main, can be 
broadly categorised as having three distinctive perspectives: rational choice theory; 
behaviouralism; and the new institutionalism.   
The underlying assumption for proponents of rational choice theory is that individuals are 
rational and apply a cost-benefit analysis to all their choices in life before opting for the one 
that maximises their own utility, with little or no consideration being given as to how 
individual choices impact on others. This theory has been particularly useful in highlighting 
the role of free-riders who, acting rationally, realise that their individual behaviour will not 
have a significant impact on collective action. If all individuals act rationally cooperation will 
be non-existent and outcomes will be both individually and collectively sub-optimal. Rational 
choice theory constructs stylised and mathematical models of political conduct predicated on 
the above assumptions, not only as they apply to individuals, but also to political parties and 
public officials. It is limited in the attention it pays to preference formation, the institutional 
contexts in which rationality is exercised, and has a narrow conception of human behaviour. It 
makes no allowances for altruism and compassionate behaviour. Also, while professing to be 
ostensibly predictive, much of its justification is based on post hoc rationalisation (Hay, 
2002). 
Behaviouralism as a concept and theory emerged in the 1950s. By the late 1960s it had 
become the dominant theory and submerged the old institutionalism. It had also 
overshadowed ‘systems theory’ as promulgated by Easton (1971, but first published in 1953). 
‘Methodological individualism’ replaced ‘methodoligical holism’ as favoured by Marxian 
scholars ‘while the old institutionalism was dismissed as mere description’ (Schmidt, 2006: 
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100). Whilst also claiming to be a predictive science of the political, behaviouralism bases its 
approach on extrapolation and generalisation from observed empirical regularities and 
recurring cycles. Theoretical hypotheses may be used for probabilistic predictions based on 
the assumption that regularities in the data are generalisable beyond the immediate context 
and time parameters. Furthermore, political power is synonymous with decision-making and 
political outcomes can be predicted from political inputs. This causation and correlation is 
problematic as the link is not always readily explainable. Also, in times of rapid social, 
cultural and political change relying on inductive inference for patterns of regularity has to be 
questionable. 
New institutionalism rejects the assumptions of rational choice theory as being too narrowly 
focussed and challenges the assumed regularity of behaviouralism as also being unsuitable, 
particularly in a time of rapid change. In their place new institutionalists ‘propose more 
complex and plausible assumptions which seek to capture and reflect the complexity and 
open-endedness of processes of social and political change’ (Hay, 2002: 11). The emphasis is 
on the mediating role of institutional contexts and emphasises the importance of history, 
timing and sequence in explaining political outcomes. Institutions are embedded in society, 
difficult to reform, restrain political actors and lead to periods of relative tranquillity that are 
punctuated by periods of change. ‘Punctuated equilibria’, the ‘path-dependent’ nature of 
institutions, the periodic ‘critical junctures’ that presage change, are all central to the new 
institutionalism. 
 
New Institutionalism 
Before looking in depth at ‘new’ institutionalism it is necessary to consider briefly its origins 
in the ‘old’ institutionalism. From the earliest times scholars have been concerned with the 
role and nature of the institutions that governed society and how they could influence the 
behaviour of the governing and the governed. Aristotle, in The Politics, wrote on the success, 
or otherwise, of the institutions then extant, and made recommendations on the design of new 
institutions. Those recommendations mark the birth of political science. Hobbes, in 
Leviathan, argued for strong institutions to protect people from their own worst instincts. 
Locke, in Two Treatises of Government, had a more contractarian idea of governing 
institutions that were more democratically accountable. Montesquieu, in The Spirit of the 
Laws, promulgated the need for balance in political structures and his writings influenced the 
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founding fathers of the United States of America and the separation of powers that became a 
cornerstone of the American political system.  
 
By the late nineteenth century political science was emerging as an academic discipline in its 
own right and not just as an adjunct of the study of history. Woodrow Wilson was president of 
the American Political Science Association in the 1880s, president of Princeton University 
1902-1910, and later president of the United States.
1
 He is seen by many as the father of 
institutionalism in political science and wrote extensively on the formal institutions of 
government and defined the state in terms of its political, administrative and legal 
arrangements. The ‘old’ institutionalism can be summarised as being underpinned by the 
following criteria: legalism – the central role of law in governing; structuralism – structures 
not only mattered, they determined behaviour; holism – the use of comparative studies led to 
whole system analysis; historicism – how the political system was embedded in its historical 
development as well as its socio-economic and cultural present; and normative analysis – 
mainly concerned with norms and values and making government better (Peters, 2001: 3-11). 
 
Post World War II ‘systemic approaches to political science had largely superseded the old 
institutionalism, whether structural-functionalist or other ‘holistic’ approaches such as 
Marxian analysis’ (Schmidt, 2006: 100). Behaviouralism emerged with its emphasis on 
individuals. Political behaviour could be reduced to its social or psychological attributes 
(Dahl, 1961). With the emergence of rational choice theory political behaviour could be 
understood through economic motivations and considerations. Political actors, individuals and 
groups, were assumed to be rational utility maximisers (Parsons, 2005). For proponents of 
behaviouralism and rational choice theory institutions are of lesser significance. 
 
The term ‘New Institutionalism’ was first coined by March and Olsen in their seminal article 
‘The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life’ published in 1984. They 
were concerned that the then contemporary theories tended  
... to portray politics as a reflection of society, political phenomena as the aggregate of 
consequences of individual behaviour, action as the result of choices based on 
calculated self interest ... decision-making and the allocation of resources as the 
central foci of political life (1984: 734).  
 
                                                          
1
 Originally founded as the College of New Jersey in 1746 the college changed its name to Princeton University 
in 1896. 
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More importantly for them was the fact that the state had lost its centrality. The state had been 
sidelined. Their criticism of the behaviouralist and rational choice schools was based on the 
following phenomena they perceived as dominating those models: 
 Contextualism – politics was subordinate to exogenous forces. The causal links 
between society and the polity run from the former to the latter. Society effects politics 
but the reverse does not apply. 
 Reductionism – political actions are best understood as the aggregate consequences of 
individual behaviour. There are macro consequences of micro behaviour.  
 Utilitarianism – political events are the consequence of calculated decisions. 
 Functionalism – institutions and behaviour are thought to evolve through an efficient 
historical process that is conditional on current conditions and therefore independent 
of the historical path. 
 Instrumentalism - primacy is given to outcomes and the decision-making process, 
once seen as vital for fostering a sense of purpose, direction and identity, was now 
seen as part of a manipulative process to control outcomes. 
As an antidote to the above they proposed a ‘new’ institutionalism that brought the state back 
centre-stage in political analysis and that collective action was central to understanding the 
political. They also argued that the correlation between the collective and the socio-economic 
environment is reciprocal – politics shapes society as much as society shapes politics.  
Skocpol has been one of the leading voices in the arguments for bringing the state back 
centre-stage. In Bringing the State Back In, she offered two alternative, but complementary, 
analytical strategies for studying the state: ‘On the one hand states may be viewed as 
organizations through which official collectivities may pursue distinctive goals’ that are 
realisable; or alternatively states may ‘be viewed more macroscopically as configurations of 
organization and action that influence the meanings and methods of politics for all groups and 
classes in society’ (1985: 28). She further argued that a natural corollary of the above will be 
a requirement to ‘respect the inherent historicity of socio-political structures’ and the 
‘inescapable intertwinings of national-level developments with changing world historical 
contexts’ (ibid.). In conclusion she argued: 
We do not need a new or refurbished grand theory of “The State.” Rather, we need 
solidly grounded and analytically sharp understandings of the causal regularities that 
underlie the histories of states, social structures, and transnational relations in the 
modern world (ibid.). 
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Within ‘new institutionalism’, scholars offer a variety of sub-disciplines. Thelen (1999) offers 
the following: rational choice institutionalism, which is characterized by ‘a search for 
generalizable features of political behavior rooted in the incentive structures that individuals 
face’ (1999; 370); historical institutionalism, which emphasises ‘how institutions emerge 
from and are embedded in concrete temporal processes’ (1999: 369); sociological 
institutionalism, that specifically incorporates ‘considerations of power and/or legitimacy in 
explaining how institutions emerge and are reproduced’ (1999: 371).  
 
Peters (2001) offers the following variations: normative institutionalism, emphasises the 
norms of institutions as a means of understanding how they function and determine or shape 
individual behaviour; empirical institutionalism, which is close to the old institutionalism, and 
argues that the structure of government makes a difference to the way in which policies are 
formulated and implemented and the choices that governments select. He also adds these 
variations: international institutionalism, refers to the theoretical place assigned to structures 
in understanding the actions of states and assumes the existence of structured interactions in 
international relations, similar to what would be expected with state-level institutions; and 
societal institutionalism, attempts to describe the structuring of relations between society and 
the state, be it in a pluralist model as witnessed in the United States, or the corporatist model 
experienced in Europe. 
 
Schmidt (2006) adds discursive institutionalism which is primarily concerned with ideas and 
how they are communicated through discourse. This branch of institutionalism has also been 
called ideational institutionalism, constructivism institutionalism and economic 
constructivism.   
 
From the above it can be seen that there is a plethora of sub-disciplines in new 
institutionalism. Nevertheless, all branches of institutionalism have more points of tangency 
than divergence. Central to all is the importance of institutions. All of the above cited authors 
in their different ways are saying that politics shapes society as much as society shapes 
politics and that ‘shaping’ is effected through the institutions of state - the state understood 
through the operation of its institutions and its bureaucracy as articulated by Weber.  
 
Because this thesis is examining transformation over time historical institutionalism, with its 
emphasis on the temporal, seems the most appropriate framework.  
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Historical Institutionalism  
Pierson and Skocpol (2002), in their Harvard University essay, ‘Historical Institutionalism in 
Comparative Political Science,’ offer the following cogent explanation and justification for 
the discipline: 
Historical institutionalists address big, substantive questions that are inherently of 
interest to broad publics as well as to fellow scholars. To develop explanatory 
arguments about important outcomes or puzzles, historical institutionalists take time 
seriously, specifying sequences and tracing transformations and processes of varying 
scale and temporality. Historical institutionalists likewise analyze macro contexts and 
hypothesize about the combined effects of institutions and processes rather than 
examining just one institution or process at a time. (Italics in original) 
  
As a concept, historical institutionalism began to emerge in the early 1980s. (There is some 
debate as to its exact provenance but all scholars point to the early work of Skocpol). It 
developed as a counter-weight to various group and structural- functional theories of politics. 
Also, in contrast to the behaviouralist and rational choice schools, it attempted to bring the 
state back centre-stage. Building on the ‘institutionalist’ origins of political science it saw the 
institutional organisation as the principal factor governing collective action and outcomes and 
looked ‘more closely at the state, seen no longer as a neutral broker among competing 
interests, but as a complex of institutions capable of structuring the character and outcomes of 
group conflict’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 938).  
 
For Thelen and Steinmo, historical institutionalism is an attempt to understand how political 
struggles are mediated by the institutional settings in which they are located and those same 
institutions 
…constrain and refract politics but they are never the sole “cause” of outcomes. 
Institutional analyses do not deny the broad political forces that animate various 
theories of politics: class structure in Marxism, group dynamics in pluralism. Instead, 
they point to the ways in which institutions structure these battles and in so doing, 
influence their outcomes (1992: 3) 
 
  
Peters refers to ‘the deceptively simple idea’ at the heart of historical institutionalism, that 
‘policy choices made when an institution is being formed, or when a policy is initiated, will 
have a continuing and largely determinate influence over the policy far into the future’ (2001: 
63). Once governments make their initial institutional formations and policy selections these 
choices will persist and become ‘path dependent’ – the forces of inertia take over. (This will 
be developed further at a later stage).  
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Hall and Taylor (1996) summarise four distinct features of historical institutionalism: 
Firstly, there is the relationship between institutions and individual behaviour. There are three 
seminal questions: how do actors behave, what do institutions actually do and why do they 
persist over time? How one answers these questions is dependent on one’s perspective. For 
those who take a ‘calculus approach’ the emphasis will be on human behaviour that is 
instrumental and based on strategic calculation – utility maximisers. They also view 
institutions as providing a degree of certainty as to how others will behave as their actions are 
constrained by the enforcement mechanisms and penalties imposed by institutions. These 
institutions persist because of a type of Nash equilibrium whereby individuals persist with 
patterns of behaviour because the cost of deviation outweighs the cost of adherence. For those 
who take a ‘cultural approach’ individual behaviour is bounded by experience and actors 
revert to established routines and patterns of behaviour to achieve their goals – individuals as 
satisfisers. The individual is embedded within the world of institutions, which not only 
provide useful information, but also affect the identities and preferences of actors. Institutions 
are collective constructions that cannot be readily transformed by individual action and 
furthermore these very institutions are not only enduring but resistant to reform and redesign 
because they structure and constrain the debate about reforms. Historical institutionalists use 
both the calculus and cultural approaches to specify the relationship and interaction between 
the individual, institution and action. 
 
Secondly, there is the role and asymmetrical nature of power in the relationship between 
actors and institutions. Historical institutionalists are particularly interested in the uneven 
distribution of power across social groups and assume that institutions give some groups 
disproportionate access to the decision-making process. 
 
Thirdly, social causation is path dependent. Institutional formation at the birth of a state 
propels the state down certain pathways that have unintended consequences and inbuilt 
inefficiencies. Existing state capacities and policy legacies affect subsequent policy choices. 
Timing and sequencing are also important. Over time the flow of historical events is 
interrupted by ‘critical equilibria’ or ‘critical junctures’ when substantial institutional change 
takes place and historical development moves on to a new path. The major challenge for 
historical institutionalists, and for this research, is to understand and explain what precipitates 
critical junctures. 
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Fourthly, while the major consideration for historical institutionalism is institutions there is 
also a role for socioeconomic factors and the diffusion of ideas and beliefs which may be 
particularly discerned when new developmental pathways are chosen. Ideas also play a crucial 
role in shaping policy and changing institutions over time and this particular facet of historical 
institutionalism is critical. The main hypothesis of this thesis is that at critical junctures major 
change occurs and that that change is predicated on the implementation of new ‘ideas’ that 
rupture institutional path dependency and propel the state down new developmental pathways. 
How those ‘ideas’ are formulated, gain credence and acceptance, and are eventually 
implemented as a solution to the perceived crisis is central to this thesis.  
 
As in all the social sciences definitions can be problematic, and often ambiguous. In this 
respect historical institutionalism is no different. The only non-contentious part is what is 
understood by ‘history’ in this context. For historical institutionalists history really matters 
‘not just because we can learn from the past, but because the present and the future are 
connected to the past by the continuity of a society’s institutions’ (North, 1990: vii). Some of 
the other terms used in the discipline require explanation and elaboration. What is an 
institution, what is meant by path dependency, what are critical junctures and punctuated 
equilibria, does timing and sequence matter, do ideas matter? 
 
Institutions 
North (1990: 3) offers the following definition: ‘Institutions are the rules of the game in a 
society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’ 
and can be both formal and informal. They reduce uncertainty by establishing a stable, 
predictable (but not necessarily efficient) structure for human interactions. Institutions are 
continuously evolving and changing and even though the formal rules may change overnight, 
as a consequence of political or legal change, the ‘informal constraints embodied in customs, 
traditions and codes of conduct are much more impervious to deliberate policies. These 
cultural constraints not only connect the past with the present and the future, but provide us 
with a key to explaining the path of historical change’ (1990: 6). North further distinguishes 
between institutions and organizations which include political, economic, social and 
educational bodies. Both are interdependent. How and why organizations come into existence 
is dependent on the institutional framework and they in turn influence the institutional 
framework which may have to adapt to facilitate and/or constrain organizations. 
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Hall and Taylor offer their understanding of institutions as 
 
... the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in 
the organizational structure of the polity or the political economy. They can range 
from the rules of a constitutional order or the standard operating procedures of a 
bureaucracy to the conventions governing trade union behaviour or bank-firm 
relations. In general, historical institutionalists associate institutions with organizations 
and the rules or conventions promulgated by formal organization (1996: 938).   
 
They further make the point that institutions should be seen ‘as culturally specific practices, 
akin to the myths and ceremonies designed by many societies’ which are in turn assimilated 
into institutions ‘not necessarily to enhance their formal means-end efficiency, but as a result 
of the kind of processes associated with the transmission of cultural practices’ (1996: 947).  
 
March and Olsen see the institutions of politics as primarily administrative institutions that 
provide order and influence change. ‘Bureaucratic agencies, legislative committees, and 
appellate courts are arenas for contending social forces, but they are also collections of 
standard operating procedures and structures that define and defend values, norms, interests, 
identities and beliefs’ (1989: 17). These institutions have a repertoire of responses and 
procedures which are embedded within a set of rules which have implications for politics. The 
rules, which may be formal or informal, reflect the historical experience of the institution and 
actions are tailored to comply with a concept of identity (‘a logic of appropriateness’) which 
overrides any calculus of costs and benefits. Even though rules bring order and predictability 
they can also bring ambiguity, contradiction and conflict and the network of rules and rule-
bound relations are sustained by a confidence and trust that appropriate behaviour can be 
expected most of the time. Individual personality and the will of political actors is subservient 
to the historical traditions of the institution and learning from history-dependent routines and 
norms is more important than expectations of the future.  
 
This ‘learning from history-dependent routines’ is central to this thesis as it demonstrates the 
path dependency of institutions which, in turn, acts as a major constraint on the 
implementation of new ideas. But institutional design can also act as a blocking mechanism. 
Pierson (2004) posits that specific institutions invariably have a wider impact than intended 
(‘multiple effects’) and lead to unanticipated consequences. Skocpol takes a more 
organizational realist approach to institutions ‘viewing them as actual patterns of 
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communication and activity, rather than seeing them primarily as values, norms, ideas, or 
official rules’ (1995: 105). She is primarily interested in studying processes and outcomes 
and, somewhat surprisingly, sees these as almost accidental outcomes (‘without intentional 
foresight and control’) of the actions of actors whose capacities are institutionally constrained. 
There may well be unintended consequences (‘accidental outcomes’) but, even allowing for 
institutional constraints, in the opinion of the writer, outcomes invariably reflect the views of 
the main actors.  
  
Pierson (2004) is also concerned about institutional design. Designers, motivated by what 
they deem appropriate than by what would be effective, may have short-term political 
horizons that have long-term institutional consequences. Also, slow moving social processes 
may alter the functioning of institutions and over time it may be found that ‘previously 
desirable institutional effects are now problematic’ and gaps may emerge ‘because the actors 
who inherit institutional arrangements are not the same as those who designed them’ (2004: 
120). Within the majority of institutions there is also resilience and inbuilt obstacles to 
revision. Pierson describes these as ‘coordination problems’, which actors solve by 
converging on a sub-optimal focal point, and ‘veto points’ which coalesce around nested rules 
and cultural norms.
2
  
 
Historically, political science portrayed decision making in institutions as being primarily 
concerned with a sense of purpose, identity and belonging. The modern perspective gives 
primacy to outcomes (instrumentalism) and ignores symbolism or sees it as part of a process 
that attempts to manipulate outcomes. 
 
Administrators solicit public participation in decision making in order to secure public 
support for policies to which they are already committed… Information is gathered, 
policy alternatives are defined, and cost benefit analyses are pursued, but they seem 
more intended to reassure observers of the appropriateness of actions being taken than 
to influence the actions (March and Olsen, 1989: 7).  
 
In reality these are purely symbolic actions, strategic moves, or instruments by which the 
administrative and political elites exploit/manipulate the general public. 
 
                                                          
2
 Bulmer and Burch (2005) also refer to these institutional veto points and to their obverse – institutional 
opportunity structures.  
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Scott (2001: 48) offers the following omnibus conception of institutions which encapsulates 
all of the above to varying degrees: 
 
 Institutions are social structures that have attained a high degree of resilience; 
 Institutions are composed of cultured-cognitive, normative, and regulative elements 
that, together with associated activities and resources, provide stability and meaning to 
social life; 
 Institutions are transmitted by various types of carriers, including symbolic systems, 
relational systems, routines, and artifacts; 
 Institutions operate at multiple levels of jurisdiction, from the world system to 
localized interpersonal relationships; 
 Institutions by definition connote stability but are subject to change processes, both 
incremental and discontinuous. 
 
Institutionalists ‘typically analyze how sets of organizations and institutions relate to each 
other and, in turn, shape the processes or outcomes of interest’ and ‘generally expect to see 
powerful effects stemming from interactions among institutions, or between institutions and 
organizations’ (Pierson and  Skocpol: 12). Furthermore, Thelen makes the rather critical point 
that  ‘rather than conceiving of institutions as holding together a particular pattern of politics, 
historical institutionalists are more likely to reverse the causal arrows and argue that 
institutions emerge from and are sustained by features of the broader political and social 
context’ (1999: 384). . Thelen and Steinmo also remind us that: 
Institutions are an independent variable and explain political outcomes in periods of 
stability, but when they break down, they become the dependent variable, whose shape 
is determined by the political conflicts that such institutional breakdown unleashes 
(1992:15). 
 
In assessing transformation in Ireland this thesis views the institutions of politics as primarily 
administrative institutions that provide order and influence change – as per March and Olsen, 
and Weber. But it also recognises that organisations are also institutions with a high degree of 
resilience and that they are culturally bounded and likely to be highly path dependent.   
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Path Dependency 
 
And one should bear in mind that there is nothing more difficult to 
execute, nor more dubious of success, nor more dangerous to 
administer than to introduce a new order of things; for he who 
introduces it has all those who prosper from the old order as his 
enemies. And he has only lukewarm allies in those who might profit 
from the new. 
                                                                        Machiavelli (1532/1998: 21) 
 
Central to path dependency is the idea that initial choices not only influence, but often dictate, 
further actions. A useful analogy from the world of mathematics is the ‘Polya Urn’ process. 
Imagine an urn in which there are two balls, one black, one red. Placing one’s hand in the urn 
randomly remove one ball and then return it to the urn with an additional ball of the same 
colour and keep repeating the process until the urn is full. We have no idea as to what the 
eventual distribution of balls will be and if we run the trial a hundred times we would 
probably get a hundred different results. In any individual trial the ratio will eventually reach 
equilibrium. Sequencing is critical. The early draws in each trial will have a considerable 
random element but a powerful effect on the final distribution. Likewise with institutions, the 
decision rules link future outcomes to the outcomes of preceding selections and consequently 
exhibit ‘positive feedback’ (or self reinforcement). Each step along the path increases the 
attraction of that path for the next round. 
 
From the world of technology we get the QWERTY keyboard effect. The configuration of a 
typewriter keyboard became standard even though other configurations would now be more 
efficient, especially in an electronic age that does not have to rely on highly mechanical 
devices to effect an action. Arthur argues that ‘when two or more increasing-return 
technologies “compete” then, for a “market” of potential adopters, insignificant events may 
by chance give one of them an initial advantage in adoptions’ (1989: 116). This technology 
may then improve more than the others and appeal to a wider array of potential adopters, 
leading to wider adoption and further development and improvement.  These technologies, for 
no particular reason, can achieve an initial dominance, lock out alternative technologies, and 
maintain that dominance even if in the long run the alternative may have been more efficient 
(think Apple and Windows, Betamax and VHS).  
 
The world of economics offers the concept of ‘increasing return’. The idea is that each 
increment added to a process yields larger, rather than smaller returns. (This is in contrast to 
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‘decreasing returns’ where economic actions generate decreasing returns). Arthur (1989, 
1994) argues that in the development of a new technology an early edge may generate 
positive feedback that locks in this technology even if it not the most efficient in the long run. 
Also, large set-up or fixed costs lead to long production runs that enable those costs to be 
spread over more output thereby reducing unit costs. Those costs become a barrier to entry. 
The knowledge gained from the operation of complex systems leads to higher returns from 
continuing use and increased familiarity leads to more efficiency (Porter, 1980). Also, the 
experience gained leads to further innovation in related activities (learning effects). There are 
increased benefits as others adopt the technology (coordination effects). The effect will be 
more pronounced when the technology is linked to other infrastructure (e.g. cars with road 
infrastructure and fuel distribution). Finally, choosing options that fail to win broad support 
will have major drawbacks down the road. People will want to back the winning horse and 
will adapt their actions accordingly (adaptive expectations). 
   
Historical institutionalists believe the same principle applies to the political process. Thelen 
argues that politics involves some elements of chance (agency, choice), ‘but once a path is 
taken, then it can become “locked in,” as all the relevant actors adjust their strategies to 
accommodate the prevailing pattern’ (1999: 385). Likewise, Pierson argues that timing and 
sequence matter and starting from similar conditions a range of different social outcomes is 
not only possible but likely: ‘large consequences may result from relatively “small” or 
contingent events; particular courses of action, once introduced may be virtually impossible to 
reverse’ (2004: 18). Institutional actions become self-reinforcing and these positive feedback 
processes have unique and intriguing characteristics (Arthur, 1994). Chief among these is 
unpredictability – early actions (which may be random) have large effects and many outcomes 
are possible. It is not possible to predict the end-state. There is also inbuilt inflexiblity and the 
more advanced the process the more difficult to change to another path, particularly if the 
process had absorbed large set-up costs. An emerging stability becomes apparent. Accidental 
events early in the process do not even out, are not forgotten, and feed into future choices 
(Arthur refers to it as nonergodicity). Finally, there is potential path inefficiency as the pay-
offs generated may be lower than a foregone alternative and, consequently, inefficient. 
 
Even at an intuitive level understanding the idea of positive feedback in path dependence has 
two key elements: the cost of switching from one of course of action to another (at an 
institutional level) will increase over time; not just what happens but when and in what 
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sequence really matters. Pierson (2004), in making the case for path dependence and positive 
feedback, draws a useful analogy with the world of cooking: A cook will prepare the 
ingredients and will also carefully measure each. The good cook will know that the timing 
and sequencing of how the ingredients are added to the mix is crucial to the finished product. 
Moving the argument back to political analysis he posits that the discipline has over-
concentrated on the ‘variables’, which just give a snapshot in time and that there is a strong 
case for moving pictures – situating events and moments in a temporal sequence over 
extended periods of time can greatly enhance our understanding of social and political events. 
He also cautions of the necessity to look at the long- term process: ‘Slow-moving processes 
may be cumulative, involve threshold effects, or require the unfolding of extended causal 
chains’ (2004: 82). He elaborates on these: 
 Cumulative Causes – he refers to ‘incremental’ or ‘cumulative’ variables and how 
social and political conditions may change dramatically over time but at a very slow 
pace. 
 Threshold Effects – processes may have a modest or negligible impact until they reach 
critical levels which trigger major change (Gladwell’s Tipping Point).  
 Causal Chains – may not run on a straight trajectory. If x initiates the sequence a,b,c 
which yields y, any temporal or other changes in a,b,c may lead to a substantial lag 
between x and y. 
 Slow-moving outcomes – have long time horizons, e.g. a change in birth rates will only 
impact on the population over a long period of time. 
 
Even though politics differs from economics in many ways there are certain aspects of the 
political world that are conducive to the study of path dependence and positive feedback. A 
fundamental of political life is the provision of public goods such as defense, environmental 
protection, education etc. The distinguishing factors of these goods are jointness of supply – 
provision costs may not be greatly affected by the numbers who will use the good; 
nonexclusability – use cannot be readily restricted and cannot easily exclude free riders.  
 
There is a collective nature to politics and the consequences of individual action are not only 
highly dependent on the actions of others but individual benefits are constrained by the 
‘collective action’ of others. In the ‘collective’ sphere there is an absence of a linear 
relationship between effort and effect and we see this particularly in interest group activity. 
Furthermore, as collective decisions will have the coercive force of law, the law itself 
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becomes a public good and institutional restraints become ubiquitous. Politics involves 
struggles to establish who sets the agenda (makes the laws) and this will have an enormous 
influence on who exercises power. Power is asymmetrical and often hidden from view and, 
perversely, where it is most unequal it does not have to be used openly. Institutions have in-
built self- reinforcing mechanisms that are difficult to reverse.  In all of the above there is 
virtually an inbuilt path dependency and positive feedback mechanism. 
 
(The quote from Machiavelli at the beginning of this section illustrates that resistance to 
change (and the breaking of path dependency) is not a new phenomenon. In reading the 
biographies of many political leaders (Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, Churchill, de Gaulle, 
Thatcher, Major, Blair, de Valera, Lemass, Lynch, Haughey, Reynolds, Ahern) they all 
complain of how difficult it is to make change happen. Even the biographies of despotic 
leaders such as Hitler, Lenin and Stalin describe resistance to change but they were more 
ruthless in overcoming that resistance.  
 
In economic theory path dependency is not deemed critical because the market quickly 
provides exit mechanisms. A new, more efficient organisation will enter the market and 
ensure the demise of non-competitive, sub-optimal organisations. Alternatively, organisations 
learn from their own and others’ mistakes and correct them over time. The world of politics 
does not offer such mechanisms and reversing course may be much more difficult. In all 
probability there will not be a competitor to learn from. Indeed the rules of the game may 
preclude competition and even if learning does occur reform is particularly difficult in 
systems that exhibit positive feedback. Allied to this is the fact that the further down a path 
one has travelled the greater the costs of switching to a foregone alternative (North, 1990: 94-
95). Add in to the mix the short time horizons of many political actors (the timing of the next 
election being especially significant) a strong status quo bias exists among those who make 
the rules and ensures that path dependent effects are particularly intense in politics.  
 
If the arguments presented above in relation to path dependency are valid does this mean that 
institutional change is non-existent or, at best, incremental? For historical institutionalists the 
answer is no. Every so often some seismic events will occur that radically change the political 
landscape and the trajectory of institutions. Also, over time, incremental change can predicate 
substantial institutional change. Be that change seismic or incremental historical 
institutionalists refer to those moments of change as ‘critical junctures’. The proposition that 
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institutional path dependency is ruptured at critical junctures is central to this thesis and, 
furthermore, the power of ideas is central to that rupturing.  
 
Critical Junctures and Punctuated Equilibria 
 
I shall be telling this with a sigh 
Somewhere ages and ages hence: 
Two roads diverged in a wood and I – 
I took the one less travelled by, 
And that has made all the difference. 
                                        ‘The Road Less Travelled’ (Frost, 1949) 
  
Malcolm Gladwell in The Tipping Point, using the analogy of the spread of disease, refers to 
that ‘one dramatic moment in an epidemic when everything can change all at once as the 
Tipping Point’ (2005: 9) and extrapolates that social change follows a similar path. Ideas and 
trends become contagious, social dynamics cause rapid change, cross a line and spread like 
wildfire.  Kuhn, in his seminal The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, makes a similar point. 
He argues that scientists, even when they begin to lose faith in an existing theory and begin to 
seek alternatives, will not renounce the theory that has led them into crisis. ‘The decision to 
reject one paradigm is always simultaneously the decision to accept another’ (1970: 77). With 
the emergence of this new theory a paradigm shift occurs and the new theory revolutionises 
thinking. He draws a very useful analogy with the world of politics: 
Political revolutions are inaugurated by a growing sense, often restricted to a segment 
of the political community, that existing institutions have ceased adequately to meet 
the problems posed by an environment that they have in part created. [It is] much the 
same way [with] scientific revolution...... In both political and scientific development 
the sense of malfunction that can lead to a crisis is prerequisite to revolution (1970: 
92) 
 
The adoption and implementation of the new theory, rather than just building on existing 
theory, can be truly revolutionary and changes the scientist’s world view.   
 
For historical institutionalists it is ‘critical junctures’ – those moments when change becomes 
inevitable – periods of profound change that produce significant legacies. But it is not just 
periods of profound change. Sometimes, seemingly insignificant institutional change can lead 
to profound societal change. Pierson puts it as follows: 
Although analyses invoking the language of “critical junctures” sometimes focus on 
large-scale events, those qualities are neither necessary nor sufficient to generate path-
dependent dynamics. In fact, the point in path-dependent analyses is that “causes” may 
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often seem relatively small compared with their effects. What makes a particular 
juncture “critical” is that it triggers a process of positive feedback (2004: 51).    
  
The term ‘critical juncture’ is primarily attributed to Collier and Collier and their 1991 work 
Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labour Movement, and Regime 
Dynamics in Latin America in which they argue that governments exhibit large inertia to 
change and change can only occur when there is a conjuncture of a variety of political actors 
that individually do not have the capacity to generate significant change but that acting 
collectively make change inevitable. Bulmer and Burch (2001:81) make a subtle but 
important distinction between critical junctures and critical moments.  
A ‘critical moment’ is when an opportunity arises for significant change. Such 
opportunities may not be realised and exploited but, if they are, the outcome is a 
‘critical juncture’ at which there is a clear departure from previously established 
patterns. Critical junctures create branching points at which institutional development 
moves on to a new trajectory or pathway which is then followed incrementally until a 
new critical moment arises and (potentially) a new critical juncture follows and a new 
direction is taken. 
 
  
Krasner (1984) explains institutional change through the concept of ‘punctuated equilibria’. 
Implicit in this is the idea that institutions exist in a state of equilibrium and function in 
accordance with norms established at initiation or at a previous point of punctuation. New 
structures originate at times of crisis, establish a life of their own, and ‘once a path is taken it 
canalizes future developments’ (1984: 240). This conceptualization has been referred to as the 
branching tree model of sequential development.
3
 Krasner cites the work of Stephen Jay 
Gould who was critical of Charles Darwin’s synthesis of evolution as a continuous process in 
which species adapt to their environment. Gould (2002) saw change taking place rapidly in 
geographically isolated groups which then displace their populations of origin and he poses 
the following question: is the world primarily in constant change and is structure a mere 
incarnation of the moment, or is structure primary and restrictive, and is change a 
phenomenon that becomes inevitable when a stable structure is stressed beyond its capacity to 
resist and absorb?  
 
For Krasner ‘Punctuated equilibrium is an apt description of an analytic stance that sees 
political institutions enduring over long periods once they are established’ (1984: 243). 
However, stasis is punctuated by crises emanating from the outside environment that can lead 
                                                          
3
 The branching tree model has been used, inter alia, by Lipset and Rokkan (1967) in Party Systems and Voter 
Alignment and by Daniel Dennett  (1995) in Darwin’s Dangerous Idea. 
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to the breakdown of the old institutions and precipitate intense political conflict over new 
institutional arrangements and configurations. As Thelen and Steinmo put it: ‘At the moment 
of institutional breakdown the logic of the argument is reversed from ‘Institutions shape 
politics’ to ‘Politics shape institutions’’ (1992: 15). 
 
Whether policies are influenced by earlier policy choices, and the institutional nature of those 
choices, or by the normal incremental nature of the policy-making process has led to much 
debate in the discipline. Burch, Hogwood and Bulmer (2003) cogently argue that this 
‘incremental change’, through interaction and accumulation, can have transformative effects 
on institutions and states comparable to seismic events. 
 
This thesis holds that the branching tree model as described by Krasner, Gould et al (or 
Gladwell’s tipping point and Kuhn’s paragigm shift) offers the most apt description. 
Institutions reach a branching point when change is inevitable, they then travel down that 
trajectory until the next crisis which, in turn, creates a new branching point and the process is 
repeated. History shows that every polity at some stage reaches a critical juncture where 
change becomes inevitable. Roosevelt’s New Deal in America in the 1930s, the birth of the 
welfare state in Britain in the late 1940s, these are just two examples of radical transformation 
at critical junctures. 
 
 
The Role of Ideas  
 
Critical for historical institutionalists is the role of ideas in precipitating change and defining 
institutions. Peters (2001: 66) posits that ‘ideas tend to provide a set of ready solutions for 
policy problems that arise within their domain’. Conversely ‘institutional change to some 
extent becomes a question of how to change ideas’ (2001: 70). Hall (1989: 367) puts it as 
follows: 
 
When an evocative set of ideas are introduced into the political arena they do not 
simply rest on top of the other factors already there. Rather they can alter the 
composition of other elements in the political sphere, like a catalyst or binding agent 
that allows existing ingredients to combine in new ways 
 
 
Historical institutionalists are primarily concerned with how ideas affect institutions and 
public policy. North (1990) acknowledges that institutional change has to be understood in the 
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context of political actors trying to interpret their world through the ideas (ideologies), norms 
and values which helped them to identify their interests in the first place.     
 
Campbell (2004: 92) poses the following questions: What do we mean by ‘ideas’? Who are 
the actors and what are their ideational roles? How do ideas affect institution change – the 
causal mechanisms? What conditions most likely ensure their adoption? What is the most 
appropriate methodology for determining if ideas do effect institutional change? He argues 
that ideas can reside in the background where they can be taken-for granted assumptions that 
are culturally and politically acceptable and in the foreground where they are explicitly 
expressed by the decision-making elites and are routinely contested as they challenge the 
status quo. Background ideas, because they are culturally imbued, tend to constrain change. 
Foreground ideas, because they challenge perceived wisdom, tend to facilitate and/or enable 
change. 
 
Tables 2:1 offers a useful summary of the typology of ideas, the actors who may both utilize 
them and be influenced by them, the frames those actors (sometimes) use to strategically 
cloak their agendas in the rhetoric of public sentiment, and their effects on the policy-making 
process. 
Table 2.1: Typology of Ideas 
 Foreground 
Concepts and Theories 
Background 
Underlying Assumptions 
 Programs 
  
Paradigms 
Cognitive 
(Outcome 
Oriented) 
Ideas as elite prescriptions that 
enable politicians, corporate 
leaders, and other decision makers 
to chart a clear and specific course 
of action  
Ideas as elite assumptions that 
constrain the cognitive range of 
useful programs available to 
politicians, corporate leaders, and 
other decisions makers  
 Frames Public Sentiments 
Normative 
(Non-outcome 
Oriented) 
Ideas as symbols and concepts 
that enable decision makers to 
legitimize programs to their 
constituents  
Ideas as public assumptions that 
constrain the normative range of 
legitimate programs available to 
decision makers  
Source: Adapted from Campbell, 2004: 94)  
 
Ideas do not emerge spontaneously or gain purchase without actors. Table 2:2 offers a very 
useful illustration.  
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Table 2.2: Ideational Actors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Source: Campbell, 2004: 101) 
 
To even to begin to make a difference ideas have to gain acceptance among the political and 
bureaucratic elites. These ideas may have their origins in academia or business where 
theorists can often effect an intellectual- paradigm shift. The idea then has to be framed to fit 
within the prevailing cognitive norms while at the same time not straying too far beyond the 
dominant norms and values of public sentiment. Simultaneously, the decision makers and 
framers have to carry their constituents in order to implement a programme and effect 
institutional change. At the centre of the web are the ideational brokers whose role can be 
critical in implementing change. The point also needs to be made that often the difference 
between ideas and interests is not always easily discernible. 
   
Sometimes the affect can be direct and obvious; sometimes it can be indirect and nuanced and 
the adoption of new programs often facilitates and/or forces institutional change. The affect is 
largely influenced by how well the ideas become embedded in institutions and how the 
carriers of ideas access decision makers. Once ideas have been adopted ‘constituencies and 
implementation capacities tend to develop that constrain in path-dependent ways further 
programmatic change’ (Campbell, 2004: 110). Furthermore, paradigms and public 
constituents, as long as they remain stable, can also constrain change in a path-dependent 
Programs 
Decision makers 
(e.g. Politicians & 
Bureaucrats) 
 
Paradigms 
Theorists  
(e.g. Academics 
& Intellectuals) 
 
 
Frames 
Framers 
(e.g. spin doctors, 
political advisers,  
advertising  cos. 
Public Sentiments 
Constituents 
(e.g. the public, 
voters, business & 
political elites, 
courts 
Brokers 
(e.g. pollsters, media , PR 
experts , advisors, MBAs, 
consultants, think tanks, 
business & trade associations, 
epistemic communities)  
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fashion. Similarly institutions can affect ideas through mediating the impact of programmes, 
in setting the frames and paradigms in which ideas operate and, critically affect public 
sentiments. ‘Finally it is important to recognize that fragmentation, conflict, and overlap 
among institutions often provide important opportunities for ideas to compete in ways that 
may lead to institutional change’ (Campbell, 2004: 113). 
 
Ideas, no matter their provenance, be they cognitive or normative, background or foreground, 
will remain as just ‘ideas’ unless they can be adopted and implemented. A new idea may have 
political and administrative appeal but the short time horizons of those political actors may 
blind them to the full economic consequences. Similarly an idea may have both economic and 
administrative appeal but be politically unpalatable. And history tells us that ideas that held 
enormous political appeal (especially with an impending election on the horizon) may not be 
either economically or administrative acceptable. Hall (1989) argues that for a new idea to 
gain viability it needs to do so at three levels: the economic – has to be relevant and 
applicable to the national economy and acceptable to international markets; political – 
accepted by the ruling party and potential allies, and then the acquiescence of the public; 
administrative - biases have to be overcome and structural capacities for implementation put 
in place.   
 
Hall developed his framework when assessing why Keynesian policies were adopted in some 
countries and rejected in others. ‘Prosaic as it may seem the orientation of the governing party 
appears to have been the single most important factor affecting the likelihood that a nation 
would pursue Keynesian policies’ (1989: 376). Parties with strong ties to the working class 
were much more receptive to the new ideas. The other major factor was the institutional 
framework in which political discourse took place – the prevailing set of common political 
ideas. ‘These include shared conceptions about the nature of society and the economy, various 
ideas about the role of government... and collective memories of past experiences’ (1989: 
383). It is in this prevailing political discourse that a new idea has to make its way and its 
plausibility or otherwise will be judged. 
 
Hall’s Framework is set out in Table 2.3 
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Table 2.3: Hall’s Framework 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Adapted from Hall, 1989: 371) 
This table will be further adapted to apply to the Irish situation over the coming chapters.  
Relationship 
to existing 
theories 
Nature of 
the National 
Economy 
 
International 
Constraints 
 
Economic 
Viability 
Overall Goals of 
Ruling Political 
Allies 
Interests of 
Potential Political 
Allies  
 
Collective 
Associations with 
Similar Policies & 
their Exponents 
Political  
Viability 
 
Administrative 
Biases & Relative 
Power of Relevant 
Actors  
Structural Capacities 
for Implementation 
Administrative 
Viability 
Adoption as 
Policy 
A New ‘Big’ 
Idea 
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Campbell’s typology of ideas offers a ready theoretical understanding of moving a new idea 
from the ‘foreground’ to the ‘background’ where it becomes an underlying assumption.   
Hall’s framework demonstrates the path that a new idea has to follow – economic acceptance, 
administrative acceptance and political acceptance – before it becomes viable. It is only then 
that a new ‘idea’ can be fully implemented and effect change. Both Campbell’s typology and 
Hall’s framework will be used to track the emergence of new ideas and how they wound their 
way through the economic, administrative and political mazes of institutional life and 
punctuated institutional path dependency at critical junctures in the transformation of Ireland. 
It should then be possible to track and measure the transformation that follows the critical 
juncture.  
 
Bulmer and Burch, both individually and collectively (1998, 2001, 2003, 2005, 2009) have 
written extensively on how Europeanization has impacted on the institutional life of the 
member states of the EU through policy transfer and the implementation of new ideas. They 
posit that the change that follows from a critical juncture can be seen at the following levels:  
 
1. The systemic level: the constitutional framework of state and government; 
2. The organisational level: the offices and networks and the positions within them 
(including the powers, resources and skills attached to them), delineating who are the 
key players and the nature of the connections between them;  
3. The regulative level: the rules and guidelines about who should do what and the extent 
to which there is a strategic capacity to ensure tasks are fulfilled and to think ahead; 
4. The procedural level: the processes shaping how business is handled including 
information systems and policy processes. 
(2001:77) 
 
They further point out there is often a degree of overlap in the above components but that for 
analytical purposes it is useful to treat them as separate. And then there is an added 
component which needs to be taken into account: ‘The cultural dimension concerns the norms 
and values that are prevalent within the institution and how these are inculcated. This 
dimension is slightly different form the other four because it is present at all four levels’ 
(2001: 77). At the systemic level, it could refer to issues such as sovereignty or national 
identity. At the organisational level, it could be as simple as the roles people fill in an 
organisation. At the procedural level it could refer to the traditional civil service values of 
how information is shared between departments. At the regulative level, it could refer to 
values concerning when officials in a ministry should take legal advice on a matter. Their 
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general point is that this cultural dimension is present at all four levels and particular attention 
will be paid to political culture.  
 
Their template will be used to demonstrate the change that occurred in Ireland after each 
critical juncture.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Conclusion  
 
Historical institutionalism can be used as a framework to successfully look back and see how 
and why change occurred over time. Its value is in ‘post-dicting changes in the equilibria’ 
(Peters, 1999: 76). Critics of historical institutionalism point at its inability to predict future 
paths and transformation. But, from this writer’s perspective, the reality is that no other theory 
can do so either when attempting to predict outcomes, especially at times of profound change 
and transformation.  Historical institutionalism was chosen as the preferred theoretical 
framework for this thesis because of its emphasis on institutions; the asymmetrical nature of 
power in the relationship between actors and institutions; the role of path dependency in 
resisting change; and the role of ideas in punctuating that path dependency at critical 
junctures. To track the path of ideas through the institutional framework use will be made of 
two tools described by Campbell (2004):  
 Process Tracing – is extremely descriptive and focuses on how ideas affect outcomes. 
It tells plausible stories about how ideas, to be effective, must fit into existing 
cognitive and normative constraints.  
 Complex Inductive Counterfactual – marries the public pronouncements with the 
private views of the relevant actors through perusal of private papers, diaries etc. and, 
primarily in this thesis through personal interviews.  
  
It is proposed that when looking at the critical junctures of 1958/9 and 1986/7 in Ireland to 
use historical institutionalism as the theoretcial framework. This will demonstrate the path 
dependency of institutions that contributed to the economic crisis and precipitated the critical 
juncture; establish what ideas were in circulation that offered possible solutions; use 
Campbell’s Typology of Ideas to demonstrate how ‘new ideas’ moved from being foreground 
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concepts and theories to background underlying assumptions; on Hall’s Framework 
demonstrate how the economic, administrative and political acceptability of the ‘new ideas’ 
led to their adoption and implementation; and then, using Bulmer and Burch’s Template 
demonstrate the ensuing change and the systemic, organisational, regulative and procedural 
levels that led to the transformation of Ireland at each critical juncture.  
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Chapter 3: First Critical Juncture in the Transformation of 
Ireland 
 
It is apparent that we have come to a critical and decisive point in our 
economic affairs. The politics hitherto followed, though given a fair 
trial, have not resulted in a viable economy. 
                                                                               T. K.Whitaker (1958: 2) 
 
By the late 1950s, Ireland was in a state of economic crisis and political stalemate and had 
reached a critical juncture. Many of its citizens were wondering if the price of independence 
had been too high. However, key policy changes that were set in train in the period 1958/9, 
particularly the move from protectionism to free trade and the encouragement of foreign 
direct investment precipitated a chain of events that radically transformed the Irish state. The 
central hypothesis of this thesis is that transformation was effected through the power of 
ideas, ideas that were circulating among the administrative elite and, to a lesser extent, the 
political elite for some time. Those ideas had enormous consequences for Ireland. They, in 
effect, led to a critical juncture, broke the existing path-dependent nature of Irish institutions 
and projected those institutions, and the state, down new developmental pathways.   
 
Using a historical institutionalist perspective this chapter will trace, through the institutions of 
the state, the symptoms of the failure that were evident to most people by the middle of the 
1950s (but not openly acknowledged), the causes of that failure, the ideas that were proposed 
for a solution and how those ideas were formulated, disseminated, and eventually gained 
acceptance. 
    
Symptoms of Failure 
By the mid 1950s Ireland was unique in the world in having an excess of births over deaths 
each year and yet, because of emigration, a declining population.  By 1961 the population had 
shrunk to 2,818,341, its lowest ever recorded level, and in the period 1946-61 there was total 
emigration of 528,334 (Coakley, 2003: 365). Emigration was running at its highest levels 
since the Famine. Critically, the young and vigorous were emigrating and Ireland was an 
exporter of brains at a time when it was in critical need of them. Lee (1989: 341) refers to ‘the 
deepening despair that spread during the mid- fifties’ and the realisation that the old ways had 
been tested and found wanting. Public discourse had focussed on a narrow band of 
‘essentially rhetorical themes relating to sovereignty, constitutional relations with Britain, 
reunification of the national territory and the restoration of the Irish language’ (Farrell, 1986: 
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143). The bread and butter issues of employment, emigration, inflation, and taxation were 
peripheral to the basic partisan cleavages. Neutrality during World War II had accentuated the 
country’s isolation and introversion. Even though Ireland was a founding member of the 
Council of Europe it used it primarily for speeches on ‘the fester of partition’ (Hederman, 
1983:43). Meanwhile, Europe was prospering and recovering from the effects of World War 
II but the Irish economy was falling behind by the day. In mainland Europe between 1952 and 
1958 the main states’ economies grew by 40 – 60 percent. In the same period the Irish 
economy failed to achieve any net growth with continuing emigration and ‘within a 12-month 
period to March 1958, our population fell by over 1 percent’ (FitzGerald, 2008a). Economic 
comparison with Great Britain was even more telling. Irish income per head was 55% of that 
of Britain. In Leinster the figure was 65% which means that for the rest of the country the 
figure was less than 50% (Carter, 1957). The differential with the United Kingdom was most 
noticeable when one looked across the border to Northern Ireland which was prospering while 
the South was stagnating. Writing in 1955, Garret FitzGerald highlighted the unwillingness of 
the official mind to acknowledge that reality and suggested that Southerners should look to 
their Northern cousins ‘from whose experience in the garden one might have something to 
learn – especially if his crops of fruit are notably more successful than one’s own!’(1955: 
373). 
 
By 1956, the country had reached a crisis point which forced, for the first time, ‘a full 
realization of the economic problems posed by political independence and of our notable 
failure since 1922 to make any substantial progress towards their solution’ (FitzGerald, 1957: 
271). The crisis resulted from a confluence of events: the linkage of the Irish pound to sterling 
(at parity); various sterling crises; an artificially high demand for Irish food exports in Britain, 
which in turn fuelled a demand for imported consumer goods in Ireland; and the demand for 
labour in England which further fuelled Irish emigration.  
 
A sense of the prevailing social conditions of the time can be gauged from the following: 
 Of the 662,654 housing units in the country 152,995 had an indoor lavatory, 255,383 
had an outdoor flush lavatory, 320,571 had no special facilities and the balance had 
either a privy or chemical closet. The majority had no running water. 
 Childbirth was a hazardous occupation with a maternal death rate of 1.35 per 1,000 
live births – almost 70 times higher than in 2008. 
38 
 
 Only 3,492 boys and 3,173 girls sat the Leaving Certificate examination.1 
 By 1960 only 29.8 per cent of 15-19 year olds were in full-time education. 
 In a workforce of 1.25m one person was employed in industry for every eleven in 
agriculture. Many of these comprised a cohort officially known as ‘relatives assisting’. 
 20.5 per cent of farmers and 89.3 per cent of ‘relatives assisting’ never married.2 
 69.2 per cent of farms were less than 50 acres. 
 Unemployment was c. 6 per cent but was greatly masked by the above ‘relatives 
assisting’, who numbered over 600,000, were largely illiterate, not entitled to 
unemployment benefit and lived lives that now seem, at the very least, stultifying. 
(All above figures taken from Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1958, Department of Education 
Reports 1956 – 58, Breen et al.) 
 
In 1956 the average income per head in Ireland was $423, Denmark $809, Britain $909, 
Canada $1,420, USA $2,067.  Between 1949 and 1956 GNP grew by 8 per cent. This 
compared with 21per cent for Britain and 42 per cent for OEEC countries generally. Over the 
same period agricultural output grew at an average rate of 1.5 per cent and industrial output 
by 30 per cent. The comparable figures for the OEEC were 4 per cent and 60 per cent 
respectively (Whitaker 1958: 10-12). 
 
There was an increasing despondency and what can be clearly deciphered, with the benefit of 
hindsight, is the path dependent nature of the institutions of state. 
 
Causes of Failure 
The Great Depression of the 1930s, followed by World War II, devastated the economies of 
the world and recovery was to be slow and painful. In Ireland’s case recovery was to be much 
more elusive. This thesis contends that the malaise that affected Ireland from independence up 
to the late 1950s was largely due to the path dependent nature of  institutions evidenced in the 
following: the belief in ‘self-sufficiency’ which resulted in an over-emphasis on agriculture 
and an almost visceral abhorrence of big business; the ‘official mind’ with its emphasis on 
                                                          
1
 Girls outperformed boys. Only 23% of boys achieved an honours Leaving Certificate. The figure for girls was 
30%. 
2
 ‘Relatives assisting’ was a euphemism for unpaid relatives on farms too small to offer them gainful 
employment. As Whitaker (2008: 19) puts it they ‘formed a reservoir of hopeless, poverty-stricken men and 
women who filled the emigrant ships for decades’.  
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continuity and fiscal rectitude, and gerontocratic political and administrative elites; the power 
of the Catholic church, particularly  in education and healthcare; and the political culture of 
the state. It has already been demonstrated that the Irish economy was falling further and 
further behind the rest of Western Europe – countries that were benefitting from Marshall Aid 
and the adoption of free trade economic policies. Can it be pure coincidence that Ireland, 
which still clung to protectionism, was increasingly the poor man of Europe? To this writer’s 
mind the causal link is very strong.  
   
Self-Sufficiency 
Political independence had been conflated with economic independence and underpinning the 
myth was the concept of ‘self-sufficiency’. Since independence, ‘self-sufficiency’ had been 
the underlying philosophy of the main political parties in Ireland and ‘was the economic 
nationalism of Griffith and Sinn Fein and indeed of an old lineage’ (Murphy, 1975: 85).  In 
the Irish body politic it resided as a background, underlying assumption (as described by 
Campbell in his Typology of Ideas (2004: 94)) within a paradigm that constrained the 
cognitive range of useful ideas that could be adopted. In the area of public sentiment it 
constrained the normative range of legitimate programs available to decision makers. 
 
When Fianna Fáil assumed power for the first time in 1932 they were even more vigorous 
than their predecessors in the drive for ‘self-sufficiency’. The withholding of payment to the 
British exchequer of land annuities paid by Irish farmers in part settlement of the nineteenth 
century land wars led to retaliatory action by the British who imposed a 20 per cent ad 
valorem duty on the import of Irish livestock. There followed an ‘economic war’ with Britain 
with each side taking retaliatory action and settlement was finally agreed in 1938. The episode 
reinforced the idea of ‘self-sufficiency’ in the public consciousness but also highlighted the 
uncomfortable truth of continuing reliance on the British. The fact that the Irish pound was 
linked to sterling (on a parity basis), and that over 60 per cent of exports went to Britain, 
meant that various sterling crises, particularly in the post-war years, had an often catastrophic 
effect on the Irish economy. The reality of a near total dependence on Britain exposed the 
myth of independence.  
 
Agriculture was expected to be the main driver of economic development as it was the 
predominant source of exports. Indeed Ireland was predominantly an agrarian society with a 
plethora of small farms, which were further sub-divided with each succeeding generation, and 
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that in effect were barely feeding many of their extended family owners. There was a very 
strong attachment to the land which had been fostered by the various ‘land wars’ and by the 
fact that the Famine was still very much alive in folk memory. Government policy post 1932 
also switched the emphasis from cattle production to tillage – the former being the domain of 
large farmers who supported Cumann na nGaedheal (and had prospered since independence) 
and the latter who were mainly small farmers and supported Fianna Fáil.
3
 This had some 
short-term gains but ultimately was counter-productive as Irish land was more suitable for 
milk and beef production.  
 
Protectionism became the dominant economic philosophy.
4
 On the industrial front the 
government, especially from 1932 onwards, moved to develop a system of control of imports 
and the introduction of tariffs to protect home industries.
5
  Most of the industries that were set 
up in this period, though providing employment, did not flourish for a variety of reasons: the 
Irish market for industrial goods was minuscule; industries were too small in scale to develop 
export markets; high interest rates and labour charges meant they never achieved economies 
of scale and, most critically of all, they were dependent on imported fuel, raw materials and 
machinery.  
 
The state had also introduced a plethora of schemes to encourage industry and agriculture, 
relieve unemployment and improve social conditions. A central plank of government policy 
was the Control of Manufactures Acts 1932-34 ‘a keystone of Fianna Fail’s anti-foreign 
capital and protectionist stance’ (Garvin, 2004: 112). The Act stipulated that Irish companies, 
established behind increasingly punitive tariff barriers, remained in Irish control by requiring 
that more than half of the equity of newly formed companies must be Irish owned. To 
facilitate access to capital the Industrial Credit Corporation was also established in 1933 and 
did have limited success but the emphasis was on small, locally based industries that relied 
heavily on protectionism.  
  
A lack of private capital, allied to the innate caution of the Irish investor, who was not 
entrepreneurially minded, necessitated the state taking the initiative through the creation of a 
                                                          
3
 The argument coalesced around ‘the cow or the plough’.  
4
 Protectionism is the doctrine or practice of restricting international trade to favour home production by the use 
of tariffs or quotas. 
5
 The following import duties applied: fuels 250 per cent; foods 72.5 – 82 per cent; textiles 35.5 – 37.5 percent. 
In addition the Economist calculated in 1938 that 1,947 articles were subject to restriction and/or control 
(Whitaker, 1983: 63).  
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number of new state bodies. The Electricity Supply Board and the Agricultural Credit 
Corporation had both been founded in 1927. To these were added the Industrial Credit 
Corporation and the Irish Sugar Company in 1933, Aer Lingus in 1937 and Irish Life 
Assurance Company in 1939. Industry, supported by government funding and operating 
behind protectionist walls did offer employment opportunities and the beginning of 
managerial training but it was also prone to inefficiency and corruption. In total there were 19 
major state bodies set up between 1927 and the outbreak of World War II. In many parts of 
the world the evolution of state-sponsored bodies was part of a deliberate policy of state 
socialism. In Ireland ‘socialism’ was a dirty word. As Carter put it ‘you are not afraid of 
Socialism; or (to be more accurate) you are very much afraid of being called socialists’ (1959: 
20). Chubb (1954: 22) believed that ‘these bodies came into existence as pragmatic solutions 
to separate problems’ in what would be called state socialism by many but those who set them 
up would recoil at the term’. His main concern was the lack of control and democratic 
accountability.  Lynch and Carter (1959) generally agreed with Chubb’s diagnosis.6  
 
It is apparent at this remove that the myth of ‘self-sufficiency’ and the retreat behind higher 
and higher protectionist barriers reinforced the path dependency of Irish institutional life and 
constrained the economic and social development of the country.
7
  
 
The Official Mind 
The civil service structures put in place in Ireland, by the British in 1920, resulted from the 
Whitley Report of 1919 and a visit by Sir Warren Fisher, permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury. These structures were to remain in place, virtually unchanged, until after World 
War II.
8
 This institutional legacy ensured that when the British departed the top civil servants 
left behind were cast very much in the British mould, ‘one of a predominant negativity 
towards proposals for increasing state expenditure and a strong predilection for balancing the 
books at all costs’ (Coogan, 2004: 172). All the top officials in the Department of Finance 
came from that tradition and that legacy was to prove highly path dependent.  
                                                          
6
 Despite the criticisms attributed to him above Carter was also quite complimentary referring to “some very 
successful and progressive examples of State enterprise” (1959: 20). Whitaker (1983: 59) attributes the following 
to Keynes who, on a trip to Dublin in 1933, declared that ‘if I were an Irishman I should find much to attract me 
in the economic outlook of your present government towards self-sufficiency’! 
7
 Girvin (1989: 159) makes the intriguing point that from 1932 – 48 Fianna Fáil did not see the need to change 
its economic policies as it kept winning elections! 
8
 The Great War of 1914-18 had exposed some glaring weaknesses in the British administrative system and the 
Whitley Report was the official enquiry into the shortcomings and recommendation for change.  
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Whitaker (2008) refers to the ‘inverted Micawberism’ that permeated the Department of 
Finance (which he joined in 1938) where they were always waiting for something to turn 
down! It exercised strong central control on fiscal policy which became noted for its 
unchanging nature. March and Olsen (1989) refer to institutions as having a repertoire of 
responses that are embedded within a set of rules and how actions are constrained by a logic 
of appropriateness (compliant with a concept of identity) and that a calculus of costs and 
benefits is subservient to that identity. Learning from history-dependent routines and norms is 
more important than expectations of the future. Hall and Taylor (1996), writing on 
institutions, refer to the ‘cultural approach’ where individual behaviour is bounded by 
experience and actors revert to established routines and patterns of behaviour to achieve their 
goals. The Department of Finance conformed fully to both of these propositions.  
 
Not only in its actions but in its personnel the Department of Finance demonstrated its 
unchanging nature. J.J McElligott was Secretary from 1927 to 1953 before he was appointed 
Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, a position he held until 1960.
9
 Noted for ‘his 
tenacious preoccupation with economy and stability’ (Whitaker, 1978: 97), he was the 
quintessential ‘official mind’. He was succeeded by the sixty three year old O. J. Redmond as 
Secretary of the Department of Finance in 1953. Redmond had joined the public service as a 
fifteen year old clerk in 1906 and was one of the first half-dozen officers transferred from the 
British civil service to the Department. He ‘climbed the last rung on the ladder leading to the 
highest post in the Irish civil service – a truly remarkable testimony to the endurance of the 
ancien regime’ (Fanning: 1978: 493). This was replicated across the entire civil service. 
Jacobsen (1994: 63) refers to the ‘cohort of doctrinaire conservatives populating all 
government departments’. Arthur (1994) argues that institutional actions exhibit positive 
feedback processes which become self-reinforcing and the Department of Finance was a 
classic example of this where actions were perpetuated without any apparent questioning of 
the outcomes. The ‘official mind’ was path dependent and continued to look to the British 
civil service as a role model.
10
 
                                                          
9
 A noted feature of the Central Bank of Ireland is that, since its foundation in 1943 until 2009, most Governors, 
had been Secretary of the Department of Finance. The sole exception was Maurice Moynihan, who had been 
secretary of the Department of the Taoiseach,  
10
 Professor Ivor Browne, referring to his time as Chief Psychiatrist of the Eastern Health Board and Professor of 
Psychiatry at University College Dublin, in his dealing with the Department of Health, found that ‘the Civil 
Service still had the characteristics of a colonial administration. When you put forward a suggestion the typical 
response was ‘What are the British doing?’ ...it was if their mental horizon didn’t extend beyond the English 
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Even the great moderniser Whitaker, was restrained by the cultural approach of his 
department. In response to a proposal from the Department of Agriculture in 1951 that Ireland 
investigate the feasibility of joining a proposed European ‘Green Pool’ for the marketing of 
agricultural produce, he wrote: ‘No useful purpose would be served so far as this country is 
concerned by the creation of a European organisation for the marketing of certain agricultural 
products’ (Fanning, 1978: 489). Queried at interview about this memo Dr Whitaker did not 
remember it. On further questioning he said that at that time his own view, and the Department view, 
was that expansion could only be considered when the balance of payment difficulties, which were 
inextricably linked to sterling, had been resolved.  
 
Following the change of government in 1948, Seán Lemass, who had been a cabinet minister 
since 1932, offered the following advice to the new cabinet:  
Beware of the Department of Finance. It has always been restrictive of development ... 
any plans [the new government] may have had in their mind coming into the Dáil will 
be lost, and lost forever in the dim recesses of the Department of Finance’ (Fanning, 
1978: 465).  
 
In a Dáil debate in 1951, Sean MacEntee, who had been Fianna Fáil Minister of Finance, 
decried the Department of Finance’s ‘complete subservience to the British Treasury’ while 
James Dillon referred to the officials ‘who were delighted in their hearts but consternated in 
their minds’ when the country had not gone broke as they had prophesied. In more emollient 
tones Taoiseach John A. Costello said of those same officials: ‘They are the watchdogs of 
public finance. It is their duty to point out certain dangers but it is not their duty to create 
economic policy’ (Fanning, 1978: 466). 
 
But it was not just at civil service level that the ‘official mind’ was evident. At a political 
leadership level the men (and they were all men) who led the state from its foundation were of 
a particularly frugal disposition. De Valera’s famous address to the nation on St. Patrick’s 
Day 1943 talked about only valuing material wealth as the basis of right living and a ‘people 
who were satisfied with frugal comfort and devoted their leisure to the things of the spirit’. 
Garvin (2004: 113) cites an interview de Valera gave to The Manchester Guardian in 1927 
where he argued that a lower standard of living might be no bad thing. For Garvin ‘this 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Channel’ (2009: 138) Browne goes on to make the point that decisions were often made to ape a British policy 
just when the British themselves were about to abandon that policy in favour of some other initiative that quite 
likely came from continental Europe. 
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strange anti-economic economics informed much of Fianna Fáil’s thinking for a long time’ 
(ibid.).   
 
This research shows that the political and bureaucratic elites were essentially cut from the 
same cloth and a noted feature of both is their longevity in office. The political sphere was no 
different. When Lemass eventually succeeded de Valera as Taoiseach in 1959 his cabinet 
contained four ministers who had been part of the first Fianna Fáil government of 1932.
11
 
Gerontocracy ruled in the political and administrative elites. The men at the helm were 
wedded to self sufficiency, protectionism and, in the best British civil service tradition, a 
balanced budget. Irish institutional life exhibited the classical characteristics described by 
Arthur:  inflexibility, nonergodicity and potential path inefficiency. The institutions of the 
Irish state were highly path dependent. 
   
The Catholic Church 
There is unanimity on the overarching influence of the Catholic Church on all aspects of Irish 
political and social culture. Catholic thought was deeply embedded in Irish life as a 
background underlying assumption. The only debate is which dominated: direct Church 
influence or the Catholic beliefs of the political elites?  The Church operated at two basic 
levels: religious faith and social institution. Each impacted the other and ‘it is precisely the 
conjunction of the two which makes Irish Catholicism a truly unique clerical phenomenon’ 
(Biever, 1976: 490). Garvin argues that the Church controlled much of the elite culture and 
‘the mind of the collectivity’ (2004: 24). Since independence the Catholic Church played a 
leading role in Irish life and was often referred to as ‘a state within a state’. Ironically, there is 
no formal link between state and church in Ireland.
12
 However, the Church in Ireland remains  
inextricably linked to the state through the central role it has played in education and health 
care provision since the middle of the nineteenth century, quite often when the state’s 
provision was totally inadequate. Since the 1830s successive British governments had actively 
encouraged and promoted church involvement in educational provision. They also part 
financed the seminary in Maynooth, where the majority of priests were trained, with the 
                                                          
11
 Lee (1989: 337) points out that only twenty two men held office in Fianna Fáil governments between 1932 and 
1954. 
12
 Many European countries carry a legacy of the post-Reformation principle, cujus regio, ejus religio. In Britain 
the queen is the ‘Supreme Governor’ of the Church of England and until recently the appointment of bishops 
was a crown prerogative, exercised by the Prime Minister. In the Scandinavian countries the Lutheran Churches 
are state churches and the clergy are civil servants. In Germany there are taxes to support the churches. In Greece 
the Orthodox Church is a state church. 
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express intention of using those same Catholic priests to ensure that the Irish were protected 
from the anti-Catholic politics of the French Revolution.
13
 But, more importantly, ‘London 
and Maynooth were united by a common terror of revolution’ (Garvin, 2004: 130) and this  
close cooperation led to an increase of clerical influence, a clergy that was increasingly 
English speaking, and a concomitant decline in the Irish language. It also led to increased 
Church participation in secular politics that was to prove critical for the next one hundred and 
fifty years. Again, this institutional legacy was to prove highly path dependent and incredibly 
slow to change.
14
  
 
By the founding of the State the Catholic Church had become so entrenched in education that 
the underground Dáil of 1919 did not have a ministry of education. ‘The idea that priests 
should control education appeared natural, inevitable and desirable’ (Garvin, 2004: 132). 
Speaking in the Dáil, on the 1940 Department of Education estimate, de Valera said that ‘for 
nine out of ten of our people, the primary school is their only educational experience’ (Garvin, 
2004: 135). More ominously, Tom Derrig, who served as Minister for Education for most of 
the period from 1932 – 48, ‘believed privately that education beyond the elementary level 
destroyed children’s ancestral cultures’ (Foster, 2008: 14).15  
  
A ‘Council of Education’ was set up in 1950 by Richard Mulcahy, Minister for Education in 
the first inter-party government. Consisting of 29 members, of whom 26 were professional 
educators (including 11 clerics) and three members representing rural interests, its remit was a 
review of the primary and secondary education systems. The minister acknowledged that ‘... 
the State approach to education ... is one which unreservedly accepts the supernatural 
conception of man’s nature and destiny ... [and] that the foundation and crown of youth’s 
entire training is religion’ (Garvin, 2004: 140). In its report the Council rejected any need for 
wider access to second-level education.
16
 It also recommended the formal recognition of the 
virtual total denominational nature of the entire educational system thereby institutionalising a 
background underlying assumption. 
                                                          
13
 Catholic emancipation had only been achieved in 1829. British concerns were much more about the spread of 
republicanism than an apparent concern about the anti-Catholicism of the French Revolution.   
14
 The state agenda for education in the nineteenth century, both at national and university level, was ostensibly 
secular. The de facto position was a Catholic Church gaining an increasing influence and control of the 
educational system. 
15
 Before entering politics full-time Derrig had been a teacher in Mayo and in his youth was a student leader in 
University College Galway. 
16
 Archbishop McQuaid of Dublin believed that the Commission was seriously wrong in this conclusion and, to 
his credit, lobbied for the spread of secondary education. 
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Vocational education had been put on a statutory basis with the passing of The Vocational 
Education Act 1930 (the first educational act passed by the new state). It set up thirty eight 
vocational educational committees (VECs) throughout the country and offered an opportunity 
to poorer children to acquire some technical education. The Church was ostensibly excluded 
from the system as the Act did not mention religious education. Partly at clerical insistence, 
the schools were precluded from preparing students for the leaving certificate.
17
 More 
tellingly, the appointment of CEOs of the various VECs was to be by the Local Appointments 
Commission and, in theory at least, free from clerical influence. Teacher appointments were 
made by the VECs which left the Church, and McQuaid in particular, fulminating about the 
lack of Church control (Cooney, 1999). The Church may have lost that battle but it did not 
lose the war. It achieved representation on the VECs (clerics chaired some), but also 
succeeded in having various modifications made to the system including the provision of 
religious education. There is ample evidence of clerical influence at senior level in the 
Department of Education, particularly through the influence of the Knights of Columbanus, 
and some officials were clearly in breach of the Official Secrets Act by passing classified 
policy documents to the hierarchy (Garvin, 2004: 137).  
 
Could the technical backwardness of Ireland be attributed to the role of the Church? There 
was a woeful lack of training in science in the Irish school system. ‘In 1959 – 60 there were a 
total of 2,702 Certificates awarded in Chemistry, 2,493 in Physics, and 813 in Agricultural 
science, compared, for instance, with 46,929 in Irish literature’ (Biever, 1976: 341).18  Biever 
was an American Jesuit who completed a major study on Religion Culture and Values in 
Ireland in the early 1960s. He found that the dominant role of the Church in education had 
produced a people that believed their prime function was to obey ‘no matter whether this 
makes sense [to them] or not’ (p. 495). He goes on; ‘This obedience syndrome, we submit, 
must be taken as one major factor influencing the much lamented lack of creativity and 
initiative in contemporary Ireland, and for this the Church cannot avoid its share of 
responsibility’ (ibid.). The Church in Ireland had achieved a dominance that, for Biever, was 
not entirely welcome: 
                                                          
17
 The curriculum of boys’ secondary schools in particular was dominated by Latin and Greek, the prerequisites 
of a classical education and, more tellingly, for education to the priesthood.  
18
 Biever goes on to raise the interesting question as to whether the Church’s opposition to science was based on 
the amorality of science that in turn challenged traditional morality. As will be seen when reviewing Irish 
agriculture there was also, in spite of the avowed importance of the connection to the land, an aversion to 
scientific methods of farming. 
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It has done this primarily through educational monopoly and currently, through lack of 
receptivity to all non-ecclesiastical ideology. There is no sense of religious 
community; none is needed, for church and state, religion and nation have so 
intertwined that they cannot be conceptualized except in terms on one another. In this 
process of intermingling it may be suggested that the church has become more socially 
oriented than religiously relevant, more intent upon control of society and preservation 
of its privileged position than sensitive to the changing needs of its flock (1976: 500).   
 
Attempts by the government in the 1920s to introduce divorce were successfully opposed by 
the Catholic Church (Lee, 1989: 158). In addition the Censorship of Publications Act 1929 
prohibited any publication deemed ‘indecent or obscene’ as well as all literature advocating 
birth control.
19
 It was faithfully upheld and promulgated by the Church and the list of 
publications banned now seems risible. Bunreacht na hĒireann of 1937 acknowledged the 
special place of the Church and de Valera sought specific Vatican approval prior to its 
publication.
20
  
 
The vast majority of the hospitals in the state were either owned or run by religious orders 
such as the Sisters of Mercy and the Daughters of Charity. The publication of the Beveridge 
Report in Britain in 1942 and the setting up of the National Health Service some years later 
brought the whole question of healthcare provision centre-stage in Ireland also and led to the 
first really serious clash between Church and State. Ferriter (2004: 502) argues that the 
Mother and Child Scheme ‘became one of the most celebrated and vitriolic controversies of 
twentieth-century Ireland’. The ostensible genesis of the controversy was the Health Act 1947 
which introduced a limited national health system broadly based on the British system. The 
act proposed free (voluntary) ante and post-natal care for mothers and free medical care for all 
children under sixteen, irrespective of means. With the failure of Fianna Fáil in the 1948 
general election the implementation of the act fell to the new inter-party government of John 
A. Costello.  On his first day in the Dáil Dr. Noel Browne was appointed Minister for Health 
and he moved to implement the provisions of the act. He was vociferously opposed by the 
medical and church authorities – the former because they saw their incomes and influence 
eroded, the latter because they saw the state interfering in family life and, more worryingly 
                                                          
19
 The act confined itself to ‘sexual immorality’. Lee (1989) posits that in confining itself to the sixth 
commandment the Act permitted a blind eye to be turned to the others! The Censorship Board was invariably 
chaired by a cleric. 
20
 It has been fashionable to deride the constitution as being unduly influenced by Catholic teaching. Given what 
was happening in other Catholic countries such as Spain, Italy and Germany it may be more appropriate to ask: 
“how did a document so protective of citizens’ rights emerge from a decade so heavily influenced by anti-
democratic ideas rooted in Catholic authoritarianism, vocationalism, corporatism, fascism and Nazism?” (Keogh 
and McCarthy, 2007: 207). 
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from their perspective, possibly introducing contraception and, more alarmingly still, 
abortion. The scheme was eventually withdrawn because the ‘official mind’ capitulated to the 
Church. Browne did not receive cabinet support and resigned.
21
 An editorial in the Irish 
Times lamented that ‘an honest, far-sighted and energetic man’ had been driven out of office 
but its main point was that ‘The most serious revelation however is that the Roman Catholic 
Church would seem to be the effective government of this country’ (Murphy, 1975: 133). 
For years the Church position on birth control was the state position. All aspects of social 
policy were dominated by Church policy with the Church having a virtual right of veto. Most 
tellingly of all, in its dealings with the state, be it in education, health or the provision of 
social services the institutional Church saw itself as governed by canon law rather than state 
law. In the context of the times Catholic ideology was firmly established as background 
underlying assumptions that constrained all other ideologies and ideas.  
 
This research shows an Irish polity whose purpose, from a Church perspective, was to pray, 
pay and obey. Consultation with clergy was taken for granted before any change in 
government policy. Education, health and social policy were, in effect, dictated by the 
Church. Senior clergy had ready access to a supine media that reported Episcopal utterances 
without comment or criticism. It has already been shown that cabinet ministers were expected 
to attend at the bishops’ palaces when requested to do so. Right across Irish society deference 
was shown to the Church and its representatives. Access to the political and administrative 
elites (and to the media) far exceeded any other grouping in Irish society and is a neat 
illustration of the asymmetrical nature of power – one of the features of historical 
institutionalism.  
 
 
Political Culture 
Reference has already been made to the ‘official mind’, its fixation with self-sufficiency, and 
how it was influenced by the Catholic Church. But political culture permeates all strata of 
society and the political culture of Ireland remained largely unchanged from independence up 
to the late 1950s. Coakley (2006: 37) defines political culture as the ‘fundamental, deeply 
held views on the state itself, on the rules of the political game and on the kind of principles 
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 In his autobiography, Against the Tide, Browne recounts being summoned to Archbishop McQuaid’s palace to 
discuss the scheme. Being Minister for Health he thought the Archbishop should come to see him as all other 
citizens did. ‘Yet my colleagues informed me that it was in fact the practice, under Irish Government protocol, 
for a minister to be expected to attend, when told to do so, at a bishop’s palace’ (1986: 157).  
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that should underlie political decision making’. Agriculture dominated the economy and 
Ireland, in the period under review was predominantly an agrarian society. Again, Coakley 
(2006: 40) offers a useful definition:  
Agrarian society has been typified as that in which the population, by definition, is 
overwhelmingly involved in the primary sector of the economy (with peasants relying 
on mixed subsistence agriculture, and the industrial sector being confined to small-
scale cottage industries and crafts); with predominantly rural settlement patterns; 
mainly illiterate, ... with only a restricted transport network; and with poorly 
developed communications media. In industrial society these characteristics are 
reversed....  
 
In agrarian society an individual is born into a particular rank in society and faces restricted 
social mobility and a limited set of vocational choices – for the majority in rural Ireland, given 
the low acreage of the farms and large families, this meant they were consigned to a life of 
‘relatives assisting’. In theory, at least, Irish urban dwellers could envisage occupational and 
spatial mobility.  
 
Given that the population was largely agrarian and that Catholicism and ‘self-sufficiency’ 
were background underlying assumptions, not only of the general public but of the 
bureaucratic and political elites, society was largely conservative. An added reinforcement of 
that innate conservatism was the isolationism experienced because of the state’s neutrality in 
World War II and subsequent exclusion from the post-war boom that was fuelled by the 
Marshall Plan. Society was also paternalistic with the role of women largely confined to the 
home. Those fortunate enough to receive a limited education and a job in the civil service had 
to resign their positions on marriage. 
 
Foster (2008: 65) refers to ‘the most traditionalist paradigms that defined national identity 
since the foundation of the state: that calcified congruence of Irishness, Catholicism and 
Republicanism’. The early years were also marked by the enormous gap that existed between 
the pedestrian realities of everyday life and the rhetoric and hyperbole of the revolutionary 
leaders – nowhere more evident than in de Valera’s famous radio address on St. Patrick’s Day 
1943 when he eulogised ‘sturdy youths’ and ‘comely maidens’, a countryside bright with 
‘cosy homesteads’ and a people satisfied with ‘frugal comfort’. But the countryside was not 
bright with homesteads, cosy or otherwise. ‘In Ireland in 1945 only two per cent of rural 
homes had electricity; for rural Denmark and Holland the figures were 85 and 98 percent 
respectively’ (Ferriter, 2004: 425). Rural electrification, when it came, brought huge cultural 
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change. It helped emancipate rural women from a life of drudgery and brought in the outside 
world through increased reading and the radio. Paradoxically, concomitant with rural 
electrification, and its developmental potential, there was a mass exodus from the land and 
increased urbanisation.
22
 
 
Rhetoric was nowhere more evident than in the areas of a united Ireland and the revival of the 
Irish language. Irish unity was a cornerstone of Bunreacht na hĒireann and the promised 
solution to all the ills of the fledgling nation. The fact that successive governments did 
nothing to encourage unity, perversely, perpetuated that particular shibboleth. The underlying 
myth was that Irish unity would solve all the economic woes of the country and the only 
reason the country had not prospered was because of the continuing occupation of part of the 
national territory by perfidious Albion.  The vision of many of those who fought for, and 
secured, independence was for a Gaelic nation - Irish speaking, Catholic and agrarian with the 
land of Ireland belonging to the Irish.
23
  The revival of the Irish language was another core 
value for Fianna Fáil and enormous sums were spent in the efforts to promote the language 
but revivalists never succeeded in building a sustainable mass movement. 
  
From a political science perspective Ireland was sui generis in that it did not conform to any 
of the traditional cleavages: left/right, centre/periphery, church/state etc. Rather, the political 
cleavages that occurred at independence, and which coalesced around civil war politics, 
continued right up to the first critical juncture and permeated political culture.  
 
The perceived wisdom of ‘self-sufficiency’ remained long after it had become obvious that it 
did not deliver economic prosperity. The ‘self-sufficiency idea’, and likewise the ‘official 
mind’ and ‘the Catholic Church’ had all become institutionally bound, path dependent and 
highly impervious to change. They permeated not only political culture, but all aspects of 
Irish life. At a theoretical level they conformed to Campbell’s typology of background ideas - 
taken-for granted assumptions that are culturally and politically acceptable. Background 
ideas, because they are culturally imbued, tend to constrain change and, as this research 
shows, Irish society was characterized by its unchanging nature. Foreground ideas, because 
they challenge perceived wisdom, tend to facilitate and/or enable change. Ideational change 
                                                          
22
 Garvin (2004: 42) notes that de Valera, in lamenting the flight from the land, at one stage considered making 
cheap radios available to rural dwellers. It fell to one of his advisers to remind him that radio was a medium that 
exacerbated rural discontent and enhanced the apparent glamour of urban living.    
23
 At no time did a single Gaelic culture exist because Gaelic culture meant different things to different people. 
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would require a major paradigm shift for Irish political life. Heretofore, as Garvin (2004) 
argues, cultural expectations of government policy were zero-sum in nature: if I gained you 
lost. A natural corollary was that wealth could only be gained at the expense of others and this 
mindset had been perpetuated by successive Land Acts from 1870 to 1903 which were 
redistributive in nature and arguably anti-developmental.
24
 Redistributive policies were 
perpetuated by successive governments in the new state. To change the culture of the state 
would require a major paradigm shift.  
 
 
The Role of Ideas 
A new idea comes suddenly and in a rather intuitive way. But, 
intuition is nothing but the outcome of earlier intellectual experience. 
                                                                                           Albert Einstein (1949) 
 
Lee, writing on the transition of Ireland since 1960, bemoaned the lack of a culture of ideas – 
the Irish were imitators rather than innovators and had ‘failed to develop a serious tradition of 
native social thought’ and in the import of ideas had ‘imitated much but learned little’ (1986: 
163). For Taoiseach Lemass ‘the essence of the national problem is the insufficiency of ideas 
rather than of resources of either men or money’ (1959: 205). Lynch (1959: 17), who for 
many years was very critical of government (in)action, advocated that ‘the most desirable 
form of free trade is in ideas’ and in particular the necessity to look outside of Ireland for 
those ideas. All of the above, in their different ways, were making the point that to get the 
country out of the political and economic morass that prevailed in the 1950s would necessitate 
new approaches and new ideas.  
 
The symptoms and causes of the economic morass have already been dealt with in this 
chapter. The underlying ideological structure that justified the existing economic regime was 
a continuing belief among the political and administrative elites of the power of protectionism 
and a balanced budget to generate economic wellbeing. This continued after the rest of 
Europe had adopted growth policies and supported them with suitable policy instruments 
whereas economic management in Ireland was being utilised ‘to preserve economic stability 
rather than to generate a modern industrial economy’ (Girvin, 1989: 171). 
 
                                                          
24
 Garvin (2004) poses the intriguing question: did the fact that Northern Ireland (Britain’s Ireland) was 
outperforming the Republic (Irish Ireland) provoke the latter into embracing indicative planning? 
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Historical institutionalists such as Peters (2001) argue that ‘ideas’ provide a set of ready 
solutions for policy problems and that institutional change becomes a question of how to 
change ideas. Hall (1989) argues that at critical junctures ‘ideas matter’ and are the catalyst or 
binding agent that allow existing ingredients to combine in new ways that break the cycle of 
path dependency.  At the first critical juncture in the transformation of Ireland what ideas 
were proposed for the ills besetting Irish society? Unfortunately most of the ideational actors 
of the time are no longer alive. Two important ideational actors of the period, Dr. Garret 
FitzGerald and Dr. T. K. Whitaker, were interviewed and their views will appear later in this 
chapter. There was no television or ‘think-tanks’ operating at an Irish level. The printed press 
confined itself largely to reportage rather than prescriptions for change. An important 
purveyor of ideas was Tuairim, a quasi think-tank and debating club which was founded in 
University College Dublin in 1954. It published some important papers and attracted a 
membership that proved to be highly influential in later years. Political and economic journals 
relevant to Ireland were few and far between. The exceptions were - Administration, Studies 
and the Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland (JSSISI).
25
  
 
All of the above journals for the period 1950 – 58 were extensively examined and each article 
sorted by category, e.g. Economics, Political Theory etc.
26
 (A similar exercise was carried out 
on all relevant book reviews). Articles of a purely historical or technical nature were excluded 
from the study. The majority of articles in Studies and JSSISI were full length journal articles, 
as indeed were many of the articles in Administration, but there was no weighting given to the 
length of articles. The primary aim of the research was to ascertain what ideas were 
circulating at the time and who was promoting those ideas – the ideational actors. 
  
What ‘ideas’ became acceptable? 
Tuairim 
Tuairim’s constitution stated that ‘the prime purpose of the society is to bring together 
members of the post-treaty generation and to provide a platform for young people with new 
ideas’ (Finn, 2008: 390). Membership was confined to those between the ages of twenty one 
and forty, who would make themselves ‘intelligently conversant with one of the main 
problems of modern Ireland’ (ibid.). It involved itself in five main subject areas: Northern 
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 Bodies such as the ESRI and NESC were in the future. 
26
 A more general search of the back issues from the 1920s onwards shows an ongoing debate about the 
(de)merits of free trade, protectionism and the rise of Keynesianism. 
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Ireland, economic development, European prospects, social and educational policy, and the 
practice and development of government (Hederman, 2008: 67).   Acceptance of Articles 40 
to 45 of Bunreacht na hĒireann was a prerequisite, including Article 44 which recognised the 
special position of the Catholic Church.
27
 Nevertheless it was liberal in nature with a 
questioning attitude being the most significant requirement for membership. Finn (2008) 
conducted many interviews with members who recalled the ‘necessity to challenge the 
dominance of a reactionary Catholic Church and conservative political elites during the 
fifties... [and a] shared frustration at the stagnation and conservatism evident throughout the 
country’ (p. 13).  
 
Originally conceived as holding monthly meetings at which papers would be read by 
members it quickly expanded to include guest speakers and also created a panel of expert 
speakers on all its five main areas of interest (See Appendix 6for a full list). Branches were 
also established in Cork, Limerick, Galway, Nenagh, Clonmel, Athlone, Waterford, Kerry, 
Sligo, and London (Hederman, 2008: 70). 
 
Political reaction to Tuairim was initially suspicious.
28
 Hederman, who acted as secretary of 
Tuairim, says: 
The veterans of the state’s creation were in no mood to cede either their positions of 
power or the certitudes that had brought them so far against such odds. Any challenge 
to the social, economic and political realities was regarded at best as uninformed and, 
at worst, as a step towards treason (2008: 66).  
 
At interview (2009) Dr Hederman-O’Brien was still exercised by the negativity of the times 
and the stultifying influence of the Catholic Church in particular. She had studied music in 
Rome in the late 1940s and the enormous disparity in wealth evident in post-war Italy had a 
profound influence on her subsequent political activism. She joined Tuairim at its foundation 
and served as Secretary. She also served on the international secretariat of Pax Romana, (the 
only woman to do so). She became a life-long Europhile and committed to Ireland’s 
participation in the Europe project – ‘I saw Europe as the only hope for Ireland’ 
                                                          
27
 Tuairim was ‘approved’ by Archbishop McQuaid but subsequently drew down his wrath for a pamphlet it 
produced on education. Writing to the Papal Nuncio he advised that Tuairim had committed the ultimate sin: ‘In 
its discussion on education the group used the services of Dr. Mitchell, the Registrar of Trinity College, Dublin, 
a bitter Protestant’ (Cooney 2006).  
28
 Minister for Justice, Gerry Boland, instructed the Garda Special Branch to attend the inaugural meeting and 
report on the bone fides of those attending. They reported that ‘there does not appear to be anything significant in 
its aims and it is unlikely to make progress’ (Finn, 2008: 18). 
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Taoiseach Costello, whose son Declan attended and addressed Tuairim meetings, in direct 
reference to Tuairim, said ‘study groups... may do a real disservice to Irish Democracy if they 
seek to imply that there is some virtue in aloof neutrality or if they condemn the political 
function’ (Finn, 2008: 59). Later, Taoisech Seán Lemass, who spoke at a private dinner held 
at a Tuairim study week-end, commented in the Dáil on 21/07/59 that ‘Tuairim was one of the 
organisations that was facilitating a greater understanding of the country’s problems and was 
part of a new spirit in the country, a spirit which was greatly to be encouraged’ (Finn, 2008: 
61). Clearly, Lemass was receptive to the new ‘ideas’ being promulgated by Tuairim.29  
 
Administration  
Administration had its origins in the Customs House in Dublin in October 1952 when a group 
of senior civil servants, led by Tom Barrington, Secretary of the Department of Local 
Government, started a discussion group on public policy and up to five hundred people turned 
up to some meetings (Murphy, 2009: 122).
30
  Papers read to it were published privately to 
members only. The beginnings were tentative and nervous because the fiction still persisted 
that policy was for politicians and the role of the public servant was to administer that policy. 
It soon became clear that the papers presented could/should be published and Administration 
first appeared in 1953 with Barrington as editor. The first issue was devoted to ‘Efficiency in 
the Civil Service’ and in subsequent issues the majority of articles related to the theory and 
practice of management. The first edition also contains a note that reads: ‘It is supplied on 
condition that no public reference to its existence is made’.  Early editions included a number 
of ‘Anonymous’ articles (in the culture of the time public servants were largely invisible, 
existing to serve their political masters) but this anonymity quickly disappeared as the journal 
gained acceptance.  
 
                                                          
29
 Some members of Tuairim were to prove very influential in Irish Public Life. Donal Barrington, who was a 
founding member, became a Supreme Court judge. Ronan Keane became Chief Justice. Several other members 
went on to prominent positions in legal circles. In the world of politics Garret FitzgGerald, Michael D. Higgins, 
Barry Desmond, Jim Kemmy, David Thornley, Michael Woods, Declan Costello all were members. Maurice 
Doyle later became Secretary of the Department of Finance and Governor of the Central Bank. Miriam 
Hederman chaired the Commission on Taxation and became Chancellor of the University of Limerick. Colm 
O’hEocha became President of University College Galway while several other academics later held chairs in 
various universities. Leading Catholic clerical intellectuals such as Fr. Enda McDonagh and Sr Margaret Mac 
Curtain were also members.  
30
 Barrington subsequently became the first director of the Institute of Public Administration in 1957 and is 
widely perceived as a moderniser and intellectual who tried to educate the ‘official mind’ in modern 
management techniques and theory. 
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At this remove, it is not possible to find what articles were rejected for publication but many 
articles were published (e.g. Chubb and Lynch) that were very critical of the ‘official mind. 
Administration never strayed into the overly political, maintaining the political/administrative 
divide, but it did publish on political and economic theory and practice.
31
 It was circulated to 
all senior civil and public servants. Throughout the 1950s circulation averaged 5,000 copies 
per issue (IPA, 2009) and articles published reflected contributions from all the senior grades 
in the civil and public service.
32
 
 
Given its target audience in the public sector it is not surprising that there is a predominance 
of articles on management theory and practice (74 articles) and none on politics. It is also 
noticeable that there are many articles (six) and reviews (11) on what was happening in 
Britain (confirming the Anglocentricity of the service?). The other main categories were 
economic theory and practice with 16 articles and seven book reviews, 14 articles on political 
theory, nine on Europe, seven on social policy, and six on world affairs. 
 
What this research shows is that under Barrington’s editorship it provided a forum for 
ideational actors to promulgate their theories. It was not afraid of dissenting voices and played 
a not insignificant role in nudging the ‘official mind’ down new pathways. 
 
Studies 
Studies was founded in 1912 by the Jesuits and was another purveyor of ‘ideas’. The full 
original title was Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review of Letters Philosophy and Science.  As 
would be expected there were many articles on Catholic theology and religious affairs but it 
also included (see Appendix 1 for articles deemed relevant) wide ranging articles on 
communism, socialism etc. It always strongly advocated freedom of expression and ‘contrary’ 
views. In 1968 Archbishop McQuaid summoned the Jesuit Provincial to an audience with the 
intention of pressurising him to order the editor not to publish a special edition on Irish 
education. The Jesuits listened but declined and the edition was published without amendment 
(Cooney, 1999: 397).  
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 Only four articles by clerics, Newman, O’Doherty, O’Mathuna and Philbin were found, which, given the 
dominant role of the Catholic Church, may give some weight to the independence of the publication.    
32
 Murphy (2009: xxx) gives a figure of 2,000 copies in the early years. The figure of 5,000 was obtained from 
the IPA as the average circulation in the 1950s. 
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Economic theory and practice (45 articles) dominated Studies. The other main categories were 
political theory (24 articles) and politics (13 articles), social policy (nine articles) and Europe 
(eight articles).  
 
It is not possible to ascertain what articles were rejected for publication, nevertheless the 
above anecdote about Archbishop McQuaid, suggests a strongly independent line.  As with 
Administration, the emphasis is on economic theory and practice and political theory. But 
perusal of Studies shows a very different side of Catholic Ireland. There was a real 
willingness to push the boundaries on public discourse, challenge the status quo and offer 
some really radical options for the transformation of the state. It published articles on ‘The 
Communist Theory of Law’, ‘Recent Economic Development in Europe’, ‘Political zionism’, 
‘The Platonic Doctrine of Ideas’, ‘Some Recent Trends in Soviet Science and Philosophy’ and 
many more. Studies confronted the background underlying assumptions ingrained in the 
public sentiment and raised uncomfortable ideas about fairness and social justice. 
 
The Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland (SSISI)  
SSISI organised approximately six public meetings per annum at which a major paper was 
read followed by an open forum. Since its inception in 1847 the Society has provided a 
unique meeting ground for discussion between decision-makers in the business, public 
service, trade union, academic and research communities. Its constitution precluded any 
discussion on politics and religion but it was of course free to discuss economic and political 
theory. Prior to the founding of Administration it provided one of the few forums where civil 
servants could discuss policy and many senior civil servants presented papers (frequently of a 
technical nature and these have not been included in the analysis). The only known case of a 
paper being withdrawn by a civil servant was by Joseph Brennan, Chairman of the Currency 
Commission, in 1932 when Fianna Fáil came to power (Daly, 1997: 110).  (Brennan served as 
President of the SSISI from 1934 to 1938.)  
 
All the papers presented since 1847 are available but there are no records of attendances 
(ESRI, 2009). Anecdotal evidence suggests attendances varying between 30 and 100.  Garret 
FitzGerald, who presented his first paper in 1952, cautions that the official record does not 
always show what happened on the night. When Whitaker presented his seminal paper in 
1956 he was roundly criticised by John Leydon, recently retired Secretary of the Department 
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of Industry and Commerce and defender of protectionism (Fitzgerald, 2008).
33
 The official 
record does not carry any of the relevant exchange. 
 
Economic theory and practice (15 articles) dominated the JSSISI, followed by social policy 
(six articles) and Britain (five articles). 
 
Analysis of Articles and Book Reviews in Administration, Studies and JSSISI 
Articles, papers and book reviews of a purely historical or technical nature are excluded from 
the analysis as they are judged not relevant to ‘ideas’ that were proposed for the 
transformation of the state. In total there were 293 articles and reviews (192 articles and 101 
book reviews) which are listed in Appendix 2. For analysis purposes these articles and 
reviews have been categorised in Table 3.1 
 
Table 3.1: Articles and Book reviews in Administration, Studies and JSSISI 
 
 
The above classifications need some elaboration. Articles on Britain, Europe and the World 
represent 14% of the articles and collectively form the third largest category.  
                                                          
33
 At interview Dr FitzGerald recalled presenting his first paper in 1952 describing himself as a terrified twenty 
six year old appearing before the great and the good in an upstairs room over Roberts Cafe in Grafton St and 
hoping that no one would turn up. In the event there was a good turnout and his paper ‘Factors influencing air 
transport rates and fares’ was well received. After the meeting he recalled walking contentedly down Grafton St 
with T. K. Whitaker and Dr. D. McCarthy, Director of the Central Statistics Office. McCarthy subsequently 
served as President of University College Cork. 
Economics 
28% 
Pol. Theory 
13% 
Social 
Policy 
8% 
Politics 
4% 
Europe 
6% 
Britain 
8% 
World 
3% 
Management  
26% 
Local Gov 
4% 
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Table 3.2: Articles on Britain, Europe and the Rest of the World 
 Administration Studies JSSISI 
Britain 17 1 5 
Europe 9 8 1 
Rest of World 6 5 0 
 32 14 6 
 
The following table gives a breakdown of the above 52 articles and reviews, assigning them 
to the classifications in the above pie chart.  
 
Table3.3: Article Classification 
 Economics Social Policy Politics Management 
Administration 4 1 0 27 
Studies 8 1 5 0 
JSSISI 5 0 1 0 
 17 2 6 27 
 
In total there were 293 articles and book reviews in the three journals of which 83 were 
classified as ‘economics’ and a further 17 related to economics in Britain, Europe and the rest 
of the world. This means that 100 out of 293 (34%) related to economic theory and practice 
and a breakdown of same is shown in Table 3:7. 
 
Table 3.4: Analysis of 100 Economic Articles 
 
Economic 
Theory 
22% 
Irish Economy 
56% 
Irish Agriculture 
9% 
UK Economy 
13% 
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Appendix 1 lists all the published papers in the respective journals together with the books 
reviewed. Perusal of same shows the increasing influence of Keynesianism, events in Europe, 
and the probability of ‘free-trade’ in some shape or form. The articles covered all the main 
prevailing economic and political theories prevalent at the time. Apart from the contributions 
by Lemass there is no other evidence of politicians engaging in intellectual or theoretical 
debate.  
Fanning (2008) offers the following summation of Studies and Administration: 
... [both] advanced the same recipe for economic development: the cultivation of 
enterprise, the abandonment of protectionism, the use of foreign capital and 
membership of the European Economic Community. Overall, Europe was viewed as 
positive political influence on Ireland, a chance for economic and social uplift (p. 7). 
 
What is clear from all of the above is that the theory and practice of economics and 
management dominated the three journals. Administration concentrated on management, both 
public and private, in Ireland and other jurisdictions. Outside influences were mainly British, 
perhaps inevitable given Irish history and a common language, but the research shows clearly  
the ‘official mind’s’ continuing fealty to its Treasury origins. The other somewhat surprising 
conclusion is, that contrary to the current widely held perception of the 1950s as a cultural 
desert, there was an active, if select, cohort of ideational actors actively involved in debate 
about the economic and social life of the country. At interview Whitaker, O Cofaigh, 
FitzGerald and Hederman-O’Brien all confirmed this with the latter stating: ‘There was no 
shortage of ideas – it was just that there was nobody listening’.  
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Who were the Ideational Actors? 
The following table summarises the leading contributors and frequency of publication in the 
main journals during the 1950s. 
Table 3.5 Analysis of Authors and Articles 
 Barrington Carter Chubb FitzGerald Lynch Ryan Whitaker 
Admin. 6 2 4 2 5 2 3 
Studies  2  5 2 3 1 
JSSISI  4  1 1  2 
Totals 6 8 4 8 8 5 6 
        As already described Barrington became the first director of the IPA. Carter, an Englishman, 
held the chair of applied economics at The Queen’s University of Belfast from 1952-59 
before moving to Manchester where he held the chair of political economy until 1963 when 
he left to become a founding Vice-Chancellor of the University of Lancaster.
34
 Chubb was 
professor of political science at Trinity College, University of Dublin. FitzGerald was an 
economist and journalist who became in turn a lecturer in University College Dublin, Minister 
for Foreign Affairs and Taoiseach. Lynch was professor of economics in University College 
Dublin and economic adviser to Taoiseach John A. Costello. He also served on numerous 
public bodies and was chairman of Aer Lingus from 1954-75. Ryan was professor of 
economics at Trinity College, University of Dublin and was seconded to the Department of 
Finance in 1960 to help with the implementation of the First Programme for Economic 
Expansion. He too served on numerous public bodies and as governor of the Bank of Ireland 
from 1985-9. Whitaker was Secretary of the Department of Finance and subsequently 
Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland. On his retirement he was appointed to the Senate 
and also chaired many government commissions.  
Given their respective backgrounds it seems reasonable to suggest that the contributors from 
academia in particular were largely disinterested parties offering ideas that provided ‘a set of 
ready solutions for problems that arise within their domain’ (Peters, 2001: 66). Research on 
their writings shows the following common thread: protectionism was not only incapable of 
solving the country’s problems but was the major cause of those problems; free trade was not 
                                                          
34
Carter was strongly influenced by his mother’s Quaker beliefs.  He refused to serve in World War II and 
consequently spent some time in Strangeways prison. In 1979 he was knighted for his services to education. In 
his relatively short time in Ireland he played a very influential part in public life.    
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only desirable but inevitable; the ‘official mind’ would have to be open to new ideas. They 
were a little more circumspect about criticising the role of the Catholic Church.   
(Barrington and Chubb wrote mainly on administrative efficiency and reform and best 
practice in other jurisdictions. They also contributed 27 of the 66 book reviews in 
Administration.)  
Carter’s Papers and ‘Ideas’ 
In a general context Carter understood the background and necessity for protectionism but by 
the 1950s much of the protectionist measures were no longer working and were 
counterproductive as they utilised scarce resources and nurtured bad management practice in 
protected industries. Not only that but some of these protected industries had become state 
monopolies. 
The following papers were published by Carter (full details in the bibliography). 
1. Symposium on the Economic Outlook, 1954 (relates specifically to U.K.) 
2. Comparisons of National Incomes, Northern Ireland, Ireland and United Kingdom, 
1955 
3. Symposium on Inland Transport, 1957 
4. The Irish Economy viewed from without, 1957 
5. The Unity of the Irish Economic Problem, 1958 
6. Economics and the Public Servant, 1958 
7. A Problem of Economic Development, 1959 
8. Estimates of GDP of Northern Ireland, 1959 
For the purposes of this research concentration is on papers 2, 4, 5, 6, 7. 
Paper 2, on comparing national incomes, showed national per capita income as follows: 
United Kingdom £246, Northern Ireland £169, Ireland £131 (1955: 68). The cost of living in 
Belfast was marginally cheaper (98.7%) than Dublin (p.65) and the gap in standards of living 
was widening. However, in 1957 ‘official’ Ireland finally began to take notice. In paper 4, 
‘The Irish Economy viewed from without’, delivered to the Irish Association in Dublin, 
Carter was much more forthcoming and prescriptive.
35
  At the outset he was aware of the folly 
of an Englishman commenting on Irish affairs as there was still a widespread belief that all 
Irish travails could be laid at the feet of Britain. In the event his fears were unfounded and his 
views were well received. Inter alia he said: ‘on economic matters there is a great gulf 
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 The paper was circulated to members of the government on April 1
st
 and received favourable comment in the 
Dáil (Garvin, 2004: 109). As Garvin puts it ‘Carter was taking on republican petit-bourgeois hostility to ‘Big 
Business’, and the old Sinn-Fein and de Valeran idea that the imagined fearsome social and moral consequences 
of big industry could be bypassed by having many small factories scattered around the country’.  
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between the hard reality and the popular fantasy, so that I have to take the unpopular position 
of a destroyer of illusions’ (1957: 137). He did not spare the body politic: ‘The universal 
resort of politicians is to seek refuge in fantasy, and usually in the dreary fantasy that 
prosperity must wait on the reunion of Ireland’ (1957: 138). For him the root cause of the 
problem was bad management and technical backwardness perpetuated south of the border 
and fostered by protected industries operating behind high tariff walls. The answer to same 
could immediately come ‘from subsidiaries of large foreign companies; and it would be worth 
very large inducements indeed, including complete exemption from taxes for a period, to get 
more of them’ (1957: 140). To do so would run against a whole lot of favourite illusions: that 
small was beautiful and locally owned was better than foreign owned; that foreign ownership 
links one in bondage to the foreigner and in particular to England. He concluded with the 
following exhortation: 
...economic prosperity is not beyond the reach of the Republic, but it is not to be found 
in self-satisfied isolation, nor in the narrow pride of economic nationalism. It is to be 
found by looking outside and taking what is best in the practice of other nations; by 
seeking the co-operation of others in a development which will benefit them as well; 
in fact, by using brains and ability and common sense, and (if they are in short supply) 
by attracting them back from overseas (1957: 142). 
 
In paper 5, ‘The Unity of the Irish Economic Problem’, he again challenged myths on both 
sides of the border, commenting that it was commonsense for neighbours to help one another 
– ‘though it is a form of common sense greatly lacking in Ireland’ (1958a: 379). Continuing 
reliance on agriculture, based on a belief that the land must come first because it was Ireland’s 
principal natural resource was, in Carter’s view, misplaced and inappropriate in the short 
term. (‘In the long run the pressure of world population seems bound to ensure prosperity to a 
country which can offer an agricultural surplus so close to great centres of industrial 
population’ (p.382)). For both jurisdictions the immediate problem was in securing industrial 
development because domestically there was a ‘shortage of ideas and shortage of business 
ability to carry them out’. Shortage of finance was a less serious problem because such 
shortage is ‘often a mere symptom of the lack of ideas and ability to be expected from credit-
worthy borrowers’ (p. 383). 
 
In paper 6, ‘Economics and the Public Servant’, (originally read as a paper to the IPA and 
subsequently published in Administration) he advocated throwing the majority of economists 
into the river Liffey because of their detachment from the real world. He castigated those 
‘who develop a Theory of Demand without ever consulting their wives to find out how human 
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beings really act when they buy things’ (1958: 44) and advised his audience to always 
remember that there are human beings at the end of the chain. Making decisions requires 
sound judgement on what will be the reaction of the businessman, the worker or the 
housewife to the effects of an extra tax on prices and demand. He would rescue some of the 
economists from the Liffey so that they could provide some academic training that would help 
the public servant. However, ‘if you come with an imaginative understanding of the human 
being that is the greatest advantage of all’ (p.49). 
 
In paper 7, ‘Problem of Economic Development’, Carter again does not pull his punches. The 
process of economic development can be broken down into six stages: a definition of the 
principles of development; the gathering of information; assessment of the information; 
preparation of specific projects; the ranking of projects; the decision to proceed. He 
continued: ‘It is my view that we are fairly good on principles, that information gathering is 
deficient, that assessment is weak, and that in the preparation and execution of specific plans 
we are very weak’ (1959: 146).  Where private enterprise is not prepared to undertake the 
necessary projects the State should be prepared to do so, using the above criteria in assessing 
projects for productive investment.
36
 Whitaker’s Economic Development (see below) is 
praised for its efforts on the agricultural side but found wanting for its efforts in other areas. 
Any plan, no matter how laudable ‘must have first class brains to prepare it’ and he 
questioned if we had the right people? ‘A great deal of the future of Ireland may depend on 
the quality and training of those found for the key positions’ (1959: 153).  
 
(He also contributed a paper to the Commission on Emigration in1956). 
 
Carter was proposing a paradigm shift for the Irish body politic, attacking the assumptions 
that were embedded in institutional life by proposing new elite prescriptions and offering 
frames that would enable decision makers legitimize programmes to their constituents. Being 
an outsider may well have increased his influence. What comes across on reading his papers 
is a man who was prepared to call it as he saw it, an independent academic who dealt with the 
empirical evidence, and at the same time acknowledged that his audience might be sceptical 
of an Englishman daring to speak out on Irish economic problems. Nevertheless, it appears 
                                                          
36
 Somewhat tongue in cheek he went on: ‘though Planning (like Socialism) is a naughty word, I propose to use 
it’ (1959: 147). 
64 
 
that his contributions were well received and he was appointed to the Capital Advisory 
Committee by Minister for Finance Sweetman. He was held in high regard by fellow 
economists and was consulted regularly by Whitaker.   
One is left with the inescapable conclusion that here was a first class mind. His papers are 
highly readable, intellectually rigorous, and appear to have been delivered with a certain 
degree of panache. His contribution to Irish public life was significant, especially when one 
considers that his tenure in Ireland was only for seven years and during that time he was 
attached to The Queen’s University of Belfast, a body that would have been viewed with a 
good degree of scepticism south of the border. This makes his contribution all the more 
remarkable.  
 
Lynch’s Papers and ‘Ideas’ 
In contrast to Carter, Lynch was an insider and his influence may have been diluted by his 
association with Fine Gael and his role as economic adviser to John A. Costello. He was the 
most strident critic of the ‘official mind’ as evidenced in both the political and administrative 
elites. An analogy he used about criticism of public policy (1953: 258) could equally be 
applied to himself: ‘the urge to shoot the man at the piano often arises not so much from the 
quality of his performance as from dislike of the tune’! 
His main papers from the period are listed below: 
1. The Economist and Public Policy, 1953 
2. Public Enterprise in a Free Economy, 1954 
3. The Irish Economic Prospect, 1955 
4. Administrative Theory and the Civil Service, 1956 
5. The Economics of Independence, 1959 (originally delivered as a Tuairim lecture) 
6. Economic Planning in Ireland, 1960 
7. Administrative Efficiency, 1960 
 
In paper 1, ‘The Economist and Public Policy’, he was trenchant in his criticism of public 
policy and the quality of the official mind
37
: 
The success of any public policy depends no less on its intrinsic merits than on the 
quality of the public service that executes it. In that public service procedure, 
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 Lee refers to Lynch’s contribution as ‘a subversive and lethal assault on the quality of existing thought, but 
presented with sufficient diplomatic finesse to make it difficult for the immediate targets to express public 
indignation’ (1989: 341). 
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precedent, protocol, expediency, all have an importance, but it is the intellectual 
capacity to respond to ideas that best serves the public (1953: 260). 
  
State involvement in enterprise was often detrimental to capital formation and, more 
importantly, to enterprise and innovation. In private enterprise capital was expected to look 
after itself but in a collectivised system (which he believed Ireland was becoming) capital 
formation ‘becomes a matter solely for the central planning authority’ (1953: 245). 
Continuing reliance on protectionism was stifling initiative. Nevertheless, he acknowledged 
both the necessity and desirability of state intervention in the economy but it had to be 
concentrated in productive development. He points out that in a period of high state activity 
between 1946 and 1951 the workforce only increased by 800 per annum while emigration was 
about 24,400 per annum. What was needed was ‘intelligent centralized planning’ that would 
‘achieve a better balance in the state capital programme between socially desirable 
investments, such as hospitals, and investment that earns revenue directly or indirectly’ (1953: 
250). It required a Civil Service with ‘an enlightened approach to problems, flexibility of 
mind and an awareness of contemporary trends in informed thought’ and not ‘an obstinate and 
hidebound adherence to notions which may be as obsolete as the mammoth and the dodo’ 
(1953: 256). He finishes this seminal paper with a quotation from Keynes’ General Theory: 
Practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from any intellectual 
influences, are usually the slaves of some defunct economist. Madmen in authority, 
who hear voices in the air, are distilling their frenzy from some academic scribbler of 
a few years back. I am sure that the power of some vested interests is vastly 
exaggerated compared with the gradual encroachment of ideas [italics added] (1953: 
260). 
 
In paper 2, ‘Public Enterprise in a Free Economy’, he again wrote about the ‘curiously mixed 
form of economy’ (1954: 13) where state-sponsored bodies were neither private enterprises 
nor totally collectivist. This time his ire was directed at the lack of accountability of such 
bodies: ‘There is little merit in using the machinery of state to eliminate private monopoly and 
replace it by a public monopoly that retains the vices of the old system but reveals them less 
openly’ (1954: 20).  
 
Central to paper 3, ‘The Irish Economic Prospect’, (published in a special edition of Studies 
devoted to the theme, Ireland Tomorrow) was his argument that any optimism about the 
performance of the economy since independence was misguided because what little success 
existed was due to foreign earnings from the savings of earlier generations that were held 
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outside the state, primarily in sterling assets.
38
 The volume of total exports in 1953 was less 
than 25 five years previously. In 1928 exports paid for 76 per cent of imports; by 1953 that 
figure was down to 62 per cent (1955: 6) and the ‘total number of persons at work in Ireland 
was only 12,000 or 1 per cent more than in 1926’ (p. 9). Net capital formation in 1952 
amounted to £59m of which £25m was spent on social (unproductive) investment and £10m 
was spent on the replacement of existing capital, leaving only £25m to improve industrial and 
agricultural output. Sacrifice of current consumption (as done in other countries) would be 
required and ‘to escape from the stagnation that has held the country in thrall since the Treaty 
there must be more productive investment’ (1955: 14). Protectionism was having a stifling 
effect on production. 
 
In paper 5, ‘The Economics of Independence’, he was writing that ‘Irish political economy 
sometimes tends to be more political than economic. This imbalance merely stultifies and 
confuses’ (1959: 2). For Lynch the fault lay in the ‘Sinn Féin myth’ which continued to be a 
decisive influence on public discourse since independence and ‘assumed that political 
independence implied economic independence’ (1959: 3). He was broadly supportive of 
Whitaker’s analysis in Economic Development and did acknowledge an on-going role for 
state enterprises as Ireland ‘is a mixed economy in which private and public enterprise each 
has its place’ (1959: 10). But clearly the present system was not working and led to the worst 
of both worlds – inefficient (protected) private enterprise and haphazard public enterprise. 
Concentration must be on productive investment and closer economic links with our nearest 
neighbours. He concludes with a challenge to the ‘official mind’, the path dependent nature of 
Irish institutions, and the continuing search for new ideas:  
An essential condition for progress is the desire for change, a resentment of stagnation, 
a willingness to depart from obsolete ideas, leadership with a consistent sense of 
direction... concern for the preservation of reform, where necessary, of every 
institution which the community has established.... More than anything else, new ideas 
count in the long run – provided they are the right ones (1959: 17). 
 
The other papers continue the challenge to the ‘official mind’ by a continuing search for 
increased efficiency and better management practice allied to more long-term planning. 
 
                                                          
38
 In 1931 income from foreign investments was £14.4m (almost 24 per cent) of total foreign earnings of £61m. 
By 1953 foreign investment income at £23m (when the balance of payments deficit was £7.1m) ‘the income 
from sterling investments which unobtrusively made equilibrium possible is often treated with the somewhat 
guilty silence that surrounds a legacy inherited from a disgraced and discarded relative’ (1955: 11). 
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Running through much of Lynch’s writings is a palpable sense of frustration, and indeed 
anger, at the lack of progress the country had made since independence. He was in no doubt 
that protectionism and the official mind were the root causes of the problem. For him free 
trade and productive investment were the obvious answers. He regularly excoriated the 
hypocrisy permeating Irish public life and the unwillingness to face economic reality. The 
writer recalls seeing him on television on numerous occasions since the mid 1960s and even 
as an old man he lost none of his anger and passion for a better Ireland, always backing his 
arguments with economic data and repeating ad nauseam the necessity for productive 
investment and being open to new ideas. Like Carter, his contribution was enormous. His 
papers offered cogent arguments for change and when one gets behind his sense of frustration 
there is a distinct sense of patriotism running through his writing. He only wanted what was 
best for his fellow countrymen. 
   
Ryan’s Papers and Ideas 
With Carter and Lynch, Ryan was the other leading economist of the period and all three 
served as economic advisers on the Capital Investment Advisory Committee that was set up 
by Gerald Sweetman, Minister for Finance in 1956.  
 
His main papers for the period were: 
1. Some Public Enterprise Problems: the Pricing Policy of the Public Enterprise, 1954 
2. A National Investment Board, 1954 
3. Protection and Efficiency of Irish Industry, 1954 
4. Irish Manufacturing Industry, the Future, 1955 
5. The Irish Balance of Payments, 1956 
Ryan was, perhaps, the most academic of the ‘Three Wise Men’. His papers are theoretical in 
nature and outline the economic theory underpinning various options. He dealt with the facts 
as he saw them from a theoretical perspective. Unlike Carter and Lynch, he does not stray into 
the prescriptive. 
 
FitzGerald’s Papers and Ideas, 
In the 1950s FitzGerald variously worked as an economist, lecturer and journalist. The 
following are his main papers from the 1950s: 
1. Factors influencing air transport rates and fares, 1952 
2. The Irish Economy North and South, 1956 
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3. Ireland and the Free-Trade Area, 1957 
4. Irish Economic Problems, 1957 
5. Grey, White and Blue, 1958 
6. Training Public Servants for National Development, 1959 
7. Mr. Whitaker and Industry, 1959 
8. P.R. The Great Debate, 1959 
Reference has already been made to FitzGerald’s paper 2, ‘The Irish Economy North and 
South’ and the unwillingness south of the border to look at the neighbour’s northern garden 
and the prosperity that was evident there. Throughout the 1950s Europe, under the umbrella 
of the proposed European Free Trade Area (EFTA), the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC) and the Treaty of Rome, was also featuring and was to play an increasing ideational 
role. In paper 3, Ireland and the Free-Trade Area, he was an early and eager promoter of the 
European idea, and rather presciently wrote the following: 
Membership of the Free Trade Area would clearly be a first step towards ending our 
long isolation from Europe. It would bring with it new contacts, new friendships and, 
perhaps, a modification of the hitherto unchallenged anglocentricity of Irish life, 
whether anglophone or anglophile (1957: 25). 
 
In paper 4, ‘Irish Economic Problems’, he echoed Lynch’s views about the poor performance 
of the economy being masked by the realization of foreign assets and attacked the 
complacency and cynicism that opposed any remedial action ‘on the grounds that the status 
quo is good enough or, alternatively, because there is no hope of achieving the desired result’ 
(1957: 271). By 1956 the economic state of the country had become apparent to all with an 
adverse trade balance (import over exports) of £100 million. A psychological shift in attitudes 
and ensued and there was a growing realisation that EFTA may provide an answer.  
The prospect of emerging, however perilously, from behind the shadow of our tariff 
wall has been welcomed by many ... with the result that the protected manufacturers, 
long accustomed to tacit public acceptance of their subsidization through tariffs, have 
been almost overnight placed on the defensive and shocked into cautious silence or 
non-committal attitudes ... the case against Irish participation in the Free Trade Area 
has almost gone by default ... its emergence at this stage has already altered the 
balance of power in Ireland between protectionists and free traders. The days of 
unlimited tariff protection are now numbered (1957: 273/4). 
 
His judgement was proved correct but his timing somewhat off because of the path dependent 
nature of the institutions of state and of what Pierson (2004: 82) had to say about timing and 
sequence: Slow-moving processes may be cumulative, involve threshold effects, or require 
the unfolding of extended causal chains’. The economic argument for free trade may have 
69 
 
been irrefutable but the ‘idea’ still had to gain administrative and political acceptability before 
it could be implemented.  
 
In papers 5 and 7, ‘Grey White and Blue’, and ‘Mr. Whitaker and Industry’ he offers an 
assessment of Whitaker’s efforts and analysis in Economic Development and that of the 
Government White paper. 
 
At interview Dr FitzGerald was quite modest about his contribution inferring that all he was 
doing was stating the obvious!
39
  However he had some interesting observations of the 1950s.  
 
On the fixation with sterling he pointed out that the nature of Irish undiversified trade meant 
that our major foreign exchange earnings were in sterling and whereas there was plenty of talk 
about economic independence and breaking the sterling link ‘no one knew how to do it’.  
 
On the close ties that continued to exist between the Department of Finance and the British 
Treasury he commented that ‘Finance officials used the Christian names of Treasury officials 
while using surnames when corresponding with other [Irish] civil servants’.  
 
On the fixation with agriculture he had some sympathy with the prevailing view pointing out 
that it was only in 1957 that industrial output equalled agricultural output for the first time.  
For him free trade was the only way out of the morass and the fixation with protectionism, 
and more critically with self-sufficiency, was ‘fundamentally flawed because the country did 
not have a sufficient climatic range north to south to produce all the year round and on top of 
that we only had three million people’. It also became clear that he was a great admirer of 
Whitaker, whom he had first met through the SSISI, and spoke with enthusiasm of the 
psychological effects of Economic Development.
40
 On the Department of Finance, learning 
post 1959 to say ‘yes’, he quipped that ‘they quickly forgot’. With Whitaker as Secretary, the 
Department had changed dramatically and was now supportive of productive expenditure. 
This was in marked contrast to his experience of the Department when he served as Taoiseach 
in the 1980s. He also suggested that, in his experience, the relationship that developed 
                                                          
39
 He credited his own ‘European’ views to the fact that as he grew up at least half the books in his father’s 
library were in French. His two older brothers were partly educated in France and it was planned that he too 
would do likewise but World War II intervened.  
40
 When Whitaker was governor of the Central Bank of Ireland FitzGerald was part of an informal group that 
used to assemble at the Bank in the evening time to discuss economics (Fitzgerald 2009). 
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between Lemass as Taoiseach and Whitaker as Secretary of the Department of Finance was 
‘absolutely unique’ and not experienced before or since and that this was the key to their 
success.
41
 
 
His writing in the 1950s was quite prescient and what he had to say at interview was 
consistent with same. He was a committed European from an early stage and saw the 
possibilities for Ireland in that field before many of his contemporaries did. His contribution 
to the intellectual and economic debate was significant. Unfortunately, his time as Taoiseach 
was not marked with economic success and the difficulty of marrying theory and practice 
proved beyond him in the circumstances of the time – he led a coalition government of Fine 
Gael and Labour and there were deep divisions on taxation and fiscal policy (Hussey, 1990; 
Quinn, 2006; Desmond, 2000; Dukes, 2009).  
 
 
Whitaker’s Papers and Ideas 
The following are the main papers published by Whitaker of which 2, 4 and 5 are the most 
significant: 
1. Symposium on National Incomes and Social Accounts 1952 
2. The Finance Attitude, 1953 
3. Balance of Payments, dollar and non-dollar areas, 1954 
4. Capital Formation, Savings and Economic Progress, 1956, (Studies and 
Administration) 
5. Economic Development 1958 
6. Staid na Tíre, 1960 
 
Given the seminal role that Whitaker was to play in Irish public life it is appropriate to give 
some biographical background and historical context. He joined the civil service in 1934 and 
moved to the Department of Finance in 1938 where he swiftly rose through the ranks and was 
appointed Secretary of the Department in 1956 at the age of thirty nine. It was a highly 
significant appointment because his promotion came over the heads of more ‘senior’ 
                                                          
41
 On his own relationship with Maurice Doyle as secretary in Finance it was quickly apparent that it was not a 
harmonious one. ‘Maurice Doyle was very negative and suspicious of politicians and I was very unhappy with 
the information I was getting from Finance’. He went on to describe an incident (subsequently confirmed at 
interview with Alan Dukes, Minister for Finance in FitzGerald’s government) where Doyle briefed the 
government that the maximum that could be borrowed from the markets was £750 million. FitzGerald 
approached Henry Kissinger, then heading an economic consultancy, who quickly reported back (on a pro bono 
basis) that the markets would happily lend £900 million giving the government an extra £150 million with which 
to balance the budget. ‘I trumped Finance’s £750 million and they were not happy. That was Maurice Doyle’. 
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colleagues and departed from the hitherto accepted practice of promotion on seniority.
42
 This 
is an example of the cultural dimension of organisational change that Bulmer and Burch refer 
to as ‘understandings about who is eligible to fill a position and what they are expected to do’ 
(2001: 7). Whitaker is widely acknowledged as the pre-eminent Irish civil servant.
43
 He had 
served under both McElligott (who was Secretary for twenty seven years) and Redmond, both 
highly conservative Secretaries of the old school. On being notified of his appointment by the 
Minister for Finance, Gerald Sweetman, Whitaker went in to see Redmond, then on his 
second last day in office, to inform him of his appointment as his successor. Having received 
less than enthusiastic congratulations Redmond added: ‘You should know that I did not 
recommend you’ (Interview with author).  
 
In paper 2, ‘The Finance Attitude’, (originally delivered as an address to the Association of 
Higher Civil Servants on 28/10/1953), Whitaker outlined his Department’s thinking on public 
expenditure (and conformed to Lynch’s prototype of the ‘official mind’). ‘The first principle 
of financial administration is the inevitability of choice between competing ends’ (1954: 63). 
As every proposal involving public expenditure required Department of Finance approval ‘our 
function is not to select the most meritorious and clap these on the taxpayer’s back but, rather, 
to see that as few as possible emerge as new burdens on the community’ (p. 64). He went on 
to quote Gladstone’s dictum that the more you leave in the taxpayer’s pocket, the more 
prosperity there will be. In many ways he was confirming the path dependent nature of the 
Department of Finance and the continuing Treasury influence. In concluding he again quoted 
Gladstone: if the Department of Finance should ‘become popular that fact itself would be 
conclusive proof that it was not properly fulfilling the purpose for which it exists’ (p. 68). 
 
In paper 4, ‘Capital Formation, Saving and Economic Progress’, delivered to the SSISI in May 
1956, ten days before his appointment as Secretary in Finance, he gave a very brave and 
                                                          
42
 The senior, and expected, candidate was Sarsfield Hogan who, in the event, rose above any personal 
disappointment he may have felt, and was always supportive of Whitaker. ‘I could not say the same for the rest 
of his senior colleagues’ (Whitaker 2009). His appointment was generally welcomed by those working in the 
Department, especially by ambitious, younger colleagues who believed that Whitaker would break the mould (O 
Cofaigh). Why he was appointed by Sweetman has never been disclosed. One interviewee, who asked to remain 
anonymous, suggested that a contributory factor may have been a perception in some quarters that Hogan, the 
senior man, was more interested in rugby (an essentially British game!) than finance. 
43
 Lee (1987: 342): Whitaker ‘combined exceptional ability with exceptional dedication’ and ‘the sheer 
intellectual calibre of the man at the helm of the premier department of state’. Coogan (2004: 21): ‘the dynamic 
Whitaker’. Collins (2001: 21): ‘the combination of Lemass and Whitaker changed the face of Ireland in a few 
short years’. Fanning (2009: 33): Whitaker acquired ‘deservedly heroic stature’. Fitzgerald (2009: 60) referred to 
him as ‘my hero then as now!’ 
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‘personal’ summary of the Irish economic performance that showed his paradigm was no 
longer constrained by the background underlying assumptions that hitherto permeated his 
department.
44
 The primary need was for increased output in both agriculture and industry 
which would require both increased capital formation and an ‘incentive to invest in productive 
enterprises’ (1956: 54). Any subvention by government to agriculture, in particular, ‘should 
be directly linked to the objective of increased production rather than be given as a general 
subvention’ (p. 57).  
Prolonged protection, sheltering high domestic costs or inferior quality, blocks both 
the incentive and the capacity to expand production for export markets. Modification 
of protection, improvements in industrial organisation, and a closer gearing of pay to 
productivity are necessary.... (p. 58). 
  
New industries were required that could compete effectively in export markets but to attract 
same ‘tariff protection may have to give way to other stimuli, such as grants towards the 
initial capital cost of factories or towards technical training’ (p.59).  In this paper he also gave 
a nuanced criticism of Keynes, whom he greatly admired, but pure ‘Keynesianism’ would not 
work in a small open economy such as Ireland’s. He concluded:  
Saving and production should be encouraged and excessive consumption 
discouraged... capital development of a productive nature should be encouraged... 
there should be a liberal attitude towards profits to encourage their expansion and use 
for productive purposes... [government assistance] should be directed specifically 
towards the development of productive capacity (p. 76).  
 
Whitaker’s paper 5, ‘Economic Development’ was to prove seminal, not only in gaining 
administrative acceptability of an economic ‘idea’, but in the transformation of Ireland and 
will be dealt with in the following chapter.  
 
Whitaker occupies a unique position at the First Critical Juncture. Not only was he an 
ideational actor who played a significant part in the formulation of the ‘ideas’ that were to be 
implemented he also sold them to the political elites, thereby attaining political acceptability, 
and also ensured administrative acceptability and implementation. Remarkably for someone 
in public life he appears to have made few, if any, enemies. He epitomises all that is best in a 
public servant: a keen mind and the courage to speak out when necessary.   
 
 
                                                          
44
 Fitzgerald (2008) recounts being at that particular meeting and that Whitaker’s views on protectionism were 
strongly challenged by John Leydon, recently retired Secretary at the Department of Industry and Commerce. 
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New Ideas’ for the Transformation of Ireland 
Tuairim, Administration, Studies and JSSISI were the main purveyors of ideas at the first 
critical juncture and has been demonstrated all the main ideational actors published across the 
spectrum. Studies was founded in 1912 and JSSISI in 1847 but Tuairim and Administration 
were very much creations of the 1950s and represented a clear-cut break with tradition: they 
became the mouthpieces of the post revolution generation. The rising to the top in the civil 
service of people such as Whitaker and Barrington allowed for new thinking. ‘A logjam had 
burst that allowed for institutional recognition of what were now long-established orthodoxies 
in other Western countries’ (Fanning, 2008: 194). 
 
All of the above ideational brokers were in agreement, and consistent, that protectionism had 
outlived its usefulness. For them, Keynesianism was the new dominant economic philosophy 
and free trade inevitable. Unless Ireland wanted to fall further behind the rest of the world it 
would have to change. Free trade is the exact opposite of protectionism with no barriers or 
tariffs to trade. Its main appeal is that its efficiency principle ensures that ‘the socially optimal 
quantity of any good is the quantity that maximizes the total economic surplus that results 
from producing and consuming the good... Efficiency is an important social goal because 
when the economic pie grows larger, everyone can have a larger slice’ (Frank and Bernanke, 
2004: 82).
45
 It is met with opposition because ‘although free trade benefits the economy as a 
whole specific groups may not benefit (ibid: 413). This particularly applies to inefficient 
protected industries and, as will be seen in the next chapter, opposition to change was deeply 
ingrained in the Ireland of the time.  
 
The move from protectionism to free trade would have to be gradual. New employment 
opportunities for displaced workers (who would need to be retrained to work in the new 
‘efficient’ replacement industries) could/would arise from the attraction of foreign direct 
investment largely through the use of tax incentives and through moving state investment 
from social to productive investment. These were the proposals of the ideational actors for the 
transformation of Ireland that had largely received economic acceptability. In framing their 
proposals they were well aware of the opposition that would be encountered from various 
institutions of state. Carter and Lynch, forcefully, and FitzGerald and Whitaker more 
diplomatically, had pointed out the institutional veto points that would be encountered. What 
                                                          
45
 This was understood intuitively by Lemass who wanted to move from the redistributive model that had 
become ingrained in Irish society. For him it would be much better to have a bigger pie. 
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was being proposed entailed a major paradigm shift to replace the background underlying 
assumptions of self- sufficiency and protectionism, embedded in the public sentiment almost 
since the foundation of the state, with the new ideas of free trade and foreign direct 
investment.  
 
Ireland had arrived at a critical moment, what Burch, Hogwood and Bulmer call a perceived 
opportunity for significant change.  
At such critical moments formerly rigid institutional hierarchies become more 
malleable and the bias of an institution is subject to pressure... The opportunity may 
not be realised and exploited: it may effectively be missed. However if it is realised, 
the outcome is a ‘critical juncture’, incorporating a clear departure from clearly 
established patterns (2003: 7). 
  
It is a central tenet of this thesis that the critical moment did become a critical juncture when 
the ideas of free trade and foreign direct investment, which had received economic 
acceptability, then went on to receive administrative and political acceptability thereby 
conforming to Hall’s Framework (1989: 371) for the adoption and implementation of a new 
transformative idea.  
 
How this was achieved will be demonstrated in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 4: Achieving Administrative and Political Acceptability 
at the First Critical Juncture in the Transformation of Ireland 
 
Administrative and political acceptability were inextricably interlinked and highly dependent 
on two men: Seán Lemass as Taoiseach and T. K. Whitaker as Secretary of the Department of 
Finance. The events that unfolded over 1958/9 are a neat encapsulation of the cumulative 
causes that had the threshold effects described by Pierson as needing to be understood in the 
context of their timing and sequencing, i.e. situating events and moments in a temporal 
sequence can greatly increase the understanding of those events. In the previous chapter it was 
shown how the ideas of free trade and foreign direct investment achieved economic 
acceptability. Peters put it that ‘ideas tend to provide a set of ready solutions for problems that 
arise within their domain’ (2001: 66) and Whitaker certainly subscribed to this. His 
appointment as Secretary of the Department of Finance came about somewhat unexpectedly 
but at a critical moment ‘when a perceived opportunity arises for significant change. That is, 
an event takes place which raises a general expectation that significant change will follow’ 
(Burch, Hogwood and Bulmer, 2003: 7). That event was to be the publication of Whitaker’s 
Economic Development.  
 
On the political front change was in the air with the generation which had led the country 
since independence retiring from the scene, and the emergence of a new political elite and an 
intergenerational transfer of power. Similar change happened on the administrative front with 
the emergence of senior civil servants who had not worked for the British. Pierson (2004: 
120) refers to the problem of actor discontinuity – when ‘gaps’ may emerge ‘because the 
actors who inherit institutional arrangements are not the same as those who designed them’. 
One of the central characters to step into the ‘gap’ was Seán Lemass who succeeded de Valera 
as Taoiseach. His acceptance of the economic proposals was to prove crucial in gaining 
political acceptance and so complete two of the three strands identified by Hall for the 
viability and enactment of a new idea. It is also highly probable that both men were not only 
influenced by a new idea but the political realities of a changing international situation, the 
emergence of the EEC, and the vulnerability of Ireland to any change of policy by the British. 
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Using process tracing and interviews with some of the key actors this chapter will trace the 
steps that ensured administrative and political acceptance of the ideas of free trade and foreign 
direct investment. The main hypothesis of this thesis is that this in turn resulted in the 
transformation of Ireland at the first critical juncture. 
 
Administrative Change  
On his accession to the top job in Finance Whitaker quickly moved to make his mark. On 21 
March 1957, on his first day as Minister for Finance in the new Fianna Fáil administration, Dr 
Jim Ryan received a ten page memorandum from Whitaker on the Irish Economy. It outlined 
his concerns and the stark choices facing the country.
1
 Considering that Whitaker had been 
appointed by a Fine Gael government, Fanning (2009: 31) rightly calls this memorandum 
‘seminal and apocalyptic’ and ‘tantamount to fluttering a Union Jack under the nose of a 
Fianna Fáil bull’ (p. 32) and incredibly brave in the circumstances. In his submission to the 
new Minister for Finance, Whitaker wrote: 
It is accepted on all sides that we have come to a critical and decisive point in our 
economic affairs. It is only too clear that the policies we have hitherto followed have 
not resulted in a viable economy. It is equally clear that we face economic decay and 
the collapse of our political independence if we elect to shelter permanently behind a 
protectionist blockade ... if we do not expand our production on a competitive basis, 
we shall have failed to provide the economic basis for the political independence and 
material progress of the community. Indeed if we expect to fail, it would be better to 
make an immediate move towards reincorporation in the United Kingdom rather than 
to wait until our economic decadence became even more apparent (Cited in Fanning, 
2009: 32). 
 
Whitaker clearly believed that the country was at a ‘critical moment’ and as Bulmer and 
Burch point out ‘in theory, at each critical moment the opportunities for institutional 
innovation are at their widest’ (1998: 605) and Whitaker was innovative.  In mid-May he 
formed a committee of his senior personnel and asked them to put on their thinking caps and 
informed them that it was ‘desirable that this Department should do some independent 
thinking and not simply wait for Industry and Commerce or the IDA to produce ideas’. Their 
biggest challenge was ‘how to reshape and redirect the capital programme so that, in 
association with development in agriculture, industry etc it will provide productive and self-
sustaining employment’ (Fanning, 1978: 509). Whitaker also consulted with McElligott, then 
Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland, and with Professors Carter, Ryan and Lynch, the 
                                                          
1
 At interview Dr. Whitaker advised that Ryan’s response, and that of the few other ministers that mentioned it to 
him, was largely positive. It is also worth noting that when Ryan delivered his first budget shortly less than two 
months later his opening remarks were almost identical to those used by Whitaker in his memo. 
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three leading economists cited above who were also economic consultants to the Capital 
Investment Advisory Committee.
2
 He was also in touch with his contacts at the World Bank 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
 
What Whitaker was proposing for the Irish economy was very much based on indicative 
planning which originated in France. It was carried out by the Commission Generâl du Plan 
and sought to solve the problem of bottle-necks in the economy through a combination of 
centralised planning and decentralisation that offered incentives and inducements as 
necessary. At interview Whitaker talked at length about how he was influenced by French 
planning and in particular by the memoirs of Charles de Gaulle and quoted at length, in 
French, what de Gaulle had to say. He was also very au fait with ideas emanating from the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, even prior to Irish membership. Once 
Ireland joined both bodies in 1956 he developed strong contacts with some of the principal 
personnel in those organisations.  
 
By 12 December 1957 the work underway had progressed sufficiently for Whitaker to inform 
his Minister of the work carried out to date and seeking ministerial approval to further 
develop same. His proposal was laid before the cabinet and  formal approval, which issued on 
18 December 1957, stated that for ‘the purposes of the study the Secretary of the Department 
of Finance would have free access, for information, advice and assistance, to officers of the 
other Departments and State organizations concerned’ (Whitaker, 1958: 230). The fact that he 
received formal approval within six days of submitting his proposal is a clear indication of 
how well Whitaker had prepared the political ground. The resulting report was entitled 
Economic Development (paper 5 in Whitaker’s writing cited in the preceding chapter) and any 
history of modern Ireland refers to its ground-breaking role. 
 
Economic Development 
In essence Economic Development was a forensic examination of the Irish economy.
3
 It runs 
to 249 pages, including appendices. There are twenty four chapters in total. The introduction, 
the general economic, financial and monetary commentary, the assessment of resources and 
needs, together with the recommendations and conclusions were all written by Whitaker. All 
                                                          
2
 This committee was appointed by Gerald Sweetman and in addition to the three economists it included leading 
industrialists and businessmen. To their chagrin it included no one from the Department of Finance, and to their 
further dismay was chaired by John Leydon, the archetypical protectionist. 
3
 It also builds on Whitaker’s 1956 paper ‘Capital Formation, Saving and Economic Development’. 
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the other chapters were written by seven named officials in Finance. Whitaker acknowledges 
the advice and comments he received from various organs of the state. For ‘ideas’, as a 
practising economist, he inevitably drew heavily on the advice and works of other economists 
such as Professors Carter, Ryan and Lynch (all cited in the previous chapter), the writings of 
Professor A.K. Cairncross and of J.M. Keynes. He also acknowledges an aricle by the Bishop 
of Clonfert, Dr. William Philbin, ‘Patriotism and the Public Servant (Administration, Vol. 6, 
No. 3) which decried the lack of initiative and organisational ability in agriculture, industry 
and commerce.  
 
Central to Whitaker’s whole critique was: ‘The policies hitherto followed, though given a fair 
trial, have not resulted in a viable economy’ (p.2). He supported his arguments with the 
following figures: 
 Income – in 1956 the average income per head in Ireland was $423, Denmark $809, 
Britain $909, Canada $1,420, USA $2,067. 
 Emigration – between 1951 and 1956 the rate of emigration grew 60% over the 
previous five years 
 GNP – between 1949 and 1956 grew by 8%. This compared with 21% for Britain and 
42% for OEEC countries generally. 
 Agricultural output – (1949/ 56) grew at an average rate of 1.5% compared to a rate of 
4% for the OEEC. 
 Industrial output – (1949/56) grew by 30%, the OEEC by 60% 
 
In the ‘Introduction’ the spectre of free trade in Europe is seen as carrying ‘disquieting 
implications’ and that it was clear ‘that, sooner or later, protection will have to go’ (p. 2). It 
would not just be a matter of further investment it would also require ‘... a better appreciation 
of the dependence of material progress on individual output ... raising the general level of 
education, health and skill ... the loosening of restrictive practices ... practical encouragement 
of initiative and enterprise ... adoption of improved methods, techniques and principles of 
organisation and management ... a greater readiness to apply scientific advances’ (p. 7). What 
seems strange now is that there was a belief that  Ireland had ‘power [electrical], transport 
facilities, public services, houses, hospitals and a general “infrastructure” on a scale which is 
reasonable by European standards’ (p. 2). This had resulted from large scale investment in 
social programmes which, though desirable, were ‘non-productive’ and future investment 
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should concentrate on ‘productive’ investment.  It also took a swipe at the futility of 
decentralisation and trying to locate industry in remote areas. 
 
The body of the work concentrates on four main areas: agriculture, fisheries, industry and 
tourism.
4
 There are 113 pages devoted to agriculture and agricultural related industries, 24 
pages to semi-state industries and only 16 to general industry. The concept of a trade in 
services was still in the future. Critical was the call for the continual reappraisal of all 
investment decisions to distinguish between productive and non-productive investment. The 
report was nuanced and requires careful reading with some of the more contentious proposals 
almost hidden away. Tax initiatives to encourage investment in Irish enterprises only appear 
in Appendix 2 (p. 232) and do not appear in the main text. Education gets very little mention 
and agriculture takes precedence over all else.  
 
In the context of the times Economic Development was truly seismic.
5
 It signalled a clear shift 
from protectionism to free trade and challenged the rhetoric of self-sufficiency, a cornerstone 
of Fianna Fáil economic policy since the foundation of the State. Another sacred cow was 
slain with the encouragement of foreign investment and ownership which had been 
constrained by the Control of Manufactures Acts.  In agriculture the focus would be on export 
oriented ventures. Perhaps, most important of all, it showed that the ‘official mind’ was no 
longer exclusively obscurantist and negative, and could no longer be accused of myopia and 
an inability to look beyond the next budget. It also showed that Whitaker accepted the views 
of both Lynch and Chubb on the need for public confidence in the quality of the official mind 
as a prerequisite for national progress.
6
 It set down a clear marker for his fellow civil servants: 
‘That an official should put his name to a virtual manifesto dismayed those whose power lay 
partly in their ability to stifle dissent behind the amiable facade of ministerial responsibility’ 
(Lee, 1982: 4).  
 
                                                          
4
 At interview, and also in correspondence from Dr Whitaker when he had read the chapters on the First Critical 
Juncture, he emphasised that agriculture provided most of our exports.  
5
 Fanning (2008: 194) points out that most of the ideas presented in Economic Development as a new national 
project had been percolating in Studies for over a decade. 
6
 Lynch’s views on the ‘official mind’ have already been cited. In Administration, Vol. 8, No. 4 (1960) Chubb, in 
‘A Political Scientist’s View’ on efficiency in the public service wrote of the need of fitting men to jobs and men 
for jobs (training) which made it necessary to diagnose the qualities necessary for the job. The primary qualities 
for an efficient public service are responsibility or responsiveness and leadership – a desire to contribute. The 
authors of Economic Development fulfilled those criteria. 
80 
 
In retrospect it is easy to look back and wonder what all the fuss was about. Why such a 
concentration on agriculture? Why was action not taken sooner? Why was the link to sterling 
not broken? Why did the Department of Finance not act sooner?   
 
In researching this chapter contact was made with the three authors of Economic Development 
still alive: Dr. Whitaker, T. O Cofaigh and M. Doyle.
7
 Requests were made to all three for 
interviews. Unknown to the author Doyle was terminally ill and understandably declined an 
interview. (He died three months later in September 2009). Both Whitaker and O Cofaigh 
gave freely and generously of their time. Fifty years after the event their excitement was still 
palpable on recalling the compilation of Economic Development. Whitaker, at interview, 
quoted from Wordsworth’s poem on the French Revolution: 
Bliss it was in that dawn to be alive 
But to be young was very Heaven 
 
O Cofaigh had joined the civil service straight from school and had been appointed 
administrative officer in 1948. He served as private secretary to Gerald Sweetman, Minister 
for Finance from 1954 -7 – which he described as ‘a truly great time’. It also gave him first- 
hand experience of the political process. On Economic Development he spoke of a sense of 
‘enterprise, imagination, challenge’, of ‘being asked to use our imagination and not to be 
stultified by precedence.’ For him there was no ‘big idea’ but that they had to come up with a 
lot of small, specific ideas that would enable them ‘to butter the bread: jam might come later’. 
This conforms to what Pierson (2004: 51), writing on critical junctures, had to say: large-scale 
events are not necessary to generate path dependent dynamics. Cumulative causes may be 
incremental and ‘may often seem relatively small compared with their effects’. Those 
working on Economic Development were very much aware of the snowballing effect that 
could be generated by small changes and initiatives. On the larger scale they were very aware 
of the threat and, indeed opportunity, of Europe and often talked among themselves about 
briseadh an sleamhra – breaking the link with Britain, and sterling in particular.8 It came 
across clearly at interview that Whitaker was greatly respected by his staff and they were 
more than happy to put in long hours in the compilation of Economic Development. One gets 
                                                          
7
 Both O Cofaigh and Doyle followed in Whitaker’s footsteps and served as Secretary of the Department of 
Finance and Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland. Maurice Doyle died in September 2009. 
8
 This was something that eventually happened in 1979 when O Cofaigh was Secretary in Finance and is 
something of which he is tremendously proud. He also provided a lot of other useful information that will be 
presented when looking at the second critical juncture. 
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a sense of their excitement and pent up frustration with the path dependent nature of the 
Department until then.  
 
From the mid-1950s ‘there was an intellectual enthusiasm for the concept of Europe’ (O 
Cofaigh interview) and in preparation for Europe they started, at that time, classes in German 
and French in Finance at 5.15 pm each evening. This was subsequently taken up in other 
government departments. 
 
At interview O Cofaigh pointed out that cooperation between government departments in the 
collation of information was generally very good and wherever any resistance was felt at the 
top level there were a number of officers down the line only too happy to help, particularly 
younger officers who were not as ‘hidebound by tradition’. This should not be construed as 
denoting total administrative acceptance of the theories propounded in Economic 
Development. When I queried the emphasis on agriculture O Cofaigh, who was raised in 
inner-city Dublin, was adamant that, for many of those working on the project, agriculture 
was the problem rather than the solution. Redemption could only come through other avenues 
and a radical overhaul of agriculture. For him Bord Bainne (covered in next chapter) got 
things right in its approach to agriculture. (Whitaker, by contrast, was much more circumspect 
pointing out that for every person working in industry there were over ten people ‘engaged’ in 
agriculture).  
 
On questioning Whitaker about the period he was quite clear that action could not have been 
taken sooner because of continuing balance of payment difficulties allied to sterling crises. In 
effect people were not ready for change until then and he happened to be the one who acted as 
catalyst. His overriding influence was the threat of free trade and that immediate action would 
have to be taken to prepare for its imminent arrival. He spoke of feeling ‘a conscientious 
obligation to the state’ and that he ‘owed something to the country’.   His main inspiration 
came from his study of economics but he also acknowledged outside influences such as IMF 
and World Bank and when Ireland joined he found ‘that there was great support for us 
internationally’. He particularly mentioned the support of Louis Rasminsky who subsequently 
became Governor of the Bank of Canada (the Canadian Central Bank).  
 
What Whitaker was proposing for the Irish economy was indicative planning as practised in 
France and he arranged ‘for someone to come over and talk to us about it’.  
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(In relation to the relative success of the Northern Ireland economy both Whitaker and O 
Cofaigh were quick to point out that its success was almost entirely attributable to large scale 
subsidies from Britain). 
 
When asked to comment on the legacy of Economic Development both men were quite 
modest about its impact and their own role. Whitaker’s perception now (2009) is that in the 
immediate aftermath of Economic Development the world was entering the Kennedy era 
where there was widespread optimism across the developed world of better things to come. 
To a certain extent Economic Development captured the zeitgeist of the times and its legacy is 
psychological – ‘it offered hope and that hope was coming from Finance, not noted until then 
for hope!’ 
 
Interviews were also conducted with a number of other retired civil servants who did not wish 
to be named. They provided some very useful general background information on the public 
service generally and how it interacted with the body politic. Those who served in the 1950s 
all spoke of the sense of hope that permeated the service around the time of the publication of 
Economic Development and its aftermath and confirmed that a cultural shift did take place. 
 
What Economic Development proposed would require enormous change at the systemic, 
organisational, regulative and procedural levels.  More problematically it would require 
change at a cultural level. Bulmer and Burch posit that the cultural level constrains all four 
institutional levels: 
At the systemic level, culture could refer to overarching issues, such as the 
understanding of national sovereignty or national identity. At the organisational level, 
it could refer to understandings about who is eligible to fill a position and what they 
are expected to do. At the procedural level it could refer to the traditional Whitehall 
value of sharing information between ministries. At the regulative level, it could refer 
to values concerning when officials in a ministry should take legal advice on a matter. 
Our general point is that this cultural dimension is present at all four levels (2001: 77).  
  
Given that Ireland’s administrative and political systems were based on the British model it is 
reasonable to assume that the same constraints applied. Economic Development called into 
question the very survival of the state – in reality it questioned the most basic systemic tenet, 
national sovereignty. The background underlying assumptions (self-sufficiency from the 
foundation of the state and protectionism from the 1930s onwards) that had been reinforced in 
the public sentiment since independence were being challenged and new elite prescriptions 
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emanating from economic theory proposed that would require administrative and political 
acceptability before they could even begin to be framed as legitimate programmes.  
  
Burch, Hogwood and Bulmer posit that at a critical juncture ‘there is a clear departure from 
previously established patterns’ (2003: 7). Were the actions of Whitaker and the innovations 
he put in place just reflective of a critical moment ‘when formerly rigid institutional 
hierarchies become more malleable and the bias of an institution is subject to pressure’ (ibid.) 
or were they more than that? Again, Burch, Hogwood and Bulmer argue that, irrespective of 
its magnitude if 
...change impacts solely on its own immediate institutional environment then it is 
unlikely to transform a critical moment into a critical juncture. On the other hand, 
change which may be observed as originating in one institutional field – again, 
irrespective of its magnitude – and then pervading further institutional fields of the 
polity to affect a number of dimensions and levels, has the potential to transform the 
polity. It is, therefore, the accumulation of pervasive changes that accounts for the 
realisation of a critical moment as a critical juncture’ (2003; 14). 
 
This research argues that over a very short period of time the ideas propounded in Economic 
Development led to profound change, achieved administrative and political viability and led to 
a critical juncture in which the institutions of state were fundamentally altered.  At such 
junctures Thelen writes  that  ‘rather than conceiving of institutions as holding together a 
particular pattern of politics, historical institutionalists are more likely to reverse the causal 
arrows and argue that institutions emerge from and are sustained by features of the broader 
political and social context’ (1999: 384). . Thelen and Steinmo also remind us that: 
Institutions are an independent variable and explain political outcomes in periods of 
stability, but when they break down, they become the dependent variable, whose shape 
is determined by the political conflicts that such institutional breakdown unleashes 
(1992:15). 
This research shows that a process of transformation was set in train with the publication of 
Economic Development and the institutions of state experienced change at many levels. How 
institutional change was effected will be demonstrated in the next chapter.  
(The Irish administrative system is based on the British model where there is a high level of 
impermeability. Politicians rely on their senior civil servants when making complex economic 
decisions. Consequently ideas originating within the civil service are much more likely ot find 
acceptance).  
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Political Dimension of ‘Free Trade’ and Ireland 
In Chapter 3 the symptoms and causes of the economic failure of the Irish state were set out 
and were demonstrated to be largely attributable to the continuation of protectionism for too 
long.  But outside influences could not be kept at bay forever.  
 
Since 1948 Ireland had been a member of the Organisation for European Economic Co-
operation (OEEC), the forerunner of the OECD.
9
 In 1957 the OEEC set up formal working 
groupings to establish a European Free Trade Area. The previous October the inter-party 
government announced that, acting under the direction of the Taoiseach, a grouping of the 
Secretaries of the Departments of Finance, External Affairs, Industry and Commerce, 
Agriculture and the Taoiseach would examine the likely impacts on Ireland of the emerging 
EEC and OEEC initiatives.  This grouping was ‘to play the key role in moving Irish economic 
policy from a protectionist framework to one where interdependence with other European 
economies was assumed’ (Murphy, 2009: 238). Although concerned about the future of tariffs 
on agricultural products, continuing access to the British market, and special treatment for 
undeveloped countries, the inter-party government issued the following statement on 8 
February 1957:   
In accordance with her general attitude to movements by European countries towards 
closer economic association, Ireland welcomes the proposal to form a European Free 
Trade Area. While her attitude to the question of participating in an area, will as in the 
case of other countries, be determined in the light of consideration of her own national 
interests, Ireland views with sympathy this latest movement towards closer association 
among European countries and wishes the proposal every success (Cited in Murphy, 
2009: 241).  
 
It is clear from the foregoing that at the highest level there was at the very least an 
acknowledgment of the real possibility of free trade in some shape or form. Ireland agreed to 
take part in a number of the working groups set up by the OEEC to prepare the way for a free 
trade agreement and sought special treatment as an undeveloped country. However, as Lee 
(1989: 352) puts it: ‘The scant sympathy shown by members of EFTA towards Irish demands 
for ‘special treatment’ carried the warning that a supplicant posture was unlikely to win 
concessions’.  
                                                          
9
 Ireland had chosen not to join both the General Agreement on Trades and Tariffs and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organisation. However, from 1954 onwards there is increasing evidence of a realisation at the highest level that 
Ireland could not ignore moves towards European economic cooperation and that these moves could have 
serious impact on Irish trade. 
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History shows that events moved rapidly and Ireland was powerless to influence them. For a 
variety of reasons related to protectionism in the first instance, and existing trade relations 
with Britain, Ireland withdrew from entry negotiations. Meenan (1970: 81) posits that 
Ireland’s decision not to apply for membership was pragmatically ‘on the grounds that 
participation would not offer any advantages in view of the patterns of Irish trade’. When 
Britain signalled its intention in 1961 to formally apply for membership of the EEC Ireland 
found itself with no choice but to do likewise and later the same year made a concurrent 
application with Britain. 
 
In the Ireland of 1958/9 free trade was still only a foreground idea and elite prescription. 
Protectionism remained as a background underlying assumption lodged in the public 
sentiment. But things were changing. An export profits tax relief of 50 percent, introduced in 
the Finance Act 1956,  membership of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, 
tentative engagement with the OEEC on free trade, (all instigated by the inter-party 
government) and a balance of payments surplus in 1957, indicated the first real signs of 
change. What subsequently happened was a neat encapsulation of de Tocqueville’s 
(1838/1969) argument that revolution actually occurs when things are improving rather than 
when they are at their worst. It is also a reminder of Pierson’s advice of the importance of 
sequencing and timing. 
 
The Role of Lemass 
Having ‘progressed from gunman to politician, from parliamentarian to minister’ (Farrell, 
1983: 97), Lemass became Taoiseach on 23 June 1959.
10
   Although 60 years of age ‘he was 
like a man who had inherited a potentially valuable house which had been allowed to run 
down, but who had thrown open its stifling shutters, seen what needed to be done, and set 
about doing it vigorously and largely successfully’ (Coogan, 2004: 419). He was a founding 
member of Fianna Fáil and an ever-present and influential minister in all Fianna Fáil 
governments from 1932 until his retirement in 1966. His republican credentials were 
impeccable yet, in spite of his achievements, he was never fully accepted by some of his 
fellow TDs because of his urban roots, his perceived ambivalence on the Irish language and 
relative lack of interest in agriculture.
11
 Within the cabinet and the wider parliamentary party 
                                                          
10
 Many historians refer to an intergenerational handover but Lemass was only 17 years younger than de Valera. 
11
 James Dillon, leader of Fine Gael, famously quipped that Lemass ‘couldn’t bid a dog good day in Irish’ 
(Horgan, 1997: 302).  
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opinion polarised around MacEntee, the arch-conservative, and Lemass who was willing to 
take a gamble and push for development.
12
  By the late 1950s he was not only the heir 
apparent but had also attained the reality of power and was in a position to shape the thrust of 
public policy, being in effect CEO. Having de Valera still as head of the party, and Taoiseach 
again from 1957 when he was then seventy five years old, was a political advantage that 
enabled Lemass ‘to push through changes that were cloaked by the apparent changelessness 
of the Chief’ (Farrell, 1971: 57).13  
 
Lemass had been one of the main architects of protectionism and an ardent promoter of semi-
state bodies.     
[He] was very much a Roosevelt-style New Dealer. That American Democratic spirit 
had much more influence on Fianna Fáil than the meanderings of continental Catholic 
authoritarians. While Lemass espoused the cause of protectionism and put up with the 
silliness of the economic war, he refused to make excuses for inefficiency (Keogh, 
1994: 90). 
 
However, by the late 1940s Lemass was pragmatist enough to realise that protectionism might 
no longer be the best option. In 1947 he introduced the Industrial Efficiency and Prices Bill 
which attempted to reconcile the dilemma of improving efficiency and productivity as a 
prelude to re-examining the tariff policy. He ‘had come to the conclusion that the protected 
industries – or at least a substantial number of them – had utterly failed to deliver their part of 
the bargain and were profit-taking rather than developing or providing additional 
employment’ (Horgan, 1997: 129). The bill never became law because of the change of 
government in 1948 but it is clear that he was having second thoughts on protectionism and 
pragmatist enough to know that it had become a background underlying assumption that was 
sacred to his party and also constrained by public sentiment.  
 
After much internal debate in Fianna Fáil, and widespread opposition, especially from 
MacEntee, his old nemesis, in an address to the party faithful in Clery’s Ballroom in Dublin 
on 11 October 1955, Lemass announced that on return to government Fianna Fáil would 
create 100,000 jobs in five years. This figure caught the headlines even if there was a distinct 
lack of detail on how these jobs would be created. But the speech does give a very clear 
                                                          
12
 Much has been written about the ideological differences between MacEntee and Lemass and how opinion 
polarised around them. But their differences were not personal and they remained lifelong friends. When it came 
to appointing a successor to de Valera Lemass was proposed by MacEntee (Horgan 1997, Murphy 2009). 
13
 McCarthy (1990: 51) writes that de Valera endorsed Whitaker’s study at the cabinet meeting and suggested 
that it was merely an extension of government policy and indeed of Fianna Fáil policy since 1926. He reiterated 
this to McCarthy at an interview in 1969. 
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indication of the ideas that he had and the realisation that the old ways had failed. Inter alia he 
said: 
The Fianna Fáil party has accepted the conclusion that the economic development 
programme which it initiated 25 years ago, notwithstanding its many and very 
substantial achievements and its subsequent acceptance by all political parties has not 
proved to be sufficient to bring about all the economic and social progress which we 
desired and which we believe can be accomplished....The aims of the proposals are, 
firstly, to give the national economy the necessary initial boost; secondly, to bring 
about an increase in private investment activity to the extent required to secure an 
adequate and continuing expansion of the scope and efficiency of private productive 
enterprise; and thirdly to show that the effort needed is not beyond the country’s 
possibilities.
14
 
 
Even though his speech had been cleared in advance with the national executive of his party 
the ideas it contained were anathema to many of the old guard. Bulmer and Burch (2005) refer 
to the misfits around new policy implementation leading to institutional veto points with the 
obverse being institutional opportunity structures. In this instance, even though Lemass was 
proposing the abandonment of ‘self-sufficiency’, accepting foreign investment and de facto 
foreign ownership of new Irish industries, he skilfully negotiated those institutional veto 
points. By the time of the launch of Economic Development he had fully shed his protectionist 
clothes and had become an ardent supporter of free trade. This was Lemass at his most 
pragmatic. He was quite happy to look at anyone else’s ideas, especially those emanating 
from the public service. ‘The responsibility of civil servants is to press matters to a 
conclusion. The responsibility of government is to press matters to a decision’ (cited in 
Murray, 1990: 29). He repeatedly called on all government departments to become 
development corporations. ‘It is perhaps the normal attitude [of a government department] ... 
to be passive rather than active, to await proposals from outside ... to avoid the risks of 
experimentation and innovation ... to vetting proposals brought to them by private interests 
and individuals rather than to generate new ideas themselves’ (Lemass, 1961: 5). Bring him 
ideas and he would make quick decisions because ‘the quick decision is always better than the 
long delayed decision ... once you had some clear concept of a problem that you rarely added 
to your wisdom by going back and looking at it again, and again and again, delaying the 
decision’ (Farrell, 1971: 59). Whitaker, at interview, also confirmed Lemass’ preparedness to 
look at new ways of doing things. He was also happy to look outside the country and two 
large state-interventionist programmes appealed to him: the Tennessee Valley Authority in the 
United States of America and the Vanoni Plan in Italy. They are included here in an attempt 
                                                          
14
 Quoted in Great Irish Speeches edited by Richard Aldous 
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to show how different Lemass was from the majority of his political contemporaries and 
always open to new ideas.  
 
 
Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) 
The Tennessee River basin curved through seven states and often led to disastrous flooding. It 
was an area of dire poverty, in some parts thirty percent of the population had malaria, 
tuberculosis was rampant, children went hungry and ninety seven percent of the farms had no 
electricity.  Roosevelt’s plan was to build dams to control the flooding, provide cheap 
electricity, set up fertiliser plants and replant the forests. There was widespread opposition in 
Congress with cries of ‘socialism’ and that the whole project reeked of communism. 
‘Roosevelt handled these charges with aplomb. “I’ll tell them it [TVA] is neither fish nor 
fowl, but whatever it is it will taste awful good to the people of Tennessee Valley”’ (Jenkins, 
2005: 77). The TVA did not fit any easy categorisation. When the three member executive 
board asked the President what the TVA was supposed to be he explained: ‘It was a regional 
agency ... It wasn’t just providing navigation and flood control and power, it was reclaiming 
land and human beings’ (Morgan, 1986: 385). The project proved to be a major long-term 
success. This direct intervention by the state, where the administration perceived a clear need, 
appealed not only to Lemass’ populism but his desire for action and practical solutions.15 
Quoting Roosevelt directly that the TVA was ‘a corporation clothed with the power of 
Government but possessed of the flexibility and initiative of private enterprise’ (1959: 277), 
Lemass clearly saw the template that he was to emulate in setting up new, and reconstituting 
existing, state-sponsored bodies.  
 
The Vanoni Plan 
The plans announced by Lemass in the Clery’s Ballroom speech referred to above were the 
result of some creative borrowing on his part. He had heard of the Vanoni Plan in Italy, 
obtained a copy of same from the Italian embassy in Dublin and prevailed on C.S. Andrews to 
help him to adapt it to Irish conditions (Horgan, 1997: 165). 
 
                                                          
15
 Garvin (2004: 189) opines that the Shannon hydro-electric scheme in the 1920s was one of the models looked 
at by Roosevelt and that he openly cited the Shannon scheme as an inspiration. However, the scope of the TVA 
was much broader in its ambition. 
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The Vanoni Plan (or, probably more correctly the Vanoni-Saraceno Plan because of the work 
of Pasquale Saraceno who was head of an organisation, founded in 1946, to promote the 
development of industry in the impoverished south of Italy) was a government plan, named 
after the finance minister Ezio Vanoni, to redress the regional imbalance that existed between 
the Mezzogiorno and the much wealthier, developed northern part of Italy.  
The main objectives were full employment (and the creation of 4 million jobs), 
balance of payments equilibrium, and reducing the North-South economic divide. Key 
elements of the plan were an increase in investment, some sort of economic planning 
(supported by both public and private investments), as well as strengthening 
integration between backward nonindustrialized regions and the more developed areas 
(Maes, 2008: 501). 
 
The Vanoni Plan was central to Italy’s negotiating position for the treaty of Rome with 
insistence on deliberate government policies to tackle regional imbalances, the establishment 
of a European Investment Bank (for investment in under-developed regions) and a European 
Social Fund (for the redeployment and retraining of workers). Apart from Lemmas’ attempts 
to plagiarise it the Vanoni Plan ultimately had enormous beneficial consequences for Ireland 
through the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Regional Development Fund 
(ERDF).  
 
Lemass was no ideologue but he nevertheless believed in the power of Keynesianism, in a 
managed welfare capitalism of a type that emerged post World War II, in a quasi-corporatist 
style of government, and had become an ardent proponent of free trade and foreign 
investment. In his persona he was perceived as being somewhat gruff and not given to small 
talk and almost obsessed with efficiency. At interview Whitaker confirmed the above but 
went on to say that Lemass was ‘the most dynamic and intelligent minister I worked with’. He 
also confirmed that Lemass was a voracious reader and was especially interested in new ideas. 
Whitaker admits to being very pleasantly surprised by Fianna Fáil acceptance of Economic 
Development and credits Lemass for its success: ‘Without Lemass’ drive and also probably 
without de Valera’s benevolent blessing, change would not have come about nearly as 
quickly’ (Horgan, 1997: 176). 
  
Commentators continue to be intrigued by Lemass, his conversion to free trade and the fact 
that he was open to ideas wherever they came from. Garvin describes him as ‘a quiet 
agnostic’ who was more than well aware of the cultural power of the Church and insisted that 
all his Ministers should have copies of the Encyclicals of Pope John XXIII in their desk 
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(2009: 261). But above all he was impatient for change and spent his life trying to get people 
to try new ideas and new ways of doing things.  
He cajoled, bribed, bullied, helped, begged and pushed people into overcoming 
objections, both real and unreal, so as to grow industrial activity and to bypass the 
extraordinary thicket of institutional and cultural obstructiveness that characterised 
Ireland’s little emergent democratic polity (Garvin’ 2009: 259). 
 
In the process he succeeded in moving the concept of free trade which, prior to his accession 
to office, was constrained as a foreground idea and elite prescription, out of that frame and 
ensured its transposition to that of a background underlying assumption embedded in the 
public sentiment and in the process ensured political acceptability, not just within his own 
party, but the entire body politic. His accession to power and its coincidence with the rise of 
Whitaker offers another reminder of the importance of timing and sequencing as described by 
Pierson. 
  
Political Acceptability 
Economic Development was presented to the government on 29 May 1958 and then 
circulated, by the government, to all Departments and state-sponsored bodies with 
instructions that they were to feed back their comments for consideration at the cabinet 
meeting of 1 July. The outcome was the formation of a cabinet sub-committee of ministers 
chaired by Lemass (Industry & Commerce) and with Ryan (Finance), Smith (Agriculture) 
and, somewhat incongruously, Childers (Lands) whose role was peripheral but was there ‘as a 
listening post for Taoiseach de Valera’ (Horgan, 1997: 177). An inter-departmental 
committee, comprising the above departments, with the exception of Lands, was also set up 
under the chairmanship of C. H. Murray of the Department of the Taoiseach.
16
  
 
The cabinet sub-committee, which was largely in agreement with Whitaker’s 
recommendations, reported on 11 October  and its findings were accepted by the government. 
On 28 October  Seán Lemass, Tánaiste and de facto leader in waiting, announced at the 
Fianna Fáil Ard-Fheis that a programme of National Economic Development would be 
published within a few days that would re-define the parameters of economic policy.
17
 On 11 
                                                          
16
 Murray and Whitaker had joined the civil service on the same day in 1934 and became lifelong friends. He 
later succeeded Whitaker as Secretary in Finance and as Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland. 
17
 Referring to a discussion on Economic Development at a parliamentary party meeting in December 1958 John 
Healy wrote in the Irish Times, ten years after the event, that it was ‘a myth to even think of a huddle of Fianna 
Fáil deputies solemnly considering the implications of the Whitaker Grey Paper ... The poor whores, most of 
them still don’t know what GNP means and “indices” looks like a dirty word’ (Horgan, 1997: 178). 
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November the ensuing white paper, The Programme for Economic Expansion (PEE) and now 
generally referred to as the First Programme for Economic Expansion was published.  It drew 
heavily on Economic Development and was largely collated by Murray who worked in close 
collaboration with Whitaker throughout its preparation. On 22 November1958 Economic 
Development was also published. Shortly thereafter both documents were laid before the 
houses of the Oireachtas.
18
 This was the ultimate seal of political acceptability.  
 
(Economic Development became known as ‘The Grey Book’ because of the colour of its 
cover and to delineate its semi-official origin as being neither a government ‘white’ or ‘green’ 
paper. Whitaker (at interview) believes that whoever called it ‘The Grey Book’ must have 
been colour blind as to his eyes, and indeed to the eyes of the writer, the cover is 
unmistakably green. Publication implied acceptance of its contents and was also seen as an 
attempt to depoliticise its proposals given its provenance in the Department of Finance.)  
 
It was not just within the ruling Fianna Fáil party that political acceptance occurred. Fine 
Gael, the main opposition party, whose actions in government during 1954-7 (joining World 
Bank and IMF, export tax relief, and, most crucially of all, appointing Whitaker as Secretary 
of the Department of Finance) facilitated change, ardently supported free trade and Economic 
Development. Even after the 1961 general election, which returned a minority Fianna Fáil 
government, Fine Gael tacitly supported the government on economic policy.  
 
The striking feature of the political process is how quickly things happened. It will be recalled 
that when Whitaker proposed the undertaking of Economic Development he got formal 
approval from cabinet within six days. There were also extremely short time frames for feed-
back from interested parties when Economic Development was circulated. It was followed 
within a few short months by the Programme for Economic Expansion (PEE) and the political 
landscape was changed. The old background underlying assumption of protectionism had 
been displaced by free trade and foreign investment was to be welcomed.  This was change on 
a seismic scale and a huge paradigm shift ensued at the systemic and organisational levels. As 
Bulmer and Burch would have it views of sovereignty and identity were effected and also 
understandings of roles. Regulative and procedural change would also follow. 
   
                                                          
18
 Remarkably, no debate ever took place on either document even though they became the cornerstone of 
economic policy and gained acceptance across the political divide. 
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Administrative Acceptability 
In a clear illustration of the path dependent nature of the institutions of state administrative 
change and acceptability of the ‘new ideas’ was to be more slow moving. The PEE was in 
essence a distillation of Economic Development, with some minor changes in emphasis. It 
was authored by Charlie Murray, in close collaboration with Whitaker. At the time Murray 
was Assistant Secretary in the Department of the Taoiseach. Whitaker ‘arranged’ the transfer 
of Murray to the Department of Finance on promotion where he was put in charge of a new 
Economic Development Branch.
19
 This was the first change in the organisational structure of 
the department since the foundation of the state. Central to a critical juncture is a clear 
departure from previously established patterns and, as Bulmer and Burch (2001: 77) argue 
such change can be evidenced in the delineation of ‘who are the key players and the nature of 
the connection between them’ (2001: 77).  Whitaker and Murray were key players and the 
relationship between them was extremely close. Here was a Department of State, hitherto 
associated with always saying ‘no’, now restructuring itself to say ‘yes’ – yes to productive 
investment. It arrogated to itself some of the powers of the Department of Industry and 
Commerce and took a more radical approach on grant aid to industry – emphasis would be on 
productive investment. It was also ‘strong evidence of a shift in power away from the 
Department of Industry and Commerce’ (Keogh, 2009: 72).20  
 
Friction between the two Departments remained with Industry and Commerce firmly wedded 
to maintaining ‘protectionism’. A Departmental Secretaries Committee (Finance, Industry and 
Commerce, Agriculture, External Affairs) had been set up by the previous government and 
continued by Lemass to advise the government on trade policy and it was in this forum that 
the final battle between protectionism and free trade was fought.
21
 The recalcitrance of the 
Department of Industry and Commerce neatly encapsulated the path dependency of that 
institution and the logic of appropriateness of its actions which complied with its concept of 
identity. It was, as Thelen described it, ‘locked in’ and exhibiting signs of positive feedback 
where all decisions linked future outcomes to the outcomes of preceding outcomes only – 
there was no other way of doing things. In its loyalty to protected Irish firms it overplayed its 
hand in stating that removal of protection would result in 100,000 job losses in protected 
                                                          
19
 Interview with author 2009. 
20
 The Department, and in particular its Secretary, J.C.B MacCarthy, were very unhappy about this. Lemass had 
appointed Lynch as his successor in Industry and Commerce and Lynch spent much of his time solving 
demarcation issues and acting as peace maker (Keogh, 2009). 
21
 The relevant correspondence was published by Whitaker in 2006 as Protection or Free Trade – The Final 
Battle 
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industries (total employment 148,000). In refutation of Whitaker’s arguments for the 
reduction of protection MacCarthy (secretary at the Department of Industry and Commerce) 
countered with the following: 
I cannot accept the views set out in it other than as a, if you will not mind my putting 
it that way, somewhat idealistic approach which is not, as I am sure you will agree, 
backed by anything more than faith in the operation of the economic laws which are 
expounded (Whitaker, 2006: 68) 
 
Much of the correspondence continues in the same vein with MacCarthy steadfastly 
defending protectionism and the status quo while Whitaker appealed for innovation, the 
application of a Keynesian approach to economic management and stimulus and the adoption 
of new ideas. It will be shown in the next chapter that the more go-ahead Irish industries felt 
stymied by the approach of the Department of Industry and Commerce and gladly bypassed it 
to deal directly with the Department of Finance where they discerned a much more pro 
business approach.  
 
Whitaker was the de facto head of the civil service and in a position to drive change and to 
overcome the institutional veto points. The causal chains identified by Pierson did not run on 
straight trajectories and often had slow moving outcomes. But political viability had already 
been achieved and, critically, Whitaker had the support of Lemass who was firmly committed 
to the new ideas and was more than ready to knock heads together when required. Even as 
late as 1965, at the final negotiations of the Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement, Whitaker had 
to ring the Taoiseach to instruct the Department of Industry and Commerce to comply with 
Whitaker’s position (Interview with author). 
  
Fanning writes of Lemass and Whitaker that ‘Only when, as Taoiseach and as Secretary of the 
Department of Finance respectively, they had climbed to the top of their respective greasy 
poles, could they afford to give full rein to their more radical instincts’ (2009: 29).   
  
Next Steps 
In reviewing the events of the 1950s (which Keogh (1994) so appositely called ‘the politics of 
drift’) one is left with the inescapable question of why it took so long to implement change. 
Fanning (2009: 290 posits that perhaps it ‘was not easy for the long-term politically disabled 
to learn to pick their way without crutches across a terrain unknown to all and alien to many’.  
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Nevertheless, the country was at what historical institutionalists call a critical moment ‘when 
a perceived opportunity arises for significant change. That is, an event takes place which 
raises a general expectation that change will follow’ (Burch, Hogwood and Bulmer, 2003: 7) 
Even though new ideas were advanced by ideational actors such as Carter et al, breaking the 
path dependent nature of Irish institutional life was constrained by cultural boundaries, logic 
of appropriateness, and background underlying assumptions. All of these were deeply 
ingrained in the public sentiment. But change was happening slowly and Irish institutional life 
could not forever remain impervious to that change – a changing European order, an 
intergenerational handover at both the political and administrative levels, and what Peters 
(2001: 66) called, the emergence of a set of ideas that ‘tend[ed] to provide a set of ready 
solutions for policy problems’.  
  
What happened in Ireland in the period 1958/9 was a series of cumulative causes, what Burch, 
Hogwood and Bulmer called ‘the accumulation of pervasive changes’ (2003: 14) that effected 
dramatic change over time, albeit sometimes at a slow pace; processes sometimes had modest, 
incremental effects until they reached critical levels that triggered major change - threshold 
effects. All of the above neatly illustrated Pierson’s view of the importance of timing and 
sequencing. Sometimes, seemingly insignificant institutional change can lead to profound 
societal change. Pierson puts it as follows: 
Although analyses invoking the language of “critical junctures” sometimes focus on 
large-scale events, those qualities are neither necessary nor sufficient to generate path-
dependent dynamics. In fact, the point in path-dependent analyses is that “causes” may 
often seem relatively small compared with their effects. What makes a particular 
juncture “critical” is that it triggers a process of positive feedback (2004: 51).  
 
To distinguish between a critical moment and a critical juncture Bulmer and Burch (2001:81) 
offer the following:   
 
A ‘critical moment’ is when an opportunity arises for significant change. Such 
opportunities may not be realised and exploited but, if they are, the outcome is a 
‘critical juncture’ at which there is a clear departure from previously established 
patterns. Critical junctures create branching points at which institutional development 
moves on to a new trajectory or pathway which is then followed incrementally until a 
new critical moment arises and (potentially) a new critical juncture follows and a new 
direction is taken 
  
The central hypothesis of this thesis is that the causal chains linking ideational actors and 
administrative and political elites, precipitated a critical juncture when there was ‘a clear 
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departure from previously established patterns’ (Burch, Hogwood and Bulmer, 2003: 7). The 
ideas of free trade and foreign direct investment had achieved economic, political and 
administrative acceptability. Is acceptance of ideas enough? To make things happen would it 
require political and administrative will to implement those ideas? The next chapter will show 
that the critical moment became a critical juncture that led to the transformation of Ireland and 
that there was enormous political and administrative will involved.   
 
An adaptation of Hall’s Framework (see next page) shows a three legged model, depicting the 
changing Irish economic, administrative and political environment, achieving equilibrium. As 
with a three-legged stool, equilibrium can be found on uneven ground, and the Irish political 
landscape was uneven ground and, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, some of the 
causal chains had slow-moving outcomes and had to overcome many institutional veto points. 
The research also shows the importance of viewing events as a moving picture as advocated 
by historical institutionalists rather than taking a snapshot in time as favoured by rational 
choice theory. 
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Table 4.1: Hall’s Framework applied to Ireland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Adapted from Hall, 1989: 371) 
  
 
Relationship 
to existing 
theories 
Political 
events in 
Europe 
Work of 
Carter et al 
Economic 
Viability 
Acceptance by 
Lemass 
 
Selling the idea to 
Fianna Fáil Party 
Support of Fine 
Gael 
Political  
Viability 
 
Acceptance and pro-
motion by Whitaker  
Overcome institut-
ional veto points 
Administrative 
Viability 
Adoption as 
Policy 
Free Trade 
& FDI 
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Chapter 5: First Period of Change – implementation of the  
‘ideas’ of free trade and foreign direct investment.  
 
 
In the previous chapter, using Hall’s Framework, it was shown that the ‘ideas’ of free trade 
and foreign direct investment gained a large measure of  economic, political, and 
administrative acceptability.  Using what I refer to as the Bulmer and Burch Template change 
at the first critical juncture will be tracked and demonstrated. Bulmer and Burch (2001: 77) 
posit that institutional change following a critical juncture can be tracked at the systemic, 
organisational, regulative and procedural levels and demonstrate that new ideas punctuate 
institutional path dependency and lead to state transformation. In addition to the above four 
levels of change they also argue that there is an overarching cultural level which constrains 
change. To implement the ideas of free trade and foreign direct investment would require a 
change in political culture. This chapter will show that this was achieved using neocorporatist 
policies that brought employers and unions into the decision making process, and the use of 
indicative planning, as developed in France, to turn Ireland into a developmental state. 
 
Political Culture 
The arrival of the 1960s brought more than just a change of decade. Lemass had assumed the 
leadership of Fianna Fáil, and become Taoiseach.
1
 Soon thereafter James Dillon succeeded 
John A. Costello as leader of Fine Gael and Brendan Corish succeeded William Norton as 
leader of the Labour party. In effect there was a generational handover and change was in the 
air. Rural electrification and mechanisation were also changing the face of Irish life.
2
 The 
election of Pope John XXIII in 1958, and the Second Vatican Council which he convened, 
                                                          
1
 There was a subtle change in the organisation of government meetings: Lemass replaced the rectangular table, 
where the Taoiseach used to sit at the head, with an oval one where he sat in the centre and his old nemesis 
MacEntee sat opposite him. He told a civil servant that he ‘was able to see who was saying no to me’ (Horgan, 
1997: 196). The pace of cabinet meetings also increased with Lemass moving for quick decisions not the ‘peace 
by exhaustion’ of de Valera’s time at the helm. 
2
 Rural electrification connected over 420,000 houses in rural Ireland between 1945 and 1979. It was greatly 
accelerated after enactment of the Electricity Supply (Amendment) Act 1955 authorised the ESB to borrow to 
fund the project. Some houses received electric power and television at the same time and this had profound 
social effects as the outside world could no longer be kept at bay. Electrification was a great boon to agriculture 
as it enabled speedier mechanisation, especially of milking. In 1950 there were 402,000 horses in Ireland, mainly 
engaged in agriculture. By 1970 that number was 124,000 (CSO, 1997: 62). 
 
98 
 
changed the face of Catholicism forever. He called for an opening of the shutters to let in the 
light and for a voice for the laity in Church matters. Perhaps, most significant of all was the 
replacement of Latin with the vernacular in all Church services and a gradual erosion of the 
power of the clergy. The launch of Radio Telefís Ēireann in 1961 also had a profound effect 
on Irish life through the new medium of television which opened people’s minds to a life 
outside the island. It opened up a world where prosperity was deemed desirable and de 
Valera’s ‘frugal comforts’ no longer seemed enough. 
On the world stage the coming to power of John F. Kennedy as president of the USA helped 
create a climate of hope and optimism. There was a concomitant increase in demand for 
products and exports arising from improved conditions in the developed world and a general 
economic upturn.  
Against this background Lemass and Whitaker set to work on moving Ireland from 
protectionism to free trade. The PEE set out the targets to be achieved in Ireland’s first real 
effort at medium to long-term planning with agriculture and industry to be the main drivers of 
economic prosperity.  They would utilise a mixture of state-interventionist measures allied to 
inducements to private industry in a classic example of indicative planning. The state-
interventionist measures would focus mainly on state-sponsored bodies and legislative 
changes that would, hopefully, encourage private enterprise. They would also use corporatism 
as means of effecting change.  
Central to corporatism is the notion of interest intermediation that links producer interests and 
the state. It specifically incorporates interest groups into the policy making process, both in 
terms of the negotiation of policy and the securing of compliance with the agreed policy. As a 
political philosophy it has been influenced by Catholic social teaching beginning with the 
papal encyclical Rerum Novarum by Leo XIII in 1891. As an antidote to Marxism he argued 
that class conflict was not inevitable and capital and labour were in fact mutually 
interdependent. At that time there was a general growth in associative action and Leo XIII 
proposed that working conditions and general social welfare could be greatly improved 
through specially established organisational structures with the state approving and protecting 
such arrangements. This would obviate the necessity for the class warfare called for by 
Marxists. Somewhat paradoxically the Pope saw such arrangements as superseding the undue 
influence of the state while calling on the self-same state to protect such arrangements. The 
association between Catholicism and corporatism has remained and it became a major 
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political philosophy in Catholic countries such as Austria, Germany, Spain, Portugal and Italy 
in the inter-war period. It also developed uncomfortable associations with national socialism 
and fascism and, as a consequence, guilt by association which resulted in its disappearance 
from most political discussion. Concomitant with the growth of social democracy there 
emerged a neocorporatism that saw tripartite arrangements between the state, labour and 
employers. This facilitated state concessions on social and taxation issues, employer 
concessions on wages and unions accepting wage restraint and industrial peace. 
It has already been stated that Lemass was no ideologue and was happy to take ideas from any 
quarter. He saw the advantages and opportunities offered by corporatist arrangements. Within 
ten days of taking office as Taoiseach he wrote to the presidents of the Federation of Irish 
Industries, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions, the Chambers of Commerce of Ireland and the 
National Farmers Association inviting them, in best neo-corporatist fashion, to meet him and 
discuss the current state of the economy and its prospects and the role they might play. At a 
meeting with farmers on 27 July 1959 he told the delegates that he was anxious to have 
regular consultations with them ‘on major economic policy’ (Daly, 2002: 343).3   
 
However, he was in no doubt that it was politicians that should make the hard decisions and 
‘the development of the country in economic terms necessarily evolved around a corporatist 
style arrangement ... [and] ... for that to happen, Lemass realised that the government in its 
political form would have to be the hegemonic player in the administrative system’ (Murphy, 
1997: 4). With this in mind he instigated, or readily agreed, a number of neocorporatist 
measures that were to enable/force change and improve efficiency in the short term, and also 
have long term effects. He did have a grand design to involve unions and industry in 
developing the economy through institutional change that integrated the various interest 
groups ‘through a system of representation and co-operative mutual interaction at leadership 
level, and social control at the mass level’. (Murphy, 2009: 193).4 Lee (1989: 403) refers to 
                                                          
3
 Lemass is often accused of having no interest in agriculture and was mistrusted by the rural members of his 
own party on the issue. (Lee, Coogan). Even his staunch ally, Todd Andrews, said of him that ‘he had little real 
rapport with rural Ireland ... had surprisingly little intimate knowledge of the countryside and its people. He was 
essentially the Dublin jackeen with the ready wit and derisive humour’ (Murphy, 2009: 234). Nevertheless he 
could see business opportunities in agriculture. In a Dáil debate on March 9
th
 1950 on the setting up of the 
Industrial Development Authority Lemass, albeit in opposition, heretically declared: ‘If we are ever going to 
build up a national economy that can withstand the storms that are bound to arise in international trade, it has to 
be through industrial development’ (Horgan, 1997: 165). 
4
 As far back as 1945 Lemass had this to say about union involvement in public policy: ‘In a democratic state, 
the trade union movement must play an increasingly important part in the national life of the country ... as an 
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‘emerging institutional structures tending in a neocorporatist direction, as the main stimulus 
for efficiency’.  
 
Initially the corporatist structures put in place were bipartite. The Employer Labour 
Conference was established as a forum for employers and unions to meet and primarily 
negotiate national wage deals. The unions withdrew from it in 1963 after the White Paper 
‘Closing the Gap’, was published in February and, without ever being formally disbanded, the 
conference went into abeyance until 1970. Given that the government, then as now the biggest 
employer, was not a party to the conference, it was unlikely to succeed. But Lemass was 
determined to maintain a neocorporatist stance and did so through the establishment of a new 
body and even though this did not happen until 1963 (an example of the slow moving 
outcomes of the causal chains) it did play a significant part in changing the political culture of 
the country.   
 
The National Industrial Economic Council (NIEC), which was subsequently renamed the 
National Economic and Social Council (NESC), had Whitaker as chairman, eight other 
government nominees, and ten each from the union and employer bodies. Its terms of 
reference were laid before the Houses of the Oireachtas on October 23
rd
 1963.
5
 Secretarial 
support would be provided by the civil service, in effect primarily the Department of Finance, 
and, ab initio, the council had access to the best brains and the best information available at 
the time. Its main task was  
... to prepare general reports expressing the views of the Council on the principles 
which ought to be applied for the development of the national economy and the 
realisation and maintenance of full employment at adequate wages with reasonable 
price stability and reasonable long-term equilibrium in the balance of external 
payments. The Council shall have regard to the level and trend of incomes, including 
wages, salaries, profits, rents and other incomes, with a view to the inclusion in its 
reports of policy recommendations on these matters. (NIEC 1963). 
 
The fact that agriculture was excluded from its remit was an indication of the changing 
emphasis at official level and the new reliance on development through industry. Replying to 
queries in the Dáil (Debates 23 October 1963) Minister for Finance Ryan rather feebly 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
essential part of industrial organisation ... [and] formulating and carrying into effect a general policy for the 
furtherance of the long term interests of the workers as a class’ (Lee, 1987: 401). 
5
 The secretary at the Department of Industry and Commerce was the only other purely civil service 
appointment. The rest were prominent in the semi-state sector and business. FitzGerald (1968: 158), while 
lauding the absence of political partisanship, notes that it has the unfortunate side effect of detaching politicians 
from the policy formulation process. 
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defended the decision that inclusion would make the NIEC too unwieldy and more pertinently 
that ‘agricultural policy is determined to a large extent by external conditions which we 
cannot alter by decisions taken here’ i.e. near total reliance on British markets and the trade 
agreements governing them.  
  
The great strength of the NIEC was that its membership was very widely drawn and even with 
government appointments the urge to make ‘political’ nominations was resisted. This not only 
gave it credibility but challenged the hitherto exclusive role of the public service in policy 
formulation – a significant organisational change on the Bulmer and Burch Template. The 
council’s reports, which varied from general reviews of economic performance and prospects 
to specific reports such as ‘Report on Incomes and Prices Policy’, quickly became established 
as being reliable and offering an honest appraisal of the situation. They also had the advantage 
of wedding all parties to the process, making change more likely and easier to implement and 
of advancing  Lemass’ neocorporatist agenda. 
 
What is evident from the above is that the political culture was changing in a real way as was 
the asymmetrical nature of power. Hall and Taylor (1996) argue that the role and nature of 
power in the relationship between actors and institutions is asymmetrical and that historical 
institutionalists are particularly interested in the uneven distribution of power across social 
groups. They further assume that institutions give some groups disproportionate access to the 
decision-making process.  Organised labour now had not only access to the political and 
administrative elites but an influence on policy hitherto constrained by a cultural approach 
endemic in the political and administrative elites. Labour and employers adopted a calculus 
approach that was instrumental and based on strategic calculation. As Hall and Taylor (1996) 
contend institutional involvement not only brings an element of power but also a degree of 
certainty as to how others would behave as their actions are constrained by the enforcement 
mechanisms and penalties enforced by institutions. 
 
On the Bulmer and Burch Template the NIEC, which had been statutorily established, is 
evidence of systemic level change. It also demonstrated regulative level change (who should 
do what) and procedural level change (the processes shaping how business is handled). But, 
more importantly, it brought cultural change. 
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Administrative Change 
Administrative change was already evidenced at the organisational level in the Department of 
Finance with the appointments of Whitaker and Murray, and the setting up of the Economic 
Planning Division. The Industrial Development (Encouragement of External Investment) Act 
1958 in effect repealed much of the Control of Manufactures Acts, particularly the prohibition 
on foreign ownership of Irish industry. The Industrial Grants Act 1959 broadened the remit 
of, and gave grant-aiding powers to, the Industrial   Development Authority (IDA). These 
changes ensured that Finance assumed a much more proactive approach in the running of the 
country.
6
 Under the 1959 Act grants would be made available nation-wide (hitherto grants to 
industry were restricted to ‘undeveloped areas’ as set out in the Undeveloped Areas Act 1952) 
and the maximum grant allowable was increased from £50,000 to £250,000. Responsibility 
for dealing with the establishment of new Irish industries, or the expansion of existing ones, 
was left with the Department of Industry and Commerce. This, allied to the fact that grants to 
new industries (more likely to be established by foreign interests) were more generous than to 
established industries, gave an impression of favouritism to foreign firms ‘which offered an 
unfortunate encouragement to the latent xenophobia of a small country that had only recently 
secured its independence’(FitzGerald, 1968: 240). It is debatable as to whether the 
Department of Industry and Commerce was an institutional veto point but at the very least 
there is evidence that its actions were constrained by what March and Olsen (1989) called a 
logic of appropriateness where institutional actions are tailored to a concept of identity – and 
that concept of identity was the necessity for protectionism. (Industry and Commerce was 
largely sidelined in 1966, when all responsibility for grant aid to Irish industry was transferred 
to the IDA. This was as much a mark of faith in the efficacy of that body, and by extension a 
rebuke to the Department of Industry and Commerce.)  
 
But change was permeating the public service. Lemass clearly believed that the role of 
Finance was fundamental to that change: 
In the administration of any Government in any country the mood and attitude of the 
Finance Department is reflected throughout the whole administrative body. If it is 
hyper-critical of development proposals the effect is to discourage the formulation and 
presentation of new ideas. If the Finance Department is itself seeking to stimulate and 
encourage new thinking, the whole approach to the problems of all Departments is 
altered for the better. At this time, the positive stimulating attitude of our Department 
                                                          
6
 Keogh (2009: 72) mistakenly states that the Act transferred grant-aiding powers from the IDA to An Foras 
Tionscal. Until then the IDA had no grant-aiding powers. 
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of Finance is a very important fact in the building up of the widely deployed 
development effort which is now evident (Lemass, 1961: 5) 
  
Even Patrick Lynch, one of the harshest critics of Irish economic policy and  of the 
shortcomings of the ‘official mind’, lauded the positive role played by the Department of 
Finance noting that ‘real economy can sometimes be secured more effectively by fruitful and 
selective spending than by parsimonious thrift’ (1963: 149). More complimentarily he noted 
that ‘State investment is becoming more economically productive than redistributive as it has 
been formerly’ (p. 160), and with proper planning a growth rate of four per cent (then unheard 
of) could be achieved but would require persuading ‘every group in the community that the 
choice is between economic growth and stagnation’ (p. 162). 
  
Applying Bulmer and Burch’s Template to the administrative system change took place at all 
levels: systemic level changes took place through the enactment of legislation; organisational 
level change was demonstrated in the Department of Finance; regulative and procedural level 
change occurred right across the public service. 
  
There were to be hiccups along the way and administrative change was uneven. Nevertheless, 
by 1960 there was clear evidence that the idea of free trade had gained administrative 
acceptability. It has already been demonstrated that economic and political acceptability had 
been achieved. If historical institutionalists are correct then the conditions were now in place 
when a critical moment, ‘when formerly rigid institutional hierarchies become more malleable 
and the bias of an institution is subject to pressure’ (Burch, Hogwood and Bulmer, 2003: 7), 
could morph into a critical juncture with ‘a clear departure from previously established 
patterns’ (ibid.). It will be demonstrated that this is what happened and the result led to the 
transformation of Ireland.  
 
Making Change Happen 
Having achieved economic, political and administrative viability, and the beginnings of a 
changing political culture (including a neocorporatist framework), implementing the transition 
from protectionism to free trade would require political and administrative will. It would also 
require systemic, organisational, regulative and procedural level changes as outlined by 
Bulmer and Burch. For the political and administrative elites the ideas of free trade and 
foreign direct investment were to be implemented through the achievement of the targets set 
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out in the PEE. One of the cornerstones of implementation would be the neocorporatist 
framework already referred to. Another was to be the establishment of new, and the 
reconstitution of existing, state-sponsored bodies. 
 
State-Sponsored Bodies (SSBs) 
From 1932 onwards Lemass was the arch promoter of state-sponsored bodies. In an address 
delivered to the Institute of Public Administration on 2 March 1959 Lemass set out his 
thinking on the role of SSBs. In all cases initiation and shaping of policy in the broad sense 
would remain the prerogative of government and how such bodies were controlled would be 
‘settled on a pragmatic (italics added) rather than theoretical basis’ (1959: 277). He went on 
to give a brief resume of those bodies for which he had direct responsibility (ESB, CIE, Bord 
na Mona, Irish Sugar Co., Irish Shipping etc.) and expressed general satisfaction with how 
they performed. However, he was very alert to the dangers inherent in all such bodies: once 
established they ‘may settle down to routine operation characterised by extreme caution’; 
‘may be directed and administered with decreasing regard for the national needs’ and ‘undue 
concerns for the benefit and convenience of staff’; there is ‘no automatic spur to efficiency’ 
and ‘a danger that bureaucratic procedures may stifle efficiency and delay necessary or 
desirable innovations and changes’ (1959: 287). It was incumbent on the relevant minister to 
be vigilant and, in his experience, there was rarely any difficulty between the minister and a 
board ‘when a board is progressing vigorously and intelligently to accomplish developments 
which both desire’ (p.288). When things did not progress as expected then the role of the 
minster was clear cut. 
The Minister’s main instrument is criticism. His responsibility is to the public and he 
would fail in his responsibility if he withheld criticism where he considered it to be 
due. As a general guiding rule, the relations between the Minister and the board should 
never be too cordial. At least the board must feel that criticism will be prompt and 
vigorous whenever circumstances call for it (p. 289). 
 
Lemass as Taoiseach was never constrained by existing institutional boundaries. Whenever he 
saw an unfulfilled need or gap in the provision of state support he promptly set up a new body 
or reconstituted an existing one to reflect the changing economic and political landscape.  
Thelen points out that  ‘rather than conceiving of institutions as holding together a particular 
pattern of politics, historical institutionalists are more likely to reverse the causal arrows and 
argue that institutions emerge from and are sustained by features of the broader political and 
social context’ (1999: 384). . Thelen and Steinmo also remind us that: 
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Institutions are an independent variable and explain political outcomes in periods of 
stability, but when they break down, they become the dependent variable, whose shape 
is determined by the political conflicts that such institutional breakdown unleashes 
(1992:15). 
 
As will be seen when reviewing agriculture and industry that is what happened to many state-
sponsored bodies. 
  
Agriculture 
The PEE had the following main objectives for the agricultural sector: 
 Increased output thorough increased productivity fostered through grassland 
improvement (fertilisers) and management (specifically 1.5 million cows by 1964). 
 Eradication of bovine tuberculosis. 
 Development of agricultural education. 
 Improved marketing and development of trade relations. 
 More targeted use of state aid to obtain more competitive prices, higher turnover and 
increased farm incomes. 
The Department of Agriculture, setting out policy in June 1959, elaborated on the above, 
emphasising grassland improvement as the most important objective that would help to 
achieve the other aims. The Secretary in Agriculture, Michael Barry, wrote ‘In principle 
Government expenditure which increases productivity permanently is to be preferred to 
Government expenditure in the form of price subsidies’ (Daly, 2002: 345). 
  
The industry was very underdeveloped and this underdevelopment had its origins in history 
and, as will be demonstrated, owed its continuance to the philosophy of ‘self-sufficiency’, the 
‘official mind’ and, strange as it may seem, the Catholic Church.  
 
Breen et al offer the following summary of the industry: 
The present structure of Irish agriculture is rooted in events of the nineteenth century, 
particularly the Great Famine of mid-century, the resulting changes in demographic 
patterns, and the Land Acts of the late part of the century, which established the 
tenants of Irish land as peasant proprietors. It was in this period too that the question 
of the ownership of land became bound up with the question of Irish self-
determination (1990: 184). 
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A proliferation of small holdings and the continuance in folk memory of the effects of the 
Great Famine ensured that the philosophy of ‘self-sufficiency’ found a very receptive 
audience in rural Ireland. By 1961, in spite of continuing emigration and a declining rural 
population, out of a total workforce of 1,108,108, there were 392,675 engaged in agricultural 
occupations (Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1964: 45).
7
 The underdeveloped state of 
agriculture in 1958 was neatly summarised in the PEE: ‘Of total agricultural output, 
approximately one- third is consumed on the farms where it is produced, one-third is sold off-
farms for consumption within the country and the remaining one-third is exported’ (PEE, 
1958: 11). Given that there was little scope for increased home consumption added production 
would be for the export market. To succeed on the export market produce would need to be 
competitively priced, without incurring increased subsidisation by the exchequer, of high 
quality, and offer guaranteed continuity of supply.
8
 
 
In effect farming was largely supported by price guarantees in what was ‘the agricultural 
equivalent of protectionism’ (Loftus, 2008: 159). As in all relations with Britain, history, 
nationalism and economics had an uneasy relationship. Through a series of trade agreements 
Ireland had favoured access to British markets, particularly for agricultural produce. With the 
emergence of the EEC and EFTA Ireland sought an accommodation that would see British 
agricultural price supports extended to Irish farmers. The debate in cabinet for closer ties with 
Britain exposed the traditional fault lines: the Departments of Finance and Agriculture were in 
favour, Industry and Commerce opposed any increased access of British goods that competed 
with protected Irish industry, and External Affairs was concerned that ‘any agreement for 
joint development would imply that Ireland was economically subservient to Britain’ (Daly, 
2002:359). The trade agreement signed in April 1960 offered meagre gains for Irish farmers. 
This in itself was a reasonably good outcome given what was happening on the European 
front and British trade relations with its former colonies. Also, two days before the start of 
negotiations, Britain signed a bilateral trade deal with Denmark, a member of EFTA, 
primarily granting increased access for Danish agricultural produce. 
 
                                                          
7
 This was approximately half the number that had been engaged in 1926. The number was to halve again by 
1981.  
8
 Whitaker in particular was anxious to encourage beef production at the expense of dairying given the level of 
subsidisation of butter exports. This was because of a cheap food policy by successive British governments 
which heavily subsidised food prices and Irish produce had to compete on price. 
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The beef industry, in particular, was inexorably linked to the British market and successive 
Anglo-Irish trade agreements copper-fastened this dependency. Beef exports were 
predominantly to Britain and almost exclusively of live animals.
9
  A 1952 industry report by a 
firm of US business consultants was highly critical of the situation and did not mince its 
words  
‘... the essential fabric of Ireland’s cattle policy has been based on a warp of 
pessimism crossed by a web of timidity ... [justified] by an appraisal of market outlook 
sufficiently dismal to warrant adherence to a pattern that had been proved devoid of 
dynamic growth, on the ground that meagre certainty is better than the most promising 
hazard’ (Daly, 2002: 300).  
 
Bovine tuberculosis was rampant and fear of foot and mouth disease meant that until the early 
1960s there was a total prohibition on the importation of breeding stock from outside Britain. 
Eventually in 1962 14 Charollais and 2 Hereford bulls were imported from the USA, the first 
cattle to reach Ireland from a destination other than Britain in over sixty years. This, allied to 
the increasing use of artificial insemination, led to a dramatic improvement of both beef and 
dairying animals.  The eradication of bovine tuberculosis proved to be extremely costly 
(estimated net cost of £40m) and the country was declared disease free in 1965. 
  
The dairy industry was also highly fragmented with approximately 160 central creameries, 
each with several branches, duplicating production and competing with each other on the 
export market (Foley, 1993: 131).
10
 Ironically, because of the seasonality of production and 
issues of preservation of product, Ireland actually imported butter for domestic consumption. 
With a plethora of suppliers and processors, production costs were high and economies of 
scale were virtually non-existent, even among the larger co-operatives. The average milk herd 
size was 5.5 cows with an annual yield of 420 gallons of milk per cow.
11
 (The respective 
figures for 2001 when production peaked were 36 cows and 1041 gallons (Dept of 
Agriculture)).  
 
In spite of the disadvantages listed above Irish agriculture had one enormous advantage; the 
natural quality of its pastureland was ideally suited for both beef production and dairying.  A 
                                                          
9
 As late as 1960, there were no commercial slaughtering facilities for cattle in the country. Pig slaughtering 
facilities had a 50 per cent spare capacity (Smith, 2008). 
10
 Through amalgamation and rationalisation there were fewer than thirty by 1976 and the giants of the industry, 
such as Kerry, Avonmore, Golden Vale, Mitchelstown (now Dairygold) and Waterford, had emerged (Foley, 
1993).  
11
 In Denmark the average yield was 736 gallons and in the Netherlands 825 (Whitaker, 1958: 71). 
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report commissioned in 1948 by the Minister for Agriculture on grass production, and carried 
out by G.A. Holmes, a New Zealand world expert on the subject, stated: 
There is no area of comparable size in the northern hemisphere which has such 
marvellous potentialities for pasture production as Ēire... I have seen old permanent 
pastures with a density, colour, composition and grazing capacity superior to anything 
in Western Europe (Commission on Emigration, 1952: 41) 
 
However, this advantage was totally underutilised for a variety of reasons:  
 the plethora of small holdings, many of which were totally uneconomic: 12  
 compulsory tillage orders introduced during WW II, though not enforced had never 
been revoked;  
 the under-usage of fertilisers and lime negated the natural advantages of Irish 
pastureland;  
 the innate conservatism of Irish farmers;  
 in the main areas of dairying  and beef the predominant use of breeds of cattle which 
were general purpose rather than using specialist breeds suitable for milk production 
or beef production.  
There was little in the way of worthwhile research being undertaken and those undertaking 
the research, the Department of Agriculture and the universities, were not in agreement. As 
Manning (1999: 296) put it ‘the department felt university research did not respond to the real 
needs of agriculture, while the universities blamed the government for chronic underfunding. 
Both were right’.13 
 
Irish agriculture was highly path dependent. Self-sufficiency had become a background 
underlying assumption that remained in the public sentiment long after it was evident that as a 
concept it had failed. Pierson’s (2004) resilience and inbuilt obstacles to revision were clearly 
evident and farmers possessed the ultimate veto points by continuing to operate as their 
fathers before them. To break the path dependant nature of Irish agricultural institutions was a 
                                                          
12
 Out of 287,394 holdings 206,042 (72%) were under 50 acres and and produced a family farm income of less 
than the average industrial wage (O’Grada, C. 2008a: 9). 
13
 In Economic Development (Chapter 11) Whitaker is not only critical of the quality of education and research, 
and the status of the agricultural faculties in the universities, he also points out that in the period 1926 – 56 the 
numbers of agricultural students in UCD increased fifteen fold but the staff numbers were unchanged. He goes 
on to make the point that UCD had not sought any state assistance to remedy the situation. Implicit in his 
comments is that they would have found a willing ear in Finance. However, Daly (2002: 388) points out that in 
1949 Michael Tierney, president of UCD, complained to Finance about the inadequate facilities available to the 
faculty of agriculture which he believed should become an independent college within UCD with a much larger 
budget. 
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real challenge. However, two critical decisions were made which would have a profound 
effect on Irish agriculture and lead to its transformation: the setting up of An Foras Talūntais 
(the Agricultural Institute) and An Bord Bainne (The Milk Board). Of lesser significance was 
the reconstitution of the Pigs and Bacon Commission. It will also be seen that for all their 
innovation and dynamism these organisations were subject to slow moving outcomes because 
of institutional resistance and veto points.  
 
An Foras Talūntais (AFT) 
The setting up of AFT neatly encapsulates the difficulties of implementing a new ‘idea’: 
achieving political, administrative and economic acceptance; breaking the path dependant 
nature of existing institutions; changing political culture. The idea for an all-embracing 
agricultural institute was first promulgated by Joseph Carrigan in 1949. A former dean of 
agriculture in Vermont he was then the first head of the European Recovery Programme (the 
Marshall Plan) in Ireland. He was shocked at the poor state of development of agriculture and 
devised a plan for its modernisation. His proposals, for which he obtained approval of a grant 
of £1.84m, were to develop a new campus that would incorporate an agriculture and 
veterinary facility; take over agricultural education from the universities and centralise and 
standardise farm advisory services. James Dillon, in his first period as Minister for 
Agriculture, became an enthusiastic supporter of the scheme as was de Valera in both 
opposition and on his return to power in 1951 (Manning 1999).  The ‘official mind’, manifest 
in both the administrative and political elites, fought a protracted, obstructionist battle which 
kept a project, for which there was approved American taxpayers’ funding, on the drawing 
board for nine years. The Department of Finance opposed the scheme in the beginning but in 
time that attitude changed and Whitaker became not only an avid supporter of AFT but, as 
will be seen below, ensured that adequate funding was made available for everyday running 
and expansion. (Its rigorous scientific approach would certainly have appealed to him). 
 
As it was proposed that the institute would have a large scale of independence from the 
Department of Agriculture officials in that department were not particularly happy and saw 
the foundation of an agricultural institute as both a diminution of its role and a criticism of its 
performance to date. Daly (2002) refers to the relationship between the Department and AFT  
as the story of the ‘Two Departments of Agriculture’. In the best civil service tradition 
Agriculture did not openly express its opposition as the principle of an institute had been 
approved by the government and communicated to the Department. It wrote that the concept 
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of an institute ‘involves quite a number of perplexities, uncertainties and controversial points 
that will have to be resolved before the proposal can be further advanced’ (Daly, 2002: 392). 
Thereafter its response seemed to be one of benign neglect and Daly notes the lack of official 
correspondence and discussions taking place ‘outside the normal administrative channels’ (p. 
390). In effect the Department was an institutional veto point. 
 
Originally envisaged as a ‘recognised college of both the National University of Ireland and 
Trinity College; students would spend two years studying fundamental science at one of the 
universities and then transfer to the institute for two years further study’ (Manning, 1999: 
297). UCC’s Dairy Science department would also be absorbed and Carrigan was proposed as 
the first president of the new institute.
14
  The universities, the quality of whose research and 
teaching was questioned by Carrigan, and indeed subsequently by Whitaker in Economic 
Development, were, understandably, vehemently opposed.  
 
The Catholic Church had traditionally opposed state intervention in the lives of the people as 
socialism by another name. Proposals for an agricultural institute directed from Dublin, taking 
over the farm advisory service heretofore controlled at county level (funding came largely 
from central government) and mostly seriously of all putting Trinity College on an equal 
footing with the National University of Ireland, inevitably drew the ire of the Church. 
Archbishop McQuaid of Dublin vehemently opposed increased Protestant influence through 
Trinity College.  A delegation of Bishops Browne and Lucey bluntly told the government that 
Trinity ‘must not have a say in the teaching of agriculture in the new institute’ (Manning, 
1999: 299). By October 1955, Bishop Fergus of Achonry, in his capacity as secretary to the 
hierarchy, wrote to the Taoiseach, in trenchant terms strongly reminiscent of the mother-and-
child debate, of the dangers to Catholic students of a secularist education and furthermore... 
We regard with serious misgivings the trend in recent years to allocate to Trinity 
College a state subsidy out of proportion to the number of Protestants in the state... 
even though Trinity has an extensive endowment originating from the confiscation of 
state property... It is a serious matter for the Irish Catholic taxpayer to be asked to 
endow an institution which is prohibited to Catholics as intrinsically dangerous... 
(Manning, 1999: 301) 
 
Meanwhile Bishop Lucey at confirmation ceremonies preached on the immorality of artificial 
insemination in cattle – a practice that would be commonplace within a few short years, and 
                                                          
14
 A delegation from UCC to meet the government included the Catholic Bishop Lucey. Manning says of UCC 
that it ‘tended to express itself in a particularly truculent way’ (1999: 298). 
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actively researched and promoted by AFT.
 15
 Bishop Brown of Galway continued to oppose 
the institute because University College Galway had no agricultural faculty and, to his mind, 
any new facility should be located there (Miley, 2008).
16
 Willingness to accommodate as 
many views as possible, and a ‘continuing flexibility on the government’s part, it seems, was 
only met with continuing dogma on the part of vested interests’ (Loftus, 2008: 174).  
 
Nevertheless, eventually, in 1958, under the Agricultural (An Foras Talūntais) Act, and in 
receipt of the funding promised by Carrigan back in 1949, the AFT was established.
17
 Its 
remit included the following: providing facilities for carrying out research and the control and 
administration of such facilities; grant-aiding research and funding scholarships and 
fellowships; organising conferences, seminars and publishing papers; advising the Minister 
for Agriculture on research matters (Daly, 2002).
18
 
 
There was no central grand institute as first envisaged. The universities held on to their 
respective roles and AFT developed close links with the sector on which it relied ‘to provide 
the basic scientific knowledge and to produce the creative scientists so vital to a research 
body’ (Dooney, 1988: 116). The role of the agricultural advisory service remained fragmented 
until eventually brought under the umbrella of An Chomhairle Oiliūna Talamchíochta 
(ACOT) in 1977. 
 
Dr. Tom Walsh was appointed the first director of AFT.
19
 An expert on soils and grassland 
and a dynamic manager who inspired enormous loyalty from his staff, he proved to be an 
inspired choice and very much in the Lemass mode – high energy, willing to implement new 
ideas and a developmentalist at heart. Relationships with the Department of Agriculture were 
tetchy. Within a few months of its inauguration the AFT, through its chairman, appealed to de 
                                                          
15
 Bishop Lucey had been part of the Commission on Emigration and issued a minority report charging that ‘the 
neglect of agriculture for industry in recent decades is not only socially and morally indefensible but 
demographically unjustifiable as well’ (Horgan, 1997: 162). 
16
 UCG still does not have an agricultural faculty.  
17
 The final Dáil debate (12 February 1958) on the Act was worthy of a Gilbertian comic opera. James Dillon 
queried Taoiseach de Valera on the provenance of ‘talūntais’, apparently only introduced into the act at a late 
stage. De Valera responded ‘It is common in most languages to form abstract nouns from adjectives and that is 
what was done in this case’.  
18
 The board had four representatives from the universities (including Galway which did not have an agriculture 
faculty!), five from the farming bodies and three government appointees.  
19
 At the time of his appointment Walsh was employed in the Department of Agriculture as a senior inspector. 
He had published 60 papers in international, peer-reviewed, agricultural scientific journals. In 1961 he launched 
The Irish Journal of Agricultural Research and insisted that all research carried out by AFT adhered to the 
highest international standards and was subjected to international review and approval (Miley, 2008). 
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Valera to arbitrate on disputes with the Department. In a Jesuitical pronouncement the 
Taoiseach replied: ‘the legislation did not specifically entrust AFT with responsibility for the 
actual carrying out of agricultural research on a national level but it was a specific and sole 
responsibility of the council to coordinate all agricultural research at that level’ (Miley, 2008: 
25). Tensions remained ongoing with Walsh, well supported by his board, constantly 
confronting ‘the official mind’ and backing his arguments with good science and research.20 
 
Demonstrating the flexibility, nimbleness and ‘can-do’ attitude that appealed so much to 
Lemass, by its formal foundation on 19 May 1959 the AFT had already appointed forty 
research scientists and within a year had acquired 2,000 acres of land and established eight 
research centres. By 1963 there were twenty one research centres and satellite demonstration 
farms with a total area of 4,500 acres and by March 1964 total employment had risen to 884.
21
 
State grants for running costs rose from £146k in 1958/9 to £1.4M by 1965/6 (Miley 2008: 
21).  Early research on dairying from the research unit at Moorepark in Fermoy, County Cork, 
and on beef from the research unit in Grange, County Meath offered the following results that 
in time would have a profound effect on Irish agriculture: 
 Heifers (female cattle that had not begun lactation), with good management and 
breeding, could be safely put in calf at fifteen months rather than twenty months as 
heretofore. This gave an extra year’s lactation, an extra calf and reduced non-
productive feeding costs. 
 Nationally it was taking 3.3 acres to produce 350 gallons of milk. Within a year 
Moorepark was using 1 acre to produce 400 gallons and within a few years had this 
figure up to 1,000 gallons through the use of specific dairy cattle (rather than the 
generic general purpose Dairy Shorthorn animal then widely used), improved animal 
husbandry and grassland management. 
 The peak supply of milk in summertime was 13 times that of the winter trough. Again, 
through the judicious use of feed, in particular the making of silage instead of hay for 
winter feeding, researchers halved this figure. 
 The introduction of paddock grazing system, for both dairying and beef, greatly 
increased output. 
                                                          
20
 Hoctor, who served as Assistant Secretary in Agriculture and wrote the semi-official history of the department, 
comments that on the setting up of AFT ‘the Department could now divest itself of some (Italics added) of its 
research activities’ (1971: 248). The reality was more prosaic with the Department vigorously defending its own 
position and reluctant to concede any area of influence. 
21
 173 research officers, 291 technical staff, 70 administrators, 350 farm workers. 
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(The above figures taken from Murray, 2008 and Smith, 2008). 
 
While the above figures were very encouraging and were soon achieved by the more 
progressive farmers they were not generally transferable across the country and are a very 
good example of the causal chains  and slow-moving outcomes referred to by Pierson where 
there may be a substantial time lag between X (research) and Y (implementation at farm level. 
Farmers, also, were path dependent. 
 
On the setting up of new institutions Pierson (2004) says, inter alia, that institutional 
designers may not act instrumentally, i.e. actors may be motivated more by what they deem 
appropriate than by what would be effective and that certainly applied to AFT.  The reporting 
structures and areas of responsibility vis a vis. the Department of Agriculture were 
deliberately left vague to placate Agriculture; the universities and the Church got their way on 
third level education; University College Galway had a representative on the board even 
though it did not have a faculty of agriculture. Rather than rationalisation the farm advisory 
service became even more fragmented. All of the above meant that the causal chains did not 
run on a straight trajectory and led to slow moving outcomes. The real surprise is that AFT 
achieved what it did and one cannot but conjecture what might have been if Walsh and his 
team had been given free rein. 
 
On the Bulmer and Burch Template AFT effected change at all levels: systemic – it was a new 
statutorily established state-sponsored body; organisational – brought new key players, offices 
and networks to Irish agriculture; regulative – who should do what and ensure strategic 
capacity became quickly apparent in the area of research; procedural – information systems 
and policy processes were fundamentally altered. 
 
An Bord Bainne. 
Ireland has a dairying tradition going back to the seventeenth century. The Cork Butter 
Market became the largest butter market in the world and the price on the market was the 
world price (Cork Butter Museum). By the turn of the twentieth century Ireland was exporting 
40,000 tons of butter per year. In 1889 Sir Horace Plunkett set up the first true co-operative 
for the processing of milk. An umbrella group, The Irish Agricultural Organisation Society, 
was set up to promote the co-operative movement and ten years later it had 876 societies. 
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Over the years many of these failed and in 1927 the government set up the Dairy Disposal 
Company to take over creameries that were in trouble. Changing tastes led to a decreased 
demand for heavily salted Irish butter but post World War II a new and unexpected market 
opened up for Irish dairy produce with the demand for chocolate crumb, used in the 
manufacture of milk chocolate, offering a new market for milk. This was largely in the hands 
of private companies and the larger co-operatives leaving the government with the less 
profitable liquid milk/butter surplus. (Hoctor, 1971, Bord Bainne, 1982). 
 
A 1959 report from the Advisory Committee on the Marketing of Agricultural Produce, 
chaired by Dr Juan Greene of the National Farmers Association, contained the following: 
‘The fundamental point to be decided is whether this country should be an exporter of 
whatever temporary surplus of dairy produce that may arise from time to time or whether the 
country should be a long-term and regular exporter of dairy produce’ (Bord Bainne, 1982: 
32). This mirrored the thinking of Lemass and Whitaker. The developmental model chosen 
was largely based on both the New Zealand and Australian Dairy Boards which were product 
buying organisations with quasi-monopoly powers.
22
  The Bord made an inspired choice in its 
first general manger, Tony O’Reilly (now Sir Anthony J. F. O’Reilly), then only 25 year 
old.
23
  Within six months of his appointment he launched the Kerrygold brand on the English 
market. This proved to be a watershed in the marketing of Irish products overseas as it offered 
an identifiable brand that was uniquely Irish. Exports of butter to the English market rose 
from 3,516 tons in 1960 to 18,401 tons in 1965 and 32,959 tons by 1970 (some of the increase 
was attributable to changes under the trade agreement with Britain). 
 
More importantly, the Bord brought a degree of scientific management to the whole purchase 
of produce. It introduced a standard costing system which involved ‘a weekly consolidation of 
milk take and utilisation which enabled the Bord to direct production to those products 
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 Set up under the Dairy Produce Marketing Act 1961 it had a nine member board, three each from government 
suppliers and manufacturers of dairy produce. 
23
 A renowned rugby player, capped both for Ireland and the Lions, he subsequently was appointed General 
Manager of Comhlucht Siūcra Ēireann Teo (Irish Sugar Co) where he quickly established a joint venture with 
the Heinz corporation developing innovative freeze drying technology for vegetables that were produced and 
branded under the Erin label, a subsidiary of the Sugar Co. He was subsequently head-hunted by Heinz and 
became world-wide president in 1979 and chairman in 1987. Such was his perceived importance to the 
development of Irish agriculture that Taoiseach Jack Lynch offered him the position of Minister of Agriculture 
in 1969 (this could be done by appointing him to the Seanad thus obviating the necessity of O’Reilly standing for 
election). He is reputed to have declined because of the presence of Haughey saying there was only room for one 
bull in the field. 
In 1980 O’Reilly completed his PhD thesis, ‘The Marketing of Agricultural Produce: Strategy, Structure and 
Performance’, in the University of Bradford. 
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carrying the lowest subsidy or highest reward to the milk industry, and you had a format for 
growth and importantly, a blueprint for capital investment’ (O’Reilly, 1982: 7). In effect, 
using its monopoly powers the Bord knocked a lot of heads together and encouraged ‘co-
operation’ – then sadly lacking – in the co-operative movement. In spite of the level of 
marketing success structural change would be incremental. Even with the dynamism of 
O’Reilly the causal chains did not follow a straight trajectory and slow-moving outcomes are 
still evident in the industry with a number of small, independent creameries still hanging on 
almost fifty years later. The Dairy Disposal Board sold all of its creameries to the larger co-
operatives in an effort to streamline and rationalise the industry.
24
 
 
Writing in 1982, when he was President of Heinz, on his time in Bord Bainne, O’Reilly said: 
‘In retrospect it was the most exciting job I ever had’ (1982: 7). Reflecting on the times 
generally and the gradual transformation then underway, he said: 
The farming community began to cast aside many of the inhibitions and prejudices of 
a century of frustration... [they] were ready to put themselves to the test of world 
markets... Time, experiment and a great deal of government support was going to be 
required to achieve their ambitions... but a good start had been made (ibid: 34). 
 
The success of An Bord Bainne was due in no small part to the dynamism of O’Reilly but 
lessons had also been learnt at government level. It had a relatively small board and its powers 
were very specific as it had, in effect, monopoly powers in the purchase of produce. On the 
Bulmer and Burch Template it made change happen at all levels: systemic – it was a new 
statutorily established state-sponsored body; organisational – it concentrated marketing of 
Irish dairy produce in one body; regulative – with its monopoly buying powers it set the price 
of produce; procedural – information systems and policy processes were fundamentally 
altered. It should also be added that it made a profit and that farmers were generally happier  
with the prices they received. It should also be recalled that O Cofaigh at interview was highly 
laudatory of its role seeing it as highly influential in putting agriculture on a proper 
commercial footing.  
 
The Pigs and Bacon Commission 
Originally established in 1939 the Pigs and Bacon Commission was reconstituted under the 
Pigs and Bacon (Amendment) Act 1961 to coordinate and assist in the development of the 
                                                          
24
 A former senior member of the Department of Agriculture who agreed to be interviewed but wished to remain 
anonymous, and who was  actively involved in the process, said: ‘We got a good price for what we sold but in 
reality we would have sold them at any price to get rid of them’. 
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industry with a renewed focus on agriculture. That it was successful is evident from the fact 
that between 1959 and 1964 the numbers of pigs rose by 30 per cent and the number of sows 
by 45 per cent and the sector achieved the highest increases in the agricultural industry.  
 
Again, the choice of a general manager was to be critical. Michael Conlon had been appointed 
Cork County Manager in 1960 at the age of thirty three. He was seconded to head up the Pigs 
and Bacon Commission on its reconstitution in 1961. As with all agricultural produce the 
market was mainly British. He travelled the world developing and establishing markets for 
Irish pig meat. One of the more unusual successes was in selling pigs snouts to the West 
Indies! At interview he said ‘selling was the easy bit. The real difficulty was in getting 
processors to present the meat as the market wanted it’. Hitherto processors delivered 
‘Wiltshire sides’ - a specific way of cutting the meat favoured by the British. Continental 
buyers wanted it differently and this necessitated sending butchers abroad, mainly to 
Denmark, for training. There was huge resistance to change – another example of the path 
dependent nature of institutions.  
 
As with An Bord Bainne on the Bulmer and Burch table and the Pigs and Bacon Commission 
effected change at the systemic, organisational, regulative and procedural levels.  
  
 Changes in Agriculture - Conclusions 
What becomes clear from a review of agriculture is that even with political, economic and 
administrative acceptance of the need for change and acceptance of the ‘ideas’ of free trade 
effecting institutional change was constantly stymied and obstructed by the ‘official mind’, 
the Catholic Church, and the philosophy of ‘self-sufficiency’ which was still a dominant 
background underlying assumption that permeated the public sentiment. Farmers were highly 
resistant to change and did not act instrumentally – what was good enough for their fathers 
was good enough for them. There was also institutional resilience and multiple veto points.  
 
According to Daly (2002) by 1963 agricultural output was only one per cent higher than 1957 
- bad weather in 1958 caused an 11.5 per cent drop in output and it took several years to 
recover; over the period industrial output rose 47 per cent; agriculture was absorbing 19.5 per 
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cent of the capital programme and 12.5 per cent of the current budget
25
. Crotty (1966: 202) is 
quite critical of the impact of the PEE stating that it ‘introduced very little that was new into 
Irish agricultural policy and that such innovations that were brought in were ineffective or of 
doubtful value’. He calculated that in the period 1957 – 1963 GNP rose by an annual rate of 
3.0 per cent while the equivalent figure for agricultural output was 1.3 per cent. He also points 
out that the target of maintaining the level of milk export subsidy at the 1957 rate was not 
attained and rose in line with the level of exports. Nevertheless, enormous change was 
underway and what becomes obvious is that filtering change down to farmyard level and 
implementing the quality research being undertaken by AFT would take time.  
 
The outcomes achieved confirmed Lemass’ view that the development of the Irish economy 
would be dependent on industrial growth and the view of O Cofaigh, (interview with author) 
one of the authors of Economic Development, that ‘agriculture was the problem, not the 
solution’ may not be that far off the mark. However, the five main targets set in PEE were 
largely achieved and change was underway in agriculture. 
 
1. Increased output and grassland improvement 
The specific target of 1.5m cows by 1964 was not achieved until the following year (1.547m). 
The 50 per cent spare capacity in the pig sector was greatly reduced with a 30 per cent 
increase in the number of pigs and, more importantly, a 45 per cent increase in breeding sows. 
Sheep number were also greatly increased (CSO 1997)  
 
Grass and tillage management also showed significant improvement. Between 1957 and 1962 
consumption of lime and fertilisers rose by almost two-fifths (Ō Gráda, 2008a: 8). In the 
period 1950–59 the average annual yield of produce of tillage was 2,082 starch lbs per acre. 
In the period 1960-65 this had increased to 2,308 starch lbs per acre (Hoctor, 1971: 271). 
 
                                                          
25
 The writer recalls being an altar boy in 1958 and in the sacristy after early mass on a Sunday morning, the first 
fine day in weeks. A number of men, including his father entered, literally cap in hand, to seek permission from 
the parish priest to harvest corn that day. This would be a breach of the widely observed prohibition on 
unnecessary servile work on the Sabbath. The priest declined and they accepted, apologising for having dared to 
broach the subject. In the event there was not another day fit for harvesting for ten days or so and a valuable 
opportunity had been lost. The story is included here as a demonstration of the overarching power of the Catholic 
church, the subservience of the people, and the contributory role it played in the disastrous harvest of 1958. 
Discussing it many years later with some of the men involved, all of them still practicing Catholics, some of 
them still bristled with the refusal and their acceptance of it. One of them remarked: ‘He [the parish priest] still 
expected us to put his dinner on the table even if we did not have it for ourselves’. 
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2. Eradication of bovine TB. 
The target set had been achieved but at enormous expense.  Economic Development gave the 
cost of the eradication scheme, begun in 1954, as £1m per annum (1958:80) and would need 
to be increased substantially. The eventual cost up to 1965 was £40m. The reality was that 
bovine TB had not been eradicated and still has not. By the end of the 1980s the cost to the 
exchequer was £488m (Keogh, 1994: 215). 
 
3. Development of agricultural education. 
The number of undergraduates increased from 480 in 1956/57 to 800 in 1964/65 – an increase 
of 67 per cent – and all before the introduction of free secondary education. 
 
4. Improved marketing 
The (re)establishment of CTT, The Pigs and Bacon Commission and An Bord Bainne all 
proved to be enormously successful. Apart from establishing the Kerrygold brand, exports of 
butter to Britain rose from 3,516 tons in 1960 to 18,401 tons in 1965 (Bord Bainne, 1982: 36)  
 
5. More targeted use of state aid. 
More targeted use of state aid by definition meant a decrease in ‘social’ (housing and 
infrastructure) capital expenditure. This will be covered later.  
 
The agricultural industry and the changes that took place are a very good example of the 
necessity to look at the long-term process as advised by Pierson. Cumulative causes led to 
profound change but at a slow pace. Processes, of apparent negligible impact, cumulatively 
achieved threshold effects. Causal chains did not follow straight trajectories and had slow-
moving outcomes.  
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Industry 
Economic Development devoted 113 pages to agriculture and only 16 to general industry. 
Whitaker (1958), in outlining the industrial background offers the following figures: in 1926 
there were 164,000 engaged in industry against 647,000 in agriculture; by 1957 the respective 
figures were 284,000 and 436,000, with a much higher output per person in industry; 82.5 per 
cent of industries employed less than 50 persons. Agricultural exports (mainly live cattle) 
accounted for 57 per cent of total exports in 1957. Of the remainder a further 18 percent was 
the export of agriculture based produce. He concluded Chapter 15 with the following: ‘The 
process of transition... from a predominantly agricultural to a more balanced economy is still 
incomplete. The acceleration of that process is one of the major problems facing the Irish 
economy’. 
 
In contrast with the agricultural sector there are no specific industrial targets set out in the 
PEE. While acknowledging (S.90) that ‘there is no substitute for private enterprise... the main 
objective of Government policy in this field is to create the conditions in which it will be 
stimulated and encouraged to embark on new activities’. Key factors for success, set out in 
S.94, are: 
 Provision of adequate state facilities for encouragement of industrial development; 
 State funds to be made available to meet the long-term needs of industry that cannot 
be satisfied from private sources; 
 Be prepared to abandon and/or overhaul policies which have served their purposes and 
likely to hamper future development; 
 Welcome foreign participation in new industries aimed at exports. 
 
Realising that free trade in some shape or form was inevitable the Federation of Irish Industry 
(FII) commissioned economists Garret FitzGerald and Gerry Quinn to undertake a study of 
the woollen and worsted industries.  FitzGerald subsequently approached Professor Louden 
Ryan, then on secondment to the Department of Finance, with a proposal to extend the study 
to cover all protected industries. Given their hitherto close relationship it might reasonably be 
expected that the FII should approach Industry and Commerce, but they had concluded that 
‘Industry and Commerce had remained protection-oriented and unlikely to be supportive’ 
(FitzGerald, 2009). Horgan (1997: 227) refers to previous efforts to get the Department of 
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Industry and Commerce to encourage industry to adapt for free trade receiving ‘a polite 
brush-off’.26 The organisational changes in the Department of Finance meant that it now 
offered an institutional opportunity structure (Bulmer and Burch 2005) that circumvented 
Industry and Commerce’s veto point. In effect that Department was, as Thelen described it, 
locked in and constrained by a culture that ensured institutional actions were tailored to 
comply with a concept of identity – the ‘protector’ of protectionism and established Irish 
industries. 
 
Even though FitzGerald knew Whitaker since 1952 through their membership of the SSISI 
(FitzGerald interview) Ryan formally introduced FizGerald and his proposal to Whitaker who 
readily agreed, jointly with the FII, to finance the project and the Committee on Industrial 
Organisation (CIO) was set up in 1961.
27
  
 
Committee on Industrial Organisation (CIO) 
The CIO’s terms of reference were:  
To make a critical appraisal of the measures that may have to be taken to adapt Irish 
industry to conditions of more intensive competition in home and export markets, to 
undertake an examination of the difficulties which may be created for particular 
industries and to formulate positive measures of adjustment and adaptation (Brock, 
1964: 176). 
 
Reviews were undertaken of twenty two industries that employed 83,000 workers (52.8% of 
total industrial employment).
28
 A lengthy questionnaire was circulated by the CIO to each 
industry and this in turn was followed up by a visit to most industries employing more than 
ten people. Most of the visits were conducted by two officials from the Department of 
Industry and Commerce who were assisted by an economic adviser. Initially, there was a 
good deal of suspicion on both sides with civil servants complaining of arriving at an 
appointed time to find the relevant factory manager off playing golf while the employers 
                                                          
26
 Correspondence between the government departments previously referred to shows that the exchanges were 
sometimes barely civil with MacCarthy in Industry and Commerce concluding one memo to Whitaker as 
follows: ‘I have assumed, I hope rightly, that your memorandum was intended to be provocative rather than 
doctrinaire’ (Whitaker, 2006: 69). 
27
 The unions protested at not being included in the process. This was an oversight and ‘they proved to be the 
most constructive partners’ Any tensions that arose were ‘between the Department of Industry and Commerce on 
the one hand and the rest of us, with Finance, the CII and ICTU endeavouring as a troika to nudge that 
department into psychological acceptance of free trade’ (FitzGerald, 1991: 59). 
28
 The industries covered were: Cotton, Linen and Rayon; Footwear; Vehicle Assembly; Paper and Paperboard; 
Fertiliser; Communications; Shirts; Miscellaneous Clothing; Mantles and Gowns; Confectionery (incl. Chocolate 
Crumb); Iron and Steel; Knitwear; Chemical; Pottery; Electrical Equipment; Woolens; Printing; Women’s 
Readymade Clothes; Men’s Clothes; Furniture; Leather. 
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complained that the civil servants had no technical understanding of the business. This lack of 
technical advisers was to be the main criticism of the CIO. (Brock 1964, Murphy 2009). 
 
The response rate to the questionnaires was 76 per cent overall (varying from 27 per cent to 
100 per cent in some industries) but critically all the larger undertakings were surveyed and 
visited. Overall, the CIO found that labour relations were good; much plant and machinery 
needed updating and reinvestment; with the exception of Fertilisers and Leather, production 
was highly diversified and, as a result of all these factors, costs of production were usually 
relatively high in comparison with those of Britain and the EEC countries. The reports were 
happy to point the finger at protectionism which encouraged concentration on the home 
market.  
In the industries surveyed the most usual tariff rate is 75 % full and 50 % preferential 
(these figures relate to the situation before January 1963). In some industries the 
existence of minimum specific duties raises effective protection on some goods to well 
over 100% As a result of concentration on this captive home market, exports form a 
large part of production only for a few of the 22 industries—and generally only few 
firms in any industry are responsible for these exports (Brock, 1964: 179). 
 
Critically, of the 22 industries surveyed, only 7 had exports greater than 20 per cent of gross 
output by value These were, in per cent terms: Confectionery (including Chocolate Crumb) 
51.5; Leather slightly over 50; Gowns 31; Paper 25.4; Electrical Equipment 23.4; Shirts 23; 
Footwear 22.  
 
In addition to the twenty two specific industry reports it also issued a number of interim 
reports on general findings and recommendations. An adaptation grants scheme was set up in 
1962 and offered up to 25 per cent of the cost needed to modernise plant and buildings. (‘To 
achieve quick results the scheme was to apply only up to March 1965, though it was 
subsequently extended to end-1967’ (Kennedy, Giblin and McHugh, 1989: 68)). To 
concentrate minds ‘the government announced unilateral tariff cuts in 1962, and insisted on 
implementing them in 1963 despite the suspension of the Irish application for entry into the 
EEC’ (Lee, 1989:353).29 Cuts in tariffs of 10 per cent were introduced in both 1963 and 1964 
to pave the way for free trade (Kennedy and Dowling, 1975: 62).   
 
                                                          
29
 While there was widespread disappointment in government circles at interview both FitzGerald and Whitaker 
were strongly of the view that de Gaulle’s veto of British entry to the EEC, which in effect scuppered the Irish 
application, did Ireland an enormous favour as it provided an opportunity to modernise and reposition industry. 
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It was also found that only four industries had development and adaptation plans well in hand 
and noted a ‘lack of any sense of urgency on the part of most firms despite the fact that the 
time period between decision to invest, delivery of equipment and full utilisation of it is, in 
some cases, a long one’ (CIO, 1964: 35). More tellingly was the attitude to exports and the 
relatively low number of industries meaningfully engaged in exporting. ‘The five reasons 
given for this situation were: lack of interest, lack of knowledge, not enough advertising or 
good design, tariffs and other factors outside the control of Irish industry (e.g. transport costs) 
and finally, and most important, higher levels of costs’ (CIO, 1964: 38). The CIO also 
recommended that grants available to firms coming into Ireland to set up should be available 
to native industry on the same basis and that there should be no distinction between 
‘developed’ and ‘undeveloped’ parts of the state.30  
 
The CIO reports contributed in large part to what Barry (2009: 111) refers to as ‘the rupturing 
of the protectionist equilibrium’. They painted a fairly bleak picture of Irish industry’s lack of 
preparedness for free trade in any of its guises, a management that was cosseted with the 
blanket of protectionism and largely devoid of ambition of development or export led growth. 
Lemass saw the reports as proving that ‘the policy of protection has been clearly and officially 
shown in post-war circumstances to be defective in promoting or compelling the effort needed 
to ensure the continuing efficiency of industry’ (Murphy, 2009: 201). Jacobsen’s (1994: 77) 
summary of the CIO work gives a fair reflection of the overall commentary and reaction:  
The CIO reports assembled a daunting list of industrial shortcomings; small scale, 
high import-content, low proportion of exports, meagre marketing skills and contacts, 
low specialization and, put kindly, an anachronistic approach to management. 
 
Garret FitzGerald (2009), while acknowledging the shortcomings, saw the CIO reports as 
offering a reasonably robust baseline study of Irish industry and that we ‘now knew what 
needed to be done’. Even as the CIO reports were being compiled there was a perceptible 
improvement in industrial output and confidence about the future. FitzGerald (1968) is quite 
upbeat about the prospects that began to emerge in the early 1960s and that the public 
perception was that whereas there were individual inefficient firms nevertheless there was a 
viable industrial base capable of expansion.  
 
                                                          
30
 Whitaker had also suggested this in Economic Development but it was not included in the PEE, being too 
politically sensitive. 
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The CIO did not constitute systemic level change on the Bulmer and Burch Template as it 
was not statutorily established.  But it was of enormous cultural significance at the systemic 
level where it touched on issues of national identity and the ability of the state to sustain a 
viable economy. On an organisational level, even though the Department of Industry and 
Commerce appeared to be the line Department, and its staff conducted most of the industry 
surveys, in reality it brought the Department of Finance very much centre stage. At the 
regulative level it addressed issues of strategic capacity and attempted to foster cooperation 
across sectors of industry. At the procedural level it attempted to streamline policy processes 
and put native industry on a similar footing as newly founded, foreign owned enterprises. 
 
Foreign Direct Investment  
The IDA was established under the Industrial Development Authority Act 1950 with a brief to 
initiate and develop new industries (banking, insurance and agriculture excluded) and to 
advise on the expansion and modernisation of existing industries. (It also had a role in 
investigating the revision of tariffs). Grant-aiding powers for new industries were delegated to 
An Foras Tionscal which was theoretically independent but in reality controlled by the 
Department of Industry and Commerce. Initially the Department of Finance feared the IDA 
would be controlled by ‘a gang of crackpot socialist planners’ (Garvin, 2004: 188) and, 
maintaining its cultural approach to expenditure, argued that ‘in view of the present and 
prospective condition of the Irish exchequer it is merely common sense to refrain from taking 
on new commitments either of a capital or current nature’ (Murphy, 2009: 50).  
 
Changes in the taxation treatment of profits introduced in the Finance Act 1956 (and extended 
in the Finance Acts of 1957 and 1958)  together  with the Industrial Development 
(Encouragement of External Investment) Act 1958, which in effect repealed much of the 
Control of Manufactures Acts, and the Industrial Grants Act 1959 which gave grant-aiding 
power to the IDA and increased the maximum grant from £50,000 to £250,000, all 
contributed to a changed landscape for the attraction of foreign direct investment in Ireland.  
 
A further inducement was the creation in 1959 of the Shannon Free Airport Development 
Company (SFADCO) in 1959, which covered the mid-west region.
 
This was an example of 
institutional design where, as Pierson (2004) puts it, institutional designers may not act 
instrumentally – where actors are motivated more by what they deem appropriate than by 
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what would be effective. The creation of SFADCO was a bowing to political pressure and in 
reality only served to duplicate services already being provided by the IDA. 
  
Foreign companies were attracted to Ireland for four main reasons: the availability of facilities 
and plant either already built by the IDA or of generous grants to set up totally new plants; the 
tax treatment of profits and the opportunities for the parent company, through the 
manipulation of transfer pricing, to maximise those profits; the availability of labour; 
accessibility to markets (which was greatly facilitated by subsequent membership of the 
EEC).
31
 The industries attracted were all export-orientated with 75 per cent of gross output 
going to exports. American (25%), British (44%) and German (18%) companies formed the 
bulk of the 277 IDA companies (the balance were mainly European with a few Japanese) that 
had set up by 1970 with a total investment of £122m in fixed asset and working capital 
(McAleese, 1972: 75).
32
 The industries were widely dispersed across the metal and 
engineering, textiles and clothing, food and milk products and the pharmaceutical industries,  
Failure rates were low at 5 per cent and about 50 per cent of failures were German controlled 
(ibid.: 80). 
 
In trying to establish the full extent of the influence of foreign direct investment in Ireland 
‘data limitations’ and ‘it is estimated that’ are expressions that are frequently met. An obvious 
source of information appeared to be the IDA annual reports. A search of all the university 
libraries failed to unearth any prior to 1965. A request to the IDA itself met with a categorical 
assurance that the organisation had only been set up in 1971 (!) and it had no reports prior to 
that date. The Industrial Grants Act of 1956 stipulated that an annual report of the IDA should 
be laid before the Oireachtas. The reports for 1959 – 1965 (obtained from the Dáil Library) 
comprised a single page document of income and expenditure signed by the chairman of the 
board and certified by the Comptroller and Auditor General. The reports gave no information 
on the names of the companies established, the sectors they operated in or the number of jobs 
created.  
 
                                                          
31
 Labour market advantage was somewhat negated by social factors. Many of the new industries were located in 
rural Ireland with an apparent plentiful supply of labour available for training. However, most of the males were 
involved in agriculture and at harvest or hay making time regularly took unscheduled time off to attend to these 
matters. Female participation was subject to high turnover due to the non-participation of married women. 
32
 American companies accounted for 34 per cent of the investment in monetary terms, British 29 per cent and 
German 10 per cent. 
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All other sources (Lee, Coogan, Keogh, Garvin, Ferriter, Meenan, McAleese, Kennedy et al) 
are very clear on the influence of foreign direct investmentand the positive role of the IDA but 
none of them can give precise figures citing ‘data limitations’ and ‘it is estimated’. Garvin’s 
(2004: 189) comment encapsulates the mood: ‘However, in general, Irish economic take-off 
in the 1960s was substantially accelerated by the efforts of the IDA and its ancillary 
organisations’.  
 
On the Bulmer and Burch Template foreign direct investment registers at all four levels. At 
the systemic level there was the repeal of the Control of Manufactures Act and the various 
statutory changes around grant aid. Those changes in turn led to organisational level change 
with the Department of Finance taking a much more hands on approach and insisting on 
productive investment. At the regulative and procedural levels grant aid to industry was 
streamlined and processes simplified and increasingly removed the Department of Industry 
and Commerce from the equation with a concomitant increasing influence for the IDA.  
 
Bulmer and Burch (2001: 77) posit that ‘the cultural dimension concerns the norms and 
values that are prevalent within the institution and how these are inculcated... and this cultural 
dimension is present at all four levels’. This research argues that foreign direct investment 
effected enormous cultural change. The new multinational corporations introduced  
management practices that raised the standard of Irish management, brought new marketing 
skills, sent Irish workers overseas for training and re-skilling and generally broadened 
outlooks. In the process it smartened up native Irish industry. And even though these 
companies were largely free of corporate taxes because they paid good wages the exchequer 
benefitted greatly from increased payroll taxes. 
 
Institute for Industrial Research and Standards (IIRS) 
First established in 1946 the IIRS was reconstituted 1961 under the Industrial Research and 
Standards Act 1961 with a much broader remit that was to be supportive of industry and 
development. It was specifically charged to encourage scientific research, formulate 
specifications, disseminate technical literature and research to industry, test and analyse 
commodities, promote the utilisation of natural resources,  and to assist in the development of 
exploitation of inventions. It was excluded from any area already assigned to AFT. 
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It is included here as another example of the steps put in place to help embed the ideas of free 
trade and foreign direct investment and registers on the Bulmer and Burch Template as 
evidencing change at the systemic, regulative and procedural levels.  
 
Economic Research Institute (ERI) 
The ERI was set up in 1960 with an emphasis on applying formal measurement techniques to 
the economy. It was funded and promoted by the Ford Foundation, which had also set up 
Britain’s National Institute for Economic and Social Research.33 It operated on the similar 
principles and pioneered the application of mathematical methods to policy-making. For its 
first five years it had no Irish staff because of a shortage of suitable candidates. This led to the 
internationalization of the body and also attracted a number of international economic 
conferences to Dublin (Kennedy 1993). Funding was taken over by the government in 1966 
and the name was changed to the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) but the 
research focus remained on the ‘production of economic forecasts based on formalized 
macroeconomic models as well as qualitative microeconomic studies’ (Brownlow, 2009: 16).  
 
It is included here as an example of the changes taking place and the increasing emphasis on 
having good scientific information on which to base decisions. The ESRI played a hugely 
important role in Irish life as will be seen when reviewing the second critical juncture.  
 
Córas Tráchtála Teoranta (CTT) 
The Export Promotion Act 1959 created CTT (The Irish Export Board) and stated that ‘It shall 
be the duty of the Board to promote, assist and develop exports in any manner which the 
Board considers necessary or desirable’ (Acts 20/1959).34 It met the needs of exporters in a 
number of ways: 
 Provision of information on trade regulations and procedures in target countries. 
 Market analysis. 
 Introductions to key persons in the market place. 
 Setting up of group marketing schemes (industry specific) through which exporters 
pool resources and share costs. 
 Assistance with product development and design. 
                                                          
33
 The Ford Foundation contributed $280,000 to the foundation of the ERI (Whitaker, 1986). 
34
 CTT had been in existence since 1952 but the Export Promotions Act 1959 put it on a statutory footing and 
broadened its remit. 
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 Participation at international trade fairs by national trade stands 
                                                                                                (Dooney, 1988).  
 
The reconstituted CTT brought a new energy to Irish industry through the identification of 
new markets and helping management to be more professional and efficient. In the five years 
following the publication of Economic Development Irish industry and exports experienced a 
dramatic increase. The value of net industrial output rose from £162m in 1959 to £273m in 
1964 and the value of exports over the corresponding period was as follows (Meenan, 1970: 
75): 
Table 5.1: Exports 
 Live Animals Food, Drink & 
Tobacco 
Raw Materials & 
Other Goods 
1959 £39.1m £43.6m £35.6m 
1964 £66.7m £72.8m £66.9m 
% Increase 71% 67% 88% 
 
(Over the relevant period the CPI rose from 144 to 173, an increase of 20%). 
 
As Table 5:1 shows the per cent increase in exports exceeded inflation by over 50 per cent. It 
is not being suggested that the above figures are solely attributable to CTT or indeed to the 
targets set in the PEE. Given that world trade conditions greatly improved at that time it is 
probable that Irish industry would have improved anyway. What is being suggested is that 
CTT was another manifestation of the actions taken by Lemass and Whitaker to implement 
change and make things happen.  
 
On the Bulmer and Burch Template CTT involved systemic level change as it was statutorily 
established; organisational level change in becoming a new key player and in its interactions 
with other players; regulative level change in setting up industry specific group marketing 
schemes; procedural level change in the way business was handled and specific help with 
product development and design. It also effected cultural level change through exposure to 
foreign markets, the professionalisation of marketing and management, and the beginnings of 
a belief that Irish industry, so long cosseted by protectionism, could compete on the world 
stage. 
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Transformation? 
The targets set in Economic Development and the PEE now seem modest. Nevertheless, there 
was a total increase in real GNP over the five year period of 23 per cent, as against the 11 per 
cent increase set out in the PEE (FitzGerald 1968: 45).  One of the key changes targeted by 
Whitaker in Economic Development, and reiterated in the PEE, was a shift from social to 
productive investment. Table 5:2 shows that this happened:  
 
Table 5:2 Public Capital Programme (£m) 
 Social  Other  
 Projected Actual Projected Actual 
1958 14.8 10.2 26.4 27.7 
1959 15.2 11.6 26.5 32.5 
1960 15.0 12.9 29.5 37.4 
1961 14.0 14.2 31.8 41.4 
1962 13.1 15.7 30.9 44.7 
1963 12.5 18.9 32.9 51.7 
 84.6 83.5 178.0 235.4 
(Kennedy and Dowling 1975: 227) 
 
Social refers to housing, sanitary services, education, health and certain other building work. 
Other is literally all the rest. (Kennedy and Dowling converted all figure to constant (1958) 
prices to aid comparison). Expenditure on social programmes was on target whereas 
productive investment was 32 per cent ahead of target.  
 
What the two papers offered, for the first time, was a quality analysis of the economy and 
society. This was all the more remarkable as at the time there was a dearth of expertise right 
across the civil service with no statistician in any Department except the CSO (where there 
was only a handful) and no economist grade in the entire public service (FitzGerald, 1968: 
36).
35
 Many of the changes implemented post 1958, and referred to above, were about 
ensuring quality scientific and economic information on which future programmes could be 
based.  
  
                                                          
35
 Many of the public servants that were interviewed, both on and off the record, referred to an ‘anti-intellectual 
bias’ permeating the service right up to the 1960s and maybe even beyond that date. 
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When the PEE had run its course by 1963 had real change taken place in Ireland? Had the 
state and its institutions been transformed and if so could it be attributed to the power of ideas 
breaking the path dependant nature of Irish institutional life? Or would change have happened 
in any event because of outside factors? Most commentators agree that some degree of change 
was inevitable. What this thesis shows is that the adoption and implementation of the ideas of 
free trade and foreign direct investment did punctuate Irish institutional path dependency. The 
concentration on productive investment, the acceptance of foreign capital, the setting up of 
numerous state-sponsored bodies to side-step the inertia of the established government 
departments were the means employed. Lemass and Whitaker accepted the economic ideas 
that emanated from the economic theorists. Lemass ensured political acceptability and 
Whitaker ensured administrative acceptability and in doing so both had to overcome many 
institutional veto points.  They also had to ensure major cultural change to delete 
protectionism as a background underlying assumption that was firmly embedded in the public 
sentiment and replace it with the ideas of free trade and foreign direct investment. The critical 
moment that existed after the publication of Economic Development and the PEE, and the 
coming to power of Lemass did transform into a critical juncture as described by Bulmer and 
Burch (2001:81):   
 
A ‘critical moment’ is when an opportunity arises for significant change. Such 
opportunities may not be realised and exploited but, if they are, the outcome is a 
‘critical juncture’ at which there is a clear departure from previously established 
patterns. Critical junctures create branching points at which institutional development 
moves on to a new trajectory or pathway which is then followed incrementally until a 
new critical moment arises and (potentially) a new critical juncture follows and a new 
direction is taken 
 
Using a combination of indicative planning and neocorporatism Lemass and Whitaker 
ensured systemic level change through the setting up and/or reconstitution of state-sponsored 
bodies; organisational level change beginning in the Department of Finance and that 
permeated the entire public service; and regulative and procedural level changes that effected 
business at every level. All these changes can be summarised on Bulmer and Burch’s 
Template. (See Table 5:3 on the next page). 
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Table 5.3: Bulmer and Burch Template 
 Systemic Organisat. Regulative Procedural 
Department of Finance     
An Foras Talūntais     
An Bord Bainne     
Pigs & Bacon Commission  X X  
Comm. on Industrial Organisation     
Foreign Direct Investment     
Employer/Labour Conference     
NIEC     
IIRS  X X  
CTT  X X  
ERI X X X  
 
What is evidenced by the above table is a clear departure from previously established patterns 
of institutional behaviour. The implementation of the ideas of free trade and foreign direct 
investment led to systemic, organisational, regulative and procedural levels and a clear critical 
juncture. 
 
The research also shows that both men were extraordinarily energetic and committed to 
making change happen. Lemass never missed an opportunity to talk about the need for change 
and was not hidebound by precedent. He was a man in a hurry and impatient of anybody or 
anything that stood in the way of progress. He used state-sponsored bodies to overcome 
institutional veto points and to drive change. Whitaker was respected on all sides of the 
political divide and engendered great loyalty and commitment from the younger, eager for 
change, civil servants. As evidenced from his writing and the papers he presented at various 
conferences he too never missed an opportunity to drive home the necessity for change and to 
keep the concentration on productive investment. 
 
Perhaps the most apt summary of the PEE, and by definition the ‘ideas’ on free trade, 
indicative planning and foreign direct investment, promulgated by Whitaker, adopted by 
Lemass and implemented by both of them is given by Jacobsen, another stern critic of the 
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‘official mind’: ‘The program (sic) may have consisted of arithmetical incantations, but the 
psychological impact was indisputably exhilarating and influential’ (1994: 79). 
 
Hare (2009: 80) summarises the situation: 
The careful analysis helped to change the climate of opinion about where the economy 
was going and where it could go, helped to make a new and more dynamic direction 
seem believable, and by making it believable helped to make it happen. As ever, 
economic performance has a great deal to do with beliefs and expectations, and the 
confidence that these can engender both among politicians and among business 
leaders. 
 
Economic Development, and the PEE did not get everything right and the biggest criticism is 
the over-reliance on agriculture. Nevertheless, they did offer a comprehensive exploration of 
developmental possibilities, tried to be specific and realistic in their goals while maintaining a 
flexible approach to changing economic conditions, and suggested foreign capital as a part of 
the solution. They challenged ‘the official mind’, exposed the myth of ‘self-sufficiency’ and 
the failure of protectionism, and punctuated institutional path dependency at a critical 
juncture. But the most unquantifiable, and paradoxically most important, effect was the 
confidence engendered. A political will, attitudinal and structural administrative changes, the 
establishment of key state-sponsored bodies all ensured that a critical juncture did occur. 
Some of the changes involved slow-moving outcomes (AFT, NIEC etc.) and the causal chains 
did not always follow a straight trajectory. But a ‘new idea’, that had gained viability on the 
economic, political and administrative axis (as per Hall’s Framework), moved from being a 
foreground idea, promulgated by ideational actors as an elite prescription, to becoming an 
elite and background underlying assumption that became embedded in the public sentiment. 
This led to a clear critical juncture and in the process transformed Ireland. 
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Chapter 6: Second Critical Juncture in the Transformation  
of Ireland 
 
The only new thing in the world is the history you don’t know 
                                                                                         Harry S. Truman (1945) 
 
By the mid 1980s Ireland was in a state of economic crisis and political stalemate and had 
reached a critical juncture. Many of its citizens were wondering what had gone wrong and 
why had the good times, that largely arose from the implementation of ideas at the first 
critical juncture, and experienced through most of the 1960s and 1970s, not lasted? 
Membership of the EEC since 1973 had also brought enormous economic and social change. 
Three general elections in less than 18 months in the early 1980s attested to a period of 
political instability and indeed a critical moment when an opportunity for major 
transformation presented itself. But the critical moment was not transformed into a critical 
juncture due to a lack of political will and the path dependency of the institutions of state. On 
the world stage the rise of monetarism - as an antidote to the perceived excesses of 
Keynesianism - and the ‘rolling back of the state’ became the new orthodoxy in the Anglo-
Saxon world from the mid 1980s onwards. The main hypothesis of this thesis is that at critical 
junctures major change occurs and that that change is predicated on the implementation of 
new ‘ideas’ that punctuate institutional path dependency and propel the state down new 
developmental pathways. How those ‘ideas’ are formulated, gain credence and acceptance, 
and are eventually implemented as a solution to the perceived crisis is central to this thesis. 
The adoption in 1987 of the ideas of a low-tax economy and neocorporatism in Ireland 
facilitated key policy changes designed to address the public finances and reform the tax 
system. These in turn precipitated a chain of events that radically transformed the Irish state.  
 
Looking back from this remove it is difficult to imagine how the bitter lessons of the 1950s 
seemed to have been forgotten within a generation. By the mid-1980s emigration was 
rampant, inflation was out of control, balance of payment difficulties were a constant and 
there was relative political instability. A new political party, the Progressive Democrats, had 
been launched and was to prove a catalyst for change. Debates on abortion and divorce 
dominated political discourse and proved a distraction from the real problems besetting the 
country. Again using a historical institutionalist framework this chapter will trace, through the 
institutions of the state, the symptoms of the failure in the 1980s , the causes of that failure, 
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the ideas that were proposed for a solution and how those ideas were formulated, 
disseminated, and eventually gained acceptance. 
  
Symptoms of Failure 
It was seen in Chapter 5 that following the First Critical Juncture the Irish economy at last 
began to perform and develop. Following the relative prosperity of the 1960s impending 
membership of the EEC – attained on 1 January 1973 - promised that the good times would 
continue.
1
 As membership was backed by the main political parties, Fianna Fáil and Fine 
Gael, unsurprisingly the people voted in a referendum on 22 January 1972, by a majority of 
83 per cent (on a voter turnout of 71 per cent), to accept the terms of the Treaty of Accession. 
Debates about independence, sovereignty and neutrality were all subjugated to immediate 
economic gain. 
Critics who held that accession would amount to the sale of the national birthright for 
a mess of common agricultural pottage, and that the jewel of Irish sovereignty was a 
pearl of too great a price to be bartered for the fleshpots of Brussels, were bluntly told 
that Ireland could not lose what it had not got. The White Paper... contained a blunt, 
honest and incisive description of the reality of foreign policy in Irish circumstances... 
that as a very small country independent but with little or no capacity to influence 
events abroad... Ireland enjoyed very little effective economic sovereignty (Lee, 1989: 
463). 
 
And membership was of enormous benefit. Between 1973 and 1983 financial inflows per 
annum from the EEC increased from £37.1m to £733.3m. Even with such an injection, 
‘valued at current market prices and exchange rates, GDP per head in 1981 was about the 
same proportion of the Community average (54 per cent) as it was in 1970’ (McNamara, 
1984: 224). This was partly attributable to a rise in population and the continuing 
underperformance of the Irish economy, particularly against other member countries of the 
EEC. But EEC aid may also have been a two-edged sword and contributed to a continuing of 
the redistributive mindset. This was particularly evident in relation to the Common 
Agricultural Policy (CAP) with concentration on the short-term benefits and little or no 
attention to long-term arrangements for less favoured areas of the economy.  
 
Signs of stress had been showing from 1968 onwards resulting in cutbacks in public 
expenditure and in an effort to stimulate the economy a fateful decision was taken in the 1972 
                                                          
1
 A government White Paper on membership promised an increase of no less than 150 per cent in agricultural 
incomes by 1978 while doubts about the capacity of traditional industry to confront change were glossed over in 
the careful phraseology of the paper (Lee, 1989: 463). 
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budget. Minister for Finance Colley ‘departed for the first time since the foundation of the 
state from the principle of balancing the current budget’ (Lee: 1989: 465) and introduced 
deficit budgeting.
2
  Colley was lambasted for his cavalier attitude and departure from 
economic orthodoxy in budgeting for a deficit of 1.3 per cent of GNP in the current year 
expenditure. In the event the deficit was 0.2 per cent which was less than actual deficit in 
1968 and 1970 when a balanced budget had been planned. But a dangerous precedent had 
been set and subsequent Ministers for Finance were to use this mechanism much more 
flamboyantly with increasingly damaging results (Cromien 2009, Mac Sharry 2009). Deficit 
budgeting, which promised short-term gains, exhibited positive feedback and became path 
dependent.  
 
By 1986 the economy was in terminal decline as is evidenced by the following figures: 
 The National Debt increased from £8 billion in 1980 to £24 billion in 1986 and stood 
at 134 per cent of GDP (148 per cent of GNP). 
 25 per cent of current spending went on servicing the National Debt. 
 £4 from every £5 raised in income tax was required to service interest payments on 
government borrowings. 
 The current budget deficit rose from 6.1 per cent of GNP in 1980 to 8.4 in 1985. 
 Real GDP rose by 1.8 per cent per annum over the period 1980-85 compared to a 
growth rate of 4.6 per cent over the period 1975-80.  
 Interest rates, which reached a high of 17 per cent in 1981, were still at 10.5 per cent at 
the end of 1985. 
 Personal tax levels were the second highest in the EEC. Tax deductions for a single 
person amounted to 24.6 per cent of income against the EEC average of 18.4 per cent. 
 A marginal rate of tax (inclusive of levies and social welfare contributions) of 55.5 per 
cent applied to a single person earning two thirds of the average industrial wage. This 
increased to 65.5 per cent at the full industrial wage. 
 The 1970s had seen a population increase with a net inflow of approximately 9,500 
per annum. In the five years to April 1986 there was an estimated net emigration of 
                                                          
2
 Cromien (2009) spoke of ‘Colley setting a dangerous precedent. One that it was all too easy to follow’. 
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75,000. The rate was accelerating and was estimated at 31,000 in the year to April 86 
and exceeded the natural increase of 28,000.
3
  
 The rate of unemployment increased from 7.3 per cent in 1980 to 17.3 per cent at the 
end of 1985 and was still rising (91,000 – 226,000). 
 There was a 25 per cent reduction in the numbers employed in manufacturing over the 
period.  
 The rate of inflation peaked at 20.4 per cent in 1981 and decreased to 5.4 per cent in 
1985. 
 The cost of social welfare provision increased from 29 per cent of GNP to 35.6 per 
cent also in the period 1980-85.  
 In the period 1977-86 there were a total of 1398 strikes with a loss of 5,375,373 days. 
(All of the above figures – NESC, 1986: 7-41) 
 
None of the above figures can adequately capture the mood of despair that enveloped the 
country. Property prices were falling, dole queues were lengthening alarmingly, there were 
major factory closures of long established industries and the scourge of emigration had 
returned. It was the young and educated who were leaving and this more than anything else 
engendered a feeling of hopelessness. Many of these emigrants were the daughters and sons 
of parents who themselves had emigrated and returned to an Ireland of hope in the previous 
twenty years. 
 
Causes of Failure 
The growth in the Irish economy since 1958 could be directly attributed to the changes put in 
place to implement the ideas of free trade and foreign direct investment. Ironically, the seeds 
of the causes of failure were planted with the transformation that took place after the first 
critical juncture. As Girvin (1989: 202) puts it: 
If the crisis of the 1950s was essentially national and agricultural, the 1980s can be 
characterised as a crisis resulting from interdependency; in that participation in the 
world economy facilitates the transfer to each state of instabilities in the system. 
 
Because Ireland had chosen to industrialise by the acceptance of foreign direct investment it 
was much more vulnerable to outside influences. The developed world experienced a major 
                                                          
3
 In a marked difference from the 1950s those emigrating were now well educated having benefitted from the 
introduction of free second level education in 1967. 
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recession in the late 1970s precipitated by two oil crises in 1973 and 1979 when the price of 
oil was increased ten-fold. As energy costs are inelastic there were major knock-on effects on 
all importers of oil particularly small open economies like Ireland. Governments the world 
over were determined not to return to the hyper-inflation of the early 1970s and the response 
was to introduce deflationary measures through major cut backs in public expenditure, which 
led in turn to major unemployment. Keynesianism was perceived as part of the problem and, 
as will be demonstrated later in this chapter, was jettisoned in favour of monetarism.  
 
The effects in Ireland were deeper and longer lasting than all other members of the EEC for a 
variety of reasons beyond the country’s control: the ‘openess’ of the Irish economy already 
referred to and, of course protectionism had already been tried and failed; the small size of the 
state; and geographical peripherality. But there were also a number of self inflicted reasons. 
Economic success, as had been demonstrated in the 1950s, has to be planned for but those 
lessons were quickly forgotten following the success of the 1960s and the benefits of EEC 
membership in the 1970s. Kennedy, Giblin and McHugh (1989) argue that probably more 
than most countries ‘short-term considerations dominated, and even where longer-term 
strategies were put in place there was little attempt to form a perspective on their ultimate 
outcome’ (p.260). This absence of a longer-term perspective was a factor in fostering the 
belief among both policy makers and the public at large that economic success could be taken 
for granted. An example of the lack of a long-term perspective was the unsustainable increase 
in the numbers employed in the public service: the number of civil servants increased from 
38,200 in 1971 to 60,500 in 1981, an increase of 58 per cent (Ferriter, 2004: 670). In adjusting 
to the oil shocks and the world recession ‘what was more pronounced in Ireland, than in most 
countries, however, was the slowness in recognising the new realities and adjusting to them, 
resulting among other things in the exceptionally large and unsustainable build-up of debt’ 
(Kennedy, Giblin and McHugh, 1989: 262). Ireland tried, and failed, to spend its way out of 
recession. 
 
It will be recalled that at the first critical juncture ‘self-sufficiency’, the ‘official mind’, the 
Catholic Church and political culture were identified as the ‘Causes of Failure’. By the mid 
1980s ‘self-sufficieny’ was relegated to a footnote in history but this thesis argues that the 
‘offical mind’, the Catholic Church and political culture were still the ‘Causes of Failure’.   
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The Official Mind 
It was demonstrated at the first critical juncture that the appointment of Whitaker as Secretary 
of the Department of Finance broke the path dependency of that particular institution. 
Whitaker moved from Finance to the governorship of the Central Bank of Ireland in 1969 
remaining there until his retirement in 1976. He was succeeded at both Finance and the 
Central Bank in turn by Murray, O Cofaigh and Doyle, all of whom had been integral to the 
compilation and implementation of Economic Development. From 1956 to 1987 each of these 
men in turn dominated Irish economic policy.
4
 It is a very clear example of how after a 
critical juncture institutions revert to path dependency and positive feedback where the 
decision rules link future outcomes to the outcomes of preceding selections (Pierson, 2004) 
or, as described by March and Olsen (1984), a logic of appropriateness where institutional 
actions are tailored to comply with a culture and concept of identity. Bulmer and Burch had 
also described this phenomenon: 
Critical junctures create branching points at which institutional development moves on 
to a new trajectory or pathway which is then followed incrementally until a new 
critical moment arises and (potentially) a new critical juncture follows and a new 
direction is taken (2001: 81) 
 
Murray, O Cofaigh and Doyle faced the difficulty of following in the footsteps of a man who 
had attained iconic status for the reforms he had implemented. The temptation to do as 
Whitaker had done proved irresistible – they, and the Department they led had become path 
dependent. It would require both imagination and bravery to dare to be different.  
 
Furthermore, social and cultural change had outstripped political and administrative change. 
In a passage that could have been written thirty years previously by Professor Lynch, Garvin 
excoriated the official mind for its lack of ‘ideas’: 
This exhaustion of political ideas resembles the 1950s but has happened for different 
reasons. In the 1950s the failure of much of the original nationalist programme forced 
a rethink, whereas it is the success of the new departures of the 1950s that have led to 
the vacuum now; they were so successful that it seemed that they merely needed to be 
applied again and again indefinitely (1982: 38). 
 
The heirs of Whitaker, and the institutions that evolved, had become path dependent and 
would require a critical juncture to project them down a new developmental pathway. 
 
                                                          
4
 Doyle became governor of the Central Bank of Ireland in 1987 (retiring in 1994) and was succeeded in the 
Department of Finance by Seán Cromien who played a major role in the transformation of Ireland.  
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But the political ‘official mind’ was also at fault. After sixteen years of unbroken rule from 
1957 Fianna Fáil was defeated in the general election of 1973. It returned to office in 1977 on 
foot of a populist election manifesto that promised an increase in public spending and a 
reduction in taxes, both designed to reduce unemployment levels. This would necessitate 
increased borrowing but, it was argued, once full employment had been achieved engines 
could be reversed. ‘The best that can be said for such a strategy at this time is that it was well 
intentioned. It ignored so many harsh realities that it was bound to run into problems’ 
(Kennedy, Giblin and Mchugh, 1989: 77).  
 
Reference has already been made to the introduction of deficit budgeting in 1972. This was a 
practice continued by various ministers of finance over the following years and reached 8.4 
per cent of GNP by 1985. While this in itself was in breach of all the best of economic advice 
when allied to the level of national debt, which increased to 134 per cent of GDP by 1986, it 
was patently obvious that there were serious structural problems in the Irish economy. 
Politicians tend, worldwide to avoid structural reform until it is forced on them by 
economic stagnation, a collapse of their currency or some other costly economic and 
social disaster. Politicians tend to close their minds as long as they can to the need for 
structural reform, because they believe that decisive action must inevitably bring 
political calamity upon their government... they persuade themselves that action 
within a relatively short time of an election would give the advantage to their political 
opponents... When the economic situation is serious enough to arouse public concern, 
both parties may, in many cases, seek to evade the issue by offering electoral bribes to 
distract voters from the real problems (Douglas, 1990: 103). 
 
The ‘official mind’ in its administrative and political manifestations had become ‘locked in’ 
as described by Thelen (1999). She further makes the point that rather than conceiving of 
institutions as holding together a particular pattern of politics that ‘historical institutionalists 
are more likely to reverse the causal arrows and argue that institutions emerge from and are 
sustained by features of the broader political and social context’ (1999: 384). The ‘official 
mind’ was reflective of and sustained by the political culture and this will be explored later in 
this chapter. 
 
The Catholic Church 
It was seen in Chapter 3 that the Catholic Church played an enormous part in all aspects of 
Irish life. It teachings and beliefs not only resided in the public sentiment as background 
underlying assumption but had also been incorporated in Irish institutional life though health, 
education and social policy. It was still an authoritarian Church that, as Seán O’Faoláin put it, 
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could only ‘Rule by Command’.5 However, from the 1960s onwards even the Church in 
Ireland was not impervious to the changes taking place in the wider world. Increasing 
secularisation, improving economic conditions, easier access to education, the Second Vatican 
Council with its emphasis on ecumenism, lay participation and freedom of conscience, all 
presented the Irish Church with enormous challenges.
6
 The main challenge to the Church 
came from a newly emerging, well-educated middle-class – a stratum of society that 
expanded considerably numerically and in self-confidence. Liberalism, individualism and 
secularism came into conflict with the hitherto traditional norms. Writing in Studies in 1963, 
Fr. E. F. O’Doherty, Professor of Logic and Psychology in University College Dublin, warned 
his fellow clerics of clinging to a dying past and attempting, King Canute style, to hold back 
inevitable change. 
There is no way known to man whereby a culture can be preserved intact, while at the 
same time remaining a living thing... a culture is something lived, not pickled: and life 
means change... the transition from a horizontally unstratified society to a highly 
stratified one, from a lived Christianity to a post-Christian society... from acceptance 
of traditional values and beliefs to their total rejection...from subsistence farming to 
the affluent society, from a peasant-structured and institutionalized society to a middle 
class way of life, and all this in one or two generations (1963: 131) 
  
A 1962 study (not published until 1976) by an American Jesuit, Fr. B. F. Biever, showed that 
almost 90 per cent of the population believed the Church was the greatest force for good in 
Ireland. If a clash arose between Church and State 87 per cent said they would back the state 
(1976: 306).
7
 Biever’s study clearly conveys the extent to which Catholic teaching permeated 
all aspects of Irish life and had become a background underlying assumption embedded in the 
public sentiment (Campbell, 2004).  
 
But incipient change was also evident with those who had completed second level education 
much more likely to question clerical pronouncements and 83 per cent of same disagreeing 
with the above proposition. It was this emerging cohort that Biever correctly foresaw as 
presenting the greatest challenge (and indeed opportunity) for the institutional Church: 
                                                          
5
 In his 1947 book-length essay The Irish he foresaw that this mindset would eventually wreck the Church in 
Ireland and the Irish would become French style Catholics who availed of the ceremony and rituals of the 
Church only for births, deaths and marriages. 
6
 Girvin (1986a: 65) posits that the Council broke the authoritarian mould of the Irish Church with many of its 
senior clerics finding it difficult to accept a laity that could speak for itself – thinking for itself was totally 
outside the bounds of possibility!  
7
 Biever’s study also showed (p. 311) that 96 per cent of people believed that the Church could not be compared 
to any other institution while 71 per cent believed that to follow Church teaching produced the best possible 
citizen (p. 314).  
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...the power struggle (if it can be glorified by such a title) in Irish Catholicism is not 
found between clergy and laity, but between clergy and laity against the intellectual 
new breed...[who] resent clerical dogmatism and authoritarian motivation... openly 
question undue church influence in areas of social concern... They speak and they 
write, but thus far their audience has been severely circumscribed to members of their 
own conviction; they have in effect been talking to themselves (1976: 520) 
 
For a brief period following the Vatican Council the liberal wing of the Church, both lay and 
clerical, found itself with a voice for the first time in almost a century, but was fated to remain 
a minority as those who sought change met the obduracy of the institutional Church. 
Eventually many voted with their feet and left the ministry and the Church and, as O’Doherty 
predicted, Ireland began to see the emergence of a post-Christian society.  Ireland became 
increasingly declericalised with an erosion of the ‘Rule by Command’ and an increasing 
defiance of the rules of behaviour prescribed by clerics for lay behaviour. 
 
Concomitant with declericalisation the 1970s saw the emergence of new groupings of 
Catholic lay groups that in many ways bypassed the hierarchy. Their lay leaders ‘were 
commonly more intransigent and uncompromising than the priests’ (Garvin, 2004: 211) and 
with an ageing, and numerically declining, clergy those same lay leaders became more 
powerful and self-assertive.
8
 Girvin (1986a) argues that these groupings, because they were 
popularly based enabled them to put pressure on politicians at local level; allowed the Church 
to claim that it had popular backing on contentious issues; let it appear that the Church itself 
was not involved in politics and at the same time allowing it to distance itself from the more 
contentious and strident lay organisations.  
  
The visit of the pope to Ireland in 1979 and his rallying cry to the faithful to oppose the 
threats to the traditional Catholic way of life, and in particular the evils of abortion, 
contraception and divorce, found a willing audience. Contraception dominated the Catholic 
lay agenda for much of the previous twenty years and had proven highly divisive. The 
contraceptive pill, which became available from 1960 onwards, offered women an element of 
control over their reproductive cycles but Church influence, and not so subtle pressure on the 
medical profession, ensured that it did not become widely available in Ireland for some time.
9
 
                                                          
8
 It was said of de Valera that he was more Catholic than the Pope. The same epithet could be applied to the 
more strident and right wing lay leaders who came to prominence in the abortion and divorce debates. 
9
 One of the fictions observed was that doctors prescribed the pill to help regulate menstrual cycles; if a natural 
extension of that was effective birth control then so be it. A 1969 Vatican ruling confirming the continuing ban 
on all forms of artificial birth control severely alienated many practicing Catholics. 
141 
 
Contraceptives were not available for sale and even after a 1973 Supreme Court ruling (the 
McGee case) that banning the sale of contraceptives was illegal, it was 1979 before Charles 
Haughey, as Minister for Health, introduced legislation which allowed married couples to buy 
contraceptives on production of a doctor’s prescription.10  
 
Shortly after the papal visit a number of lay groups associated to form the Pro-Life 
Amendment Campaign (PLAC). ‘The object of the new group was to agitate for a referendum 
to amend the constitution to prohibit abortion under any circumstances’ (Girvin, 1986a: 68). 
They had learned valuable lessons from the contraception debate and were determined not to 
be wrong-footed on the issues of abortion and divorce. Because abortion was not explicitly 
forbidden in the constitution PLAC feared that it could be introduced legislatively (highly 
unlikely as subsequent events would show) or more surreptitiously through judicial review. 
‘The emergence of a small but strident Women’s Right to Choose Group in 1980, advocating 
abortion as a female right, supplied PLAC with useful ammunition’ (Lee, 1989: 653). PLAC 
moved quickly and launched its campaign just before the 1981 general election. Just how 
successful they were can be seen from the following:   
In just over two weeks PLAC had achieved their main objective: parties representing 
over 90 per cent of Dáil members had acceded to their demands. There was an implied 
threat from PLAC that if the political parties did not promote an amendment, then a 
campaign would be mounted against these opponents... it does appear that none of the 
main parties had considered the consequences of their commitment... and that a 
mixture of piety and naivete as well as political calculation was involved (Girvin, 
1986: 69). 
 
With three elections taking place between June 1981 and November 1982 the abortion debate 
was very much centre stage. This resulted in the passing of a referendum to the constitution in 
1983 which acknowledged the right to life of the unborn, with due regard to the 
equal right to life of the mother.
11
  Many of the same protagonists joined the ‘divorce debate’ 
and the result was a 1986 referendum proposing divorce in certain limited circumstances was 
defeated. Both referenda proved to be enormously divisive and consumed huge amounts of 
political oxygen and were a distraction from the real problems besetting the country. In a time 
of profound change ‘the church continued to provide psychic moorings for many who might 
                                                          
10
 This famously became known as an Irish solution to an Irish problem. An earlier Government attempt in 1974 
to legislate for the sale of contraceptives to married couples only was defeated when the Taoiseach of the day, 
Liam Cosgrave, as did some others, voted against his own government in a free vote. 
11
 In an ironic twist the 1983 referendum wording, which was largely dictated by Church interests, proved to be 
legally ambivalent and had the opposite effect to that intended. This resulted in another major abortion debate in 
the early 1990s and required three further referenda to rectify the 1983 referendum outcome. 
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otherwise have suffered a good deal more emotional disturbance in the face of 
incomprehensible change’ (Lee, 1989: 655). More than anything else the debates around 
abortion and divorce demonstrated the continuing influence of the Catholic Church.
12
 The de 
jure position of the Church may have changed but the de facto position had not. Catholic 
teaching remained as a background underlying assumption embedded in the public sentiment 
and constrained change.  
 
Political Culture 
At the first critical juncture reference was made to the unchanging nature of Irish Society and 
political culture. Reference was also made to Coakley’s (2006: 37) definition of political 
culture as the ‘fundamental, deeply held views on the state itself, on the rules of the political 
game and on the kind of principles that should underlie political decision making’. 
Agriculture had dominated the economy and Ireland, in the period under review, was 
predominantly an agrarian society. However, 1966 had been a watershed year when the urban 
population exceeded the rural population for the first time. Urbanisation, an indication of an 
industrial society, brings very different social relations. ‘By contrast to agrarian society, 
where the existing order and the individual’s role within it are accepted, in industrial society 
the typical individual has a capacity to envisage himself or herself occupying an unlimited 
range of roles’ (Coakley, 2006: 40).13 Ireland was being urbanised and this urbanisation gave 
rise to a certain liberal/conservative cleavage on social issues which was evident in the voting 
patterns in the referenda referred to above.  
 
Change was also very evident on the education front. In 1958 there were 62,429 students 
attending secondary school and 7,649 at university. By 1987 these numbers were 341,681 and 
33,896 respectively (CSO). In the university sector there was also the beginning of a shift to 
the social sciences. There had also been an explosion in other third level education and by 
1987 there were in excess of 20,000 students attending other third level institutions. 
 
Education brings social mobility and an increase in the middle-classes in particular. This in 
turn leads to a more questioning attitude and less deference to the powers that be. Frustration 
                                                          
12
 A 1972 referendum had removed the ‘special position’ of the Catholic Church and recognised other named 
religions. 
13
 Coakley rhetorically asks the question (and does not answer it): would Ireland better be described as post-
industrial? Given that the industrial revolution largely passed Ireland by a ‘post-industrial society’ is probably 
appropriate.  
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at the level of taxation, perceived to be borne inordinately by an urban middle-class, brought 
the people on to the streets to protest in numbers never before seen.
14
 PAYE workers 
constituted two-thirds of the work force but paid 90 per cent of income tax. The effective rate 
of taxation had risen from the 12-14 per cent range throughout the 1950s and 1960s to 24.5 
per cent by 1979 (Sweeney, 1984:27). The sense of injustice was exacerbated by the 
capitulation of the government on a proposal to impose a levy of two per cent on farmers – 
the majority of whom were totally excluded from the tax net. This further accentuated a 
growing urban/rural divide and a changing political culture. There was also political fallout. 
‘The first direct elections to the European Parliament in June of 1979 provided an opportunity 
for this disaffection to make itself felt and the Fianna Fáil vote slumped by 15 per cent, to just 
under 35 per cent of the votes cast’ (Collins, 2001: 112). The government response was to set 
up a Commission on Taxation which will be dealt with later.  
 
The role of the media was also changing from being, in many instances, subservient reporters 
of the news to a questioning attitude devoid of deference. The new media became part of the 
story and in effect broke the path dependency of the ‘old’ media. Conor Brady, editor of the 
Irish Times, had this to say about crossing that line between reporting and making the news.  
The proposition that such a line can exist at all is something of a reductio ad 
absurdum... the news media are not merely a mirror of events. They become, in effect 
part of the story... Editors and journalists are uncomfortable with the idea. They 
cherish myths about their detachment (2005: 119).  
 
Two of the leading examples of this new breed of reporter were John Healy and Vincent 
Browne. Healy, through his Irish Times ‘Backbencher’ column, brought political commentary 
to a new level and ‘abandoned the reverential, hushed tone in which heretofore journalists had 
referred to political figures and, in particular, members of the government’ (Brady, 2005: 
245). Browne, as editor of Magill and as editor (and for a period owner) of the Sunday 
Tribune brought investigative reporting to a new level.
15
 
 
                                                          
14
 In a protest organised by the Dublin Council of Trade Unions over 150,000 took to the streets of Dublin in 
1979. The following year over 700,000 marched in 37 centres immediately prior to the budget (Sweeney, 1984: 
28).  
15
 Both men became inextricably linked with the political rise and fall of Charles J. Haughey. Healy became an 
apologist for Haughey seeing him as the only hope for the economic recovery of the country. Browne never 
missed an opportunity to question Haughey’s unexplained wealth and his position was vindicated by history.  
Ironically, Browne and Haughey were reconciled shortly before the latter’s death enabling Browne to offer a 
more balanced view of Haughey’s contribution.  
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A media world dominated by men was turned on its head with the arrival of a new breed of 
female reporter such as Nell McCafferty and Mary Maher in the Irish Times and Mary Kenny 
at the Irish Press. Tim Pat Coogan, who was editor of the Irish Press described Kenny’s 
arrival as being ‘like a comet exuding in its wake a shower of flaming particles from burning 
bras’ (2008: 145). Feminism had arrived on the Irish scene and its leading exponents were 
members of the fourth estate and used the media to challenge the patriarchal attitudes then 
embedded in the public sentiment as background underlying assumptions.  
 
A change that was to have a significant impact on Irish institutional life, took place soon after 
Haughey became Taoiseach in 1979. As expected he closed down the Department of 
Economic Planning and Development and moved its senior officials into the Department of 
the Taoiseach.
16
 This was just the beginning of the centralisation of power in that department. 
When Haughey left office in 1981 the department, which had formerly just consisted of a 
small secretariat that coordinated government business, had been trebled in size with 
‘divisions to handle foreign affairs, economic and social policy, cultural and legal affairs’ 
(Collins, 2001: 137). Since the foundation of the state the Department of Finance had been 
primus inter pares of government departments. Its role was now being usurped and the centre 
of civil service power was beginning its move to the Department of the Taoiseach. This move 
was completed absolutely when Haughey returned to power in 1987 and Padraig O hUiginn 
was Secretary of the Department. 
  
Another important milestone in a changing political culture was the foundation of the 
Progressive Democrats by Des O’Malley in December 1985 following his expulsion from the 
Fianna Fáil party.
17
 Generally regarded as one of the most able politicians of his era he was 
highly principled, and as with many such people, did not suffer fools gladly and offered a 
somewhat prickly exterior.
18
 At the party launch O’Malley spelled out the core philosophy of 
the party. ‘It focused on the need for a peaceful approach to the problems in Northern Ireland, 
                                                          
16
 Professor Martin O’Donoghue, who had been Minister for Economic Planning and Development, was also 
dropped from the cabinet. A few days later he took delivery of a strange looking parcel from Haughey’s official 
Garda driver. On opening same he found two dead ducks with a note from Haughey: ‘shot on my estate this 
morning’ (Collins, 2001; 134). O’Donoghue got the message. 
17
 O’Malley had been appointed Minister of Justice following the Arms Crisis of 1970 which saw Haughey 
removed from office and facing criminal charges for his alleged part in the illegal importation of arms in 
connection with the Northern Ireland troubles. Thereafter the two men were implacable enemies and it is 
questionable if any single political party could have accommodated both of them. 
18
 At the foundation of the party O’Malley’s wife, Pat, warned Paul Mackay ‘If you get involved with this man it 
is going to be a rough, rough ride. It is like becoming involved with Jesus Christ. Once you declare yourself for 
him you have to forget everything else and be with him. He is difficult’ (Collins, 2005: 35).  
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the need for fundamental tax reform to favour enterprise and employment and the requirement 
for a clear distinction between Church and State’ (Collins, 2005: 37). O’Malley, in a landmark 
speech to Dáil Ēireann on 20 February 1985 spelled out a clear vision of a pluralist Ireland 
that would be the mark of a true republic.
19
 (For O’Malley the Irish version of republicanism 
had degenerated to pure Anglophopia and this was nowhere more evident than in Fianna Fáil 
attitudes). The proposals on tax reform would be paid for from cuts in public expenditure, 
abolition of subsidies, integration and/or abolition of a number of state agencies, abolition of 
ministerial pensions and the Seanad, and the sale of state assets. The belief that ‘the tax-cuts 
could be self-financing through the boost they would provide to economic activity was widely 
regarded as pie in the sky’ (Collins, 2005: 63). This ‘idea’ of the Progressive Democrats 
became not only accepted but a major cause of the transformation of Ireland at the second 
critical juncture.  
 
Urbanisation, public disaffection with the tax regime evidenced in protest marches in 
1979/80, the changing role of the media, the rise of feminism, concentration of power in the 
Department of the Taoiseach and the birth of the Progressive Democrats were all signs of a 
changing political culture that made change to Irish institutional life possible.  
 
The Role of Ideas 
In reviewing the role of ideas at the first critical juncture most of the leading lights of the time 
had gone the way of what Whitaker calls slí na fírinne. Searches were made of 
Administration, Studies and JSSISI which were, at that time, the main vehicles for the 
dissemination of ideas addressing Ireland’s economic plight. A review was also carried out of 
the work of Tuairim and the influence of its members. The purpose of the reviews was to 
ascertain what ideas were promulgated and how the ideas of free trade and foreign direct 
investment came to be accepted and implemented. At the second critical juncture Tuairim had 
ceased to exist but the three journals referred to above were still going strong but, as will be 
demonstrated, their content and influence had changed largely due to the emergence of new 
institutions in the 1960s: the Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) and the National 
Economic and Social Council (NESC). Both of these institutions were to be highly influential 
and offered respected outlets for the dissemination of ideas. (Journals such as the Irish 
                                                          
19
 This speech has been widely hailed as one of the great Irish parliamentary speeches of modern times. The 
context was a debate on contraception. At interview O’Malley said that he had just ‘a few notes on the back of a 
brown envelope, as I recall’ but had thought a lot about what he wanted to say. 
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Banking Review and the Economic and Social Review mainly carried articles of a technical 
nature covering monetary and fiscal reporting and forecasting, econometrics, population 
changes and socio –demographic issues). 
 
What ideas became acceptable? 
 
Administration 
In the period 1980-88 Administration carried a total of 87 articles that could be defined as 
addressing national issues. The following broad classifications apply: 
 
Table 6.1: Administration Articles 
 
 
 
 
Given the perilous state of the public finances it is not surprising that the economy should be 
the main focus of attention. Articles covered the various budgets, public expenditure and its 
efficacy, the growth in the public sector and industrial development.  As unemployment was 
as high as 18.3 per cent in 1987 this subject drew a lot of attention with particular emphasis 
on the prevalence of youth unemployment. Industrial relations were seen as part of the 
(un)employment situation and also featured regularly.  
 
Not unexpectedly the European Community also featured heavily with articles on regional 
devleopment, food aid, redistribution and social policies (together with the implications for 
Economics 
19% 
(Un)employme
nt 
16% 
Cultural 
Change 
14% 
Public 
Management 
13% 
Europe 
13% 
Social 
Policy 
12% 
Public Policy 
8% 
Industrial 
Relations 
2% 
Taxation 
3% 
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the Irish administrative system), and reform of the Community budget. Public management 
and public policy articles addressed issues ranging across the spectrum of the constitution, the 
civil service, state-sponsored bodies, the public interest, and the design of democracy.  
 
The Commission on Taxation (this will be dealt with later) issued its first report in 1982 and 
there were two articles reacting to same. Dr. N Morris of the Institute for Fiscal Studies in 
London generally welcomed the report and went on to point out that the problems of the Irish 
tax system were similar to the British situation: tax avoidance was a major industry primarily 
because the tax base had never been adequately defined; ‘reliefs and exemptions have been 
granted in a haphazard manner so that the distribution of the tax burden is seen as unfair’ 
(1982: 8).
20
 Brendan Dowling, then of J&E Goodbody, Government Stockbrokers, and 
formerly of the ESRI, was critical of the report because it allowed for piecemeal 
implementation with the government being tempted to cherry pick the pieces that increased 
revenue raising powers and he feared ‘that the evolution of the tax system over the next five 
years will bear little resemblance to the proposals of the Commission and there will continue 
to be an ad hoc response to divergent pressures of interest groups and revenue shortages’ 
(1982: 17). History was to prove him right.  
 
Nicholas Mansergh, planning officer with Cork Corporation, in his paper ‘The Taxation of 
Development Land: A Proposal’ marked the tenth anniversary of the Kenny Report.21 
Mansergh (1982) came up with a novel scheme whereby once land was zoned for 
development tax would be immediately levied on same and the tax became more punitive the 
longer the land remained undeveloped. His proposal does not appear to have received any 
serious consideration.  
 
The final article on taxation in Administration was ‘A Radical Reform of Social Welfare and 
Income Tax Evaluated’ by Patrick Honohan (1987), then lecturer in economics at University 
College Dublin, subsequently professor at Trinity College Dublin and now Governor of the 
                                                          
20
 That the similarities with Britain are so striking is another example of the continuing Treasury influence on the 
Department of Finance sixty years after independence – continuing path dependency. 
21
 Called after the name of the chairman, more correctly it was the report of the Committee on the Price of 
Building Land. It proposed that land rezoned for development should be purchased by the state at a premium of 
25 per cent over its agricultural value thereby controlling speculation in land. Lack of political will and dubious 
legal advice that its proposals were anti-constitutional meant it was never implemented. In the light of 
subsequent events this was a critical moment as its implementation would surely have drastically altered the 
economic history of Ireland. 
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Central Bank of Ireland. He was somewhat critical of both the Commission on Taxation and 
the Commission on Social Welfare reports and advocated an integrated system that involved 
the payment of a basic income to all. It would require a two-tier tax regime with three 
objectives: limiting the magnitude of redistribution to large families to an acceptable level; a 
low marginal tax rate on higher incomes; the payment of a basic income greater than the 
minimum social welfare rate. The scheme would have the advantages of eliminating poverty 
traps, be simple to administer, and universality in social benefits would be stigma free. There 
was also less likelihood of fraud and a likely reduction in misrepresentation. He included 
detailed costings on his proposals and concluded that ‘the entire basic income idea stands or 
falls on one’s view as to the adequacy of the payments that are possible’ (1987: 81). 
 
Acknowledging the pace of social and cultural change there was a realisation that 
administrative change had not kept pace and there are several articles on the changes 
necessary in both state-sponsored bodies and the civil service. Seán de Fréine, a principal 
officer in the Department of Public Service, contributed two articles entitled ‘To Change the 
Organisation, Change the Culture’. Drawing extensively on the literature of management, 
organisational behaviour and sociology he defines culture and the drivers of change. By 1966 
the population of Ireland had become largely urban - just 60 years previously two out of every 
three people were living in the countryside. Pointing out that ‘urbanisation is a noted 
harbinger of change’ (1984: 466), nevertheless, the Irish naively believed that the 
comparatively stable social conditions that prevailed heretofore were attributable to native 
virtue! To change organisational culture in the public service training would be the key 
‘beginning with some form of management development, leading to team development, to 
inter-team development and to strengthening superior-subordinate relationships, often through 
a form of management by objectives’ (1985: 127).  Change would also require new values 
such as emphasising prevention rather than correction – getting it right first time. All levels of 
the organisation must be attended to covering such diverse things as ‘education, 
communications, structure, procedures, techniques, measurement of performance, staff 
appraisal.... To blend these together in an integrated and mutually supporting system is no 
easy task’ (1985: 130). He entered the following timely, necessary and prescient caveat: doing 
it piecemeal was sure to lead to failure. 
 
In 1982 Stephen Lalor, then a research fellow at Trinity College Dublin and subsequently a 
civil servant, wrote on corporatism in Ireland. He outlined the steps taken by Lemass 
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(previously covered in Chapter 4 of this thesis) to bring the unions and employers into the 
policy-making process and described it as societal corporatism. He was cognisant that the 
charge of being anti-democratic was always likely to be levied against corporatism but 
believed that this did not apply to the Irish situation.
22
 Niamh Hardiman, then a post graduate 
student at Nuffield College Oxford took Lalor to task. Her main criticism was that what 
Ireland was experiencing was institutional tripartism rather than corporatism and backs up her 
claim with extensive citations. The existence of institutional tripartism structures ‘however 
elaborate they may be, is not necessarily an indication that they are carrying out the 
significant political functions’ (1984: 79). In this she misses the point that the institutions put 
in place did carry out significant political functions. She expected interest groups, if they are 
to be purely corporatist, to be interested only in ouputs, i.e. the policies they pursue to be only 
in the interests of the functional groups embraced in the system. Lalor described what was 
happening while Hardiman was stuck on theoretical definitions – another example of practice 
always predating theory. Somewhat presciently Lalor concluded his original article as 
follows: ‘if in the future the emergence and strengthening of corporatist structures coincide 
with an increase in importance or utility of economic planning there will be circumstantial 
evidence that more than a contingent relationship exists’ (1982: 95). Garvin (1982), in 
‘Change and the Political System’, acknowledges that ‘the nationalist social democracy of 
Lemass seems to be working rather creakily’ (p. 37) but that to all intents and purposes 
corporatism was dead. In the event Garvin totally misread the situation and corporatism 
‘Irish-style’ emerged as one of the main ‘ideas’ that led to the transformation of Ireland at the 
second critical juncture.  
 
Studies 
In reviewing the ‘ideas’ that were in circulation in the 1950s proposing economic and political 
salvation for Ireland the Jesuit publication Studies was a major player. It carried a total of 105 
articles and book reviews on economic and political theory and practice. The most influential 
commentators all contributed: Professors Carter, Lynch, Ryan and Meenan; Whitaker and 
Fitzgerald. 
 
                                                          
22
 Whitaker (1977: 290) writing on planning in Ireland raised the concern ‘that democratic principles are not 
necessarily fully consistent with consulting only the functional organisations’ and that after formal consultations 
have taken place they should then ‘be the subject of debate and approval by parliament’. 
150 
 
Reflective of the Jesuit charism of social justice articles in the 1980s predominantly relate to 
social issues: poverty in Ireland; homelessness; personal rights in industrial relations; crime 
and punishment; feminism; divisions in society; and challenges and opportunities facing rural 
Ireland. Northern Ireland also played an increasing role and, related to same, the meaning of 
being Irish and Irish identity. Ecumenism also featured strongly. The summer edition of 1985 
was devoted to Economics and Ideology. The main articles were: 
 ‘The Role of the State in Economic Affairs’ by Kieran Kennedy;23 
 ‘Economic Philosophy and Ideology in Ireland’ by J.L. Pratschke; 
 ‘The Political Economy of Utopia’ by D. McCulloch. 
The above, together with articles on the prospects for the world economy in 1980, and foreign 
policy and neutrality in 1988, were the only contributions on politics and economics and are 
evidence of a distinct shift in editorial policy since the 1950s. It is likely also to be linked to 
the availability of other channels and may also be attributable to increased secularisation.  
 
The Journal of the Statistical and Social Inquiry Society of Ireland (JSSISI) 
As with Studies the JSSISI review of articles shows a change of emphasis and range of 
contributors. Nevertheless, it reflected the concerns of the times. Reflecting the state of 
industrial unrest three of the seven papers presented in 1980 were on industrial relations. 
Ireland and the European Monetary System featured in 1981 as did the government White 
Paper on Education. Irish agriculture, farm income, EU membership and the Common 
Agricultural Policy were regular features between 1980 and 1988. Unsurprisingly, given its 
title the journal carried several articles by staff of the CSO on the collection of statistics and 
the methodology employed. 
 
In a 1981 paper,  ‘Company Tax – effective rates on profits’, J.C. Stewart described the 
difficulties that a combination of differing or controversial measures of profit and obscure 
reporting of tax paid made the calculation of tax rates on profits for the corporate sector a 
difficult if not arbitrary process. In the same year a paper by Rottman, D.B., Hannan, D.F. & 
Wiley, M.M. 'Social policy and income adequacy in the Republic of Ireland: the importance 
of social class and family cycle' focussed on the comparison between direct income and 
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 Kennedy was the Director of the ESRI and as will be seen later a highly influential commentator. An 
unexpected contribution of his to Studies was a book review on the Resurrection of Jesus by a Jewish writer. 
151 
 
disposable income and the effect of taxation policy on same. It also dealt with the apparent 
injustices inherent in the system. 
 
By 1984 the issue of taxation reform was becoming increasingly topical. ‘Some implications 
of tax reform’ by Donal de Buitleir conceded that the Irish tax system was totally 
unsatisfactory, unfair and complicated, wasted resources on a grand scale and that reform was 
long overdue.
24
  Paul Sweeney, economic advisor to ICTU delivered ‘The PAYE sector's 
perspective of taxation and trade union demand for reform’ in which he outlined the 
background to the PAYE protests of 1979 and demonstrated that since then, rather than 
improving, taxes had become more regressive. In the same vein, Donal C. Murphy of the 
CSO presented a paper ‘The impact of state taxes and benefits on Irish household incomes’ 
which drew on data from various household budget surveys and again highlighted some of the 
anomalies and inequalities inherent in the taxation system. The employers’ perspective was 
given by E. McCarthy of the Federated Union of Employers. In his paper ‘The inefficiency of 
the Irish tax system’ he referred to the inbuilt inadequacies of the system and how they 
impacted employer/employee relationships and the development of pay policy. 
 
On the 3 December 1987 the SSISI held a ‘Symposium on the Privatisation of State Assets 
and State Commercial Companies’ with three invited speakers: Sean Cromien, Secretary 
General of the Department of Finance; Peter Cassells, Assistant Secretary of the Irish 
Congress of Trade Unions; Moore McDowell, Department of Political Economy at University 
College Dublin.
25
 Their papers were published in early 1988 in JSSISI vol. XXV, part V. 
Cromien offered an overview of privatisation taking place across the world and pointed out 
that privatisation was taking place on both sides of the ideological divide – Gorbachev’s 
USSR and Reagan’s USA with Thatcher’s UK. He summarised the advantages/disadvantages 
of privatisation and the political philosophy underpinning both sides of the debate. Referring 
to state-sponsored bodies in Ireland he refers to Lemass’ pragmatism and the thinking behind 
state involvement: ‘It was never the expressed intention to supplant viable private sector 
activity by governmental agencies. There was no grand design for a socialised economy’ 
(Cromien, 1988: 58). Without saying so explicitly he seems to agree with critics of the 
government’s role that the lack of a strategic overview in setting up state-sponsored bodies 
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 De Buitleir served as Secretary of the Commission on Taxation.  
25
 Both Cromien and Cassells were interviewed by the author in relation to their respective roles at the second 
critical juncture. 
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was a large part of the problem facing the country at that time.
26
 By his estimates there were 
20 or so bodies that between them employed 75,000 people and had assets in excess of £4 
billion. While trying to remain as neutral and non-political as possible he offered the 
possibility of joint ventures between the state and the private sector citing the example of the 
fertiliser industry where the state owned Nitrigin Ēireann Teo had combined with Imperial 
Chemicals Incorporated in a joint venture. 
 
Given his background it is not surprising that Cassells opposed privatisation. He questions the 
motivation of those proposing privatisation in no uncertain terms:  
In recent years, the lobby in favour of privatisation, or more specifically the handing 
over of something that belongs to the public (you and me) to a small number of private 
individuals, has been very vociferous, aggressive and blatant in their use of 
propaganda. In putting together this propaganda, they have been assisted by a number 
of economists who unlike eminent predecessors such as Paddy Lynch, T K Whitaker 
and James Meenan, appear to consider that facts and realities may be ignored or 
distorted and history rewritten to prove the case on behalf of their client (1988: 62).  
 
He went on to point out that under the recently concluded Social Partnership agreement, The 
Programme for National Recovery, state-sponsored bodies would be actively encouraged and 
facilitated to develop and diversify their economic employment-creating activities, i.e. have 
an increased role. 
 
McDowell sets out the theoretical and empirical considerations around privatisation. He 
argues that the debate is presented as an economic one when in reality it is a political one and 
a review of what happened in the UK shows that economic efficiency had been sacrificed to 
political goals. Thatcher’s aims should be seen as 
... a single part of a broader programme which includes lower taxes, increasing private 
provision and finance for health, old age and education. These deep changes require 
the creation of a stable coalition of interests committed to a non-collectivist political 
stance (1988: 72).   
 
Much of the debate around privatisation was driven by the perceived inefficiency of the 
public service but McDowell’s research did not support that view. 
 
He offered an interesting comment on the ‘official mind’ and privatisation: 
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 It will be recalled that at the first critical juncture the establishment of state-sponsored bodies was one of the 
main vehicles for effecting change.  
153 
 
In the UK, 'sponsor' departments of the civil service appear actively to have 
encouraged privatisation of state firms in their areas of responsibility. There is no 
evidence of any equivalent attitude in Irish civil service departments which give the 
strong impression of being more anxious to ensure collective "control" of economic 
and social activity than to ensure that it is motivated by efficiency in resource use and 
responsiveness to market pressures. Civil servants have more faith in their own ability 
to guide the economy than in that of market forces. There is, it seems, no social 
consensus that market forces should be permitted to guide resource allocation 
(McDowell, 1988:84).    
 
The above SSISI symposium has been included because the privatisation of some state-
sponsored bodies did become a reality. 
 
Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) 
Originally founded in 1960 as the Economic Research Institute the ESRI has grown to be an 
internationally renowned body producing high quality economic and social research. Its 
mission statement is ‘To produce research that contributes to understanding economic and 
social change and that informs public policymaking and civil society in Ireland and 
throughout the European Union’ (www.esri.ie). In the period 1980 – 88 it produced a total of 
282 publications (includes Books, General Research Series, Memorandum Series, Forecasting 
Series and Working Papers).
27
 
 
Since 1976 it has published a five year research plan setting out the main planned research for 
the period. It also, unusually for an Irish public body, benchmarks its output against the plan. 
In The ESRI Research Plan 1981-85 the director, Kieran Kennedy, writes  
The aim of the institute is to provide knowledge that will be useful in improving 
economic and social conditions in Ireland’. In addition the research plan should 
identify the main issues ‘relating to the choices facing Irish decision makers and 
establish research priorities consistent with the resources likely to be available to the 
institute’ (Kennedy, 1981: 1).28   
 
The areas to be covered were as diverse as Living Conditions, Economic Forecasting and 
Modelling, Prices and Incomes, Population and Labour Force. Reflecting the times a major 
concentration would be on Public Expenditure and Taxation with specific research on the 
following: the social insurance system; evaluation of major public expenditure programmes; 
                                                          
27
 In 1981 the council of the ESRI had 29 members. The president was Dr. T.K. Whitaker and the chairman was 
Professor Patrick Lynch. There were five clerics, three of whom held chairs in Irish Universities.  
28
 Kennedy was a highly influential director and respected commentator. The ESRI publications list credits him 
with 36 publications. Strangely enough the book being cited is not one of them. A search of the library catalogue 
in UCC credits him with a further nine books, all of them on Irish economic matters. 
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the rise in public sector employment; analysis of efficiency and equity effects of the major 
taxes and transfers (such studies to be aligned with the work of the Commission on Taxation).  
 
Given the ‘social’ in its title many of the publications are on social issues such as poverty and 
the social welfare system, long term unemployment and measures to counteract it, the 
criminal justice system, the education system and, particularly, early school leavers, social 
mobility, labour market policies and employment growth.  
 
Economic analysis and forecasting, together with various sectoral analyses, make up a large 
part of the published work. A regular and highly important feature has been the Quarterly 
Economic Commentary which assesses the state of the nation’s finances and the effects of 
government budgetary and economic policy. All the reports from 1980 – 88 were perused to 
ascertain what ‘ideas’ were emanating from that quarter.  
 
Through 1980 and 1981 the unsustainable level of government borrowing was the main focus 
of attention together with the negative effects of taxation policy. The consumer price index 
(cpi) rose by 12 per cent between November 1979 and May 1980 and by 3.5 per cent for the 
quarter ended October 1981. The ESRI attributed these increases to indirect taxation and went 
on to spell out various options for widening the tax base. Throughout this period it was also 
pointed out that joining the European Monetary System (EMS) was not having the promised 
effects: ‘Clearly the process of redirecting exports to markets other than the UK has not 
accelerated – if anything it has slowed down’ (Bacon, et al, 1981: 53). 
 
Again in 1982 ‘the balance of payments deficit is the principal constraint on action’ (Bacon, 
et al, 1982a: 32) and unemployment was likely to continue rising. It goes on to make the 
telling point that ‘In some respects the focus on the exchequer borrowing requirement 
obscures the fact that the problem is not the borrowing but the expenditure’ (ibid: 33). In a 
neat demonstration of how little had been learned (or quickly forgotten!) since the publication 
of Economic Development in 1958 the ESRI repeatedly drew attention to non-productive 
expenditure. The December 1982 issue concluded with the following: ‘Simply calling 
expenditure “Capital” is not sufficient reason for undertaking it’ (Bacon, et al, 1982b: 52). 
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The 1983 reports addressed the continuing lack of competitiveness and the need for a 
developmental strategy. The Telesis Report and its recommendations also featured heavily. 
(This was a report commissioned by NESC and will be dealt with later).  
 
By 1984 there were some signs of a recovery in the economy with a rise of 36 per cent in 
exports in the first half of the year. However this figure was attributable to a number of 
unusual factors: the sale of agricultural stock into EEC intervention and the export of alumina 
from one factory in Limerick (there had been a spike in world demand for the product). There 
was also substantial growth in electronic and chemical exports. The ESRI went on to point out 
that these industries had very little linkages to the rest of the economy, were not huge 
employers and were paying low, or no, corporation tax. Commenting on the growing debate 
around the perceived inefficiency of the public sector (a debate that was spilling over from the 
actions of Thatcher in ‘rolling back the state’) it referred to ‘the simplistic nonsense’ being 
espoused. It concluded: ‘It is surely sufficient that teachers, nurses and tax inspectors should 
be required to face a differential fall in their living standards for the sake of their own and the 
country’s long term future, without having also to suffer a denigration of their role in society’ 
(Baker, et al, 1984: 24).  
 
Increases in American interest rates in 1983 and 1984 added £700 million to the annual 
servicing of the national debt and this exposure to outside influences was a continuing theme 
in the 1985 quarterly reports. The July report commented on ‘the perceived wisdom’ that 
government was constrained by the inequity of failing to index social welfare benefits and the 
injustice of cutting familiar levels of socially provided services but failure to cut the deficit 
would mean that ‘these perceived constraints may have to be revisited’ (Baker, et al, 1985: 
26). 
 
1986 saw a collapse in the price of oil and a general uplift in world trade leading to increased 
optimism. This was likely to lead to modest improvement in Ireland but ‘if this is to be the 
start of lasting recovery it must not be dissipated in euphoria leading to unrealistic pay 
settlements or a relaxation of fiscal discipline’ (Baker, Scott and Hayes, 1986a: 29). Just a few 
months later ‘the mood of optimism about the course of the economy, which was fairly 
widespread in the early months of 1986, has now largely dissipated’ (Baker, Scott and Hayes, 
1986b: 27). The fall in inflation was lower than expected; there was no great improvement in 
the public finances; weak sterling had eroded margins for exporters; the census showed that 
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population growth was significantly lower than anticipated and job losses higher. Even the 
bad weather was blamed for a lack of recovery in agriculture. Currency speculation around 
EMS led to interest rate rises but an 8 per cent devaluation of the punt helped counterbalance 
this. The same issue went on to warn of the need for ‘extreme parsimony’ in preparation of 
the estimates and concluded:  
At the risk of inducing terminal tedium in the reader it is necessary to state yet again 
that it remains imperative for the long-term health of the economy that substantial 
progress should be made as soon as possible towards reducing the current budget 
deficit in absolute as well as proportionate terms (Baker, Scott and Hayes,1986b: 30). 
 
The ESRI summary of 1986 was that the cause of the malaise could not be blamed entirely on 
inadequate budgeting or imperfect modelling for the poor performance of the economy. 
Neither could international currency fluctuations nor indeed the weather be blamed and... 
... purely domestic problems have been greatly exacerbated by the intransigence of 
interest groups, excessive concern for short term self interest, and a general 
unwillingness to lower unrealistic expectations. A principal task of the incoming 
government, whatever its political complexion, is to address these fundamental issues, 
and to attempt to create some unity of purpose (Baker, Scott and Hayes, 1986c: 28). 
 
There was a change of government in March 1987. The April report stated that ‘the major 
uncertainty is whether the key fiscal aims of restraining the growth in the public service pay 
bill can be achieved in practice’ (Baker, Scott and Quinn, 1987: 5).  Unemployment at the end 
of 1986 was 18.25 per cent against an OECD average of 8.5 percent. The budget deficit as a 
per cent of GNP was 8.5 per cent against an OECD average of 3.25 per cent. It went on to 
express the hope ‘that the budget limits on expenditure will be adhered to, and that they will 
be accepted, however grudgingly, by the interest groups affected’ (ibid: 24).  By July the 
ESRI was beginning to believe that the budget targets could be met and even though 
corrective action taken was likely to have a deflationary effect of 2 per cent on GNP they 
expected that there would be a real increase of 1.75 per cent overall for the year. They also 
noted that some of the cuts were having an uneven effect. They finished 1987 on a positive 
note with the December report welcoming Social Partnership and the commitments on public 
pay. It also noted that the budget targets were likely to be met. 
 
The overarching concern of all the quarterly commentaries is the necessity to address the 
public finances through a concentration on productive investment decisions, control of public 
sector pay, and addressing the inefficiencies and inequities in the taxation system.  
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The Commission on Taxation 
In response to the general unrest on taxation generally outlined in the section on Political 
Culture the Commission on Taxation was set up Michael O’Kennedy, Minister for Finance in 
1980. Its brief was ‘to enquire generally into the present system of taxation and to recommend 
such changes as appear desirable and practicable so as to achieve an equitable incidence of 
taxation’ (1982: 25). The Commission was chaired by Dr. Miriam Hederman-O’Brien who, 
by her own admission, knew nothing about tax (interview 2009) but believed this was a 
distinct advantage as she had no preconceived ideas.
29
 The other members of the Commission 
were drawn from business, unions, farmer bodies, accountancy bodies and academia.
30
 The 
secretariat was drawn from the Revenue Commissioners and Department of Finance. In 
addition to a forensic examination of the Irish system the Commission also examined the tax 
systems in Australia, Canada, France, Isle of Man, Luxembourg, Netherlands, New Zealand, 
Sweden and Great Britain.  
 
The work of the Commission was underpinned by the following principles: 
1. The direct tax base should be measured on a basis which measures the amount a 
person could spend in a particular period while maintaining intact the real value of 
their capital in terms of purchasing power. 
2. Income from different sources should be taxed in the same way. 
3. A husband and wife living together should be regarded as the basic unit for tax 
purposes. 
4. The tax system should be neutral in respect to inflation. 
5. The minimisation of waste requires that a tax system should not influence individual 
or business choices (predicated on the belief that individuals left to their own devices 
will spend their income wisely and firms will choose the most efficient means of 
production).  
                                                          
29
 Dr Hederman-O’Brien featured in an earlier chapter for her role in Tuairim. A practicing barrister, she 
continues to play an active part in Irish public life holding a myriad of directorships in private and public bodies, 
and has been active in Irish/European relations since she attended university in Rome in the late 1940s. She was 
Chancellor of the University of Limerick from 1998 – 2002. At interview she talked about meeting Tomás O 
Cofaigh, then secretary of the Department of Finance, pleading her ignorance on taxation and requesting the 
secondment of an enlightened and open-minded civil servant who would act as secretary to the Commission. The 
appointment of de Buitléir proved to be an inspired choice. 
30
 Together with Hederman-O’Brien, Donal Nevin and Dan Murphy, representing ICTU, served on NESC (see 
next section). Professor Louden Ryan, who featured prominently in an earlier chapter, The First Critical Juncture 
in the Transformation of Ireland, was also a member. 
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6. It is generally preferable to make direct payments to those in need than through the tax 
system. 
7. Taxes should not be earmarked for specific purposes. 
8. Compulsory social insurance contributions should be more correctly regarded as a tax 
and should be evaluated by the same criteria. 
 
The Commission sat from 1980 to 1985 and produced five reports:  
Direct Taxation, 1982, called for a much clearer definition of the tax base and to include all 
assets and ‘all accretions of economic power including capital gains, inheritances and 
other windfalls’ (p. 30) no matter how acquired. It also had recommendations on the 
taxation of fringe benefits, borrowings and savings, the disproportionately favourable 
treatment of householders, capital gains and the exemption of a large proportion of 
farmers from the tax base. 
Direct Taxation – the Role of Incentives, 1984, concluded that the existing high levels of 
taxation were a disincentive to productive effort; high taxation rates were exacerbated 
by the erosion of the tax base by a plethora of incentives; tax avoidance was 
widespread; the cost of incentives was being met by higher taxation on other activities. 
(It also recommended (p. 21) tax relief on stallion fees ‘to ensure the continued 
development of the industry in Ireland’).  
Indirect Taxation, 1984, dealt with VAT and excise duties on alcohol, tobacco, transport and 
betting. It also recommended the abolition of stamp duty on property. 
Special Taxation, 1985, recommended local government to have powers to raise local taxes, 
especially on property, punitive taxes for those causing environmental damage and 
royalties on mining and mineral development to have a progressive rate.  
Tax Administration, 1985, acknowledged that ‘the administration of taxation in Ireland had 
virtually broken down. Non-compliance is a major problem’ (p. 21). It recommended 
self-assessment for all sources of personal and corporate income with the exception of 
wages and salaries, a more general system of deduction of tax at source on other types 
of income, an integrated collection and enforcement system including a penalty code. 
 
All reports contain minority findings as many of the proposals were perceived by some 
members as impinging unduly on their interests/members. Dr Hederman-O’Brien believes 
that ‘if we were to achieve unanimity we would be still there’ (2009). She found the farmer 
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representatives the most difficult to keep onside, not surprising given the favourable tax 
treatment of farmers heretofore. Nevertheless, the reports proved to be very useful as they 
offered a menu of solutions/alterations many of which were taken up by NESC and the 
government and subsequently implemented.  
 
 
NESC 
The National Industrial Economic Council (NIEC) set up in 1963 (see Chapter 5) was 
reconstituted as the National Economic and Social Council (NESC) in 1973 with the 
following remit:  
The function of the Council is to analyse and report to the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) 
on strategic issues relating to the efficient development of the economy and the 
achievement of social justice and the development of a strategic framework for the 
conduct of relations and negotiation of agreements between the government and the 
social partners. The Council is chaired by the Secretary General of the Department of 
the Taoiseach and contains representatives of trade unions, employers, farmers' 
organisations, NGOs, key government departments and independent experts’ (NESC 
2009).  
 
As noted above NESC is chaired by the Secretary of the Department of the Taoiseach and this 
may very well be one of the major reasons for its success.
31
 It operates with a small full-time 
secretariat but can call on expertise from across the public service as required. It regularly 
commissions outside research and indeed the ESRI is one of the principal beneficiaries of 
such commissioning. The quality of its work has long been respected on all sides of the 
political divide and its figures are taken as being accurate and reliable. To date it has produced 
one hundred and twenty reports on all aspects of social and economic policy.  
 
In 1980 NESC commissioned Telesis, an American management consultancy firm, to carry 
out a review of Ireland’s industrial strategy with the objective of ensuring that ‘the Irish 
government’s industrial policy is appropriate to the creation of an internationally competitive 
industrial base in Ireland which will support increased employment and higher living 
standards’ (NESC 1982: 10).32  Central to the Telesis report was a refocusing on indigenous 
internationally trading companies and a reduction of support for new foreign firms. The report 
                                                          
31
 It will be recalled that the NIEC at its foundation was chaired by Whitaker in his capacity as Secretary in the 
Department of Finance. By the 1980s the locus of power had shifted considerably as detailed above under 
Political Culture when Haughey made substantial changes in 1979. 
32
 Officially called ‘A Review of Industrial Policy’, it is more generally referred to as the Telesis Report. 
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also commented extensively on the electronics industry, then perceived as a success because it 
employed 30,000, but they, correctly, foresaw problems because ‘the functions which would 
provide the basis for the development of higher value-added businesses are not located in 
Ireland’ (1982: 7).  
 
NESC considered the Telesis report together with report no. 56 ‘Industrial Policy and 
Development: A Survey of Literature from the Early 1970s to the Present’ and no. 59 ‘The 
Importance of Infrastructure to Industrial Development in Ireland - Roads, 
Telecommunications and Water Supply’ before issuing their own conclusions and 
recommendations.
33
  Implicit in their report is the failure to develop indigenous industry and 
that the type of foreign industry attracted was bringing very little in the way of added value. 
The recommendations can be summarised as follows (NESC, 1982a): 
 State assistance to be more finely tuned to help indigenous companies overcome the 
main barriers to entry to international markets; 
 Policies on internationally trading indigenous companies to be complemented to 
ensure those firms have the scale, functions and financial capacity to compete abroad; 
 Greater selectivity in assistance to foreign companies to ensure they locate key aspects 
of their businesses in Ireland; 
 Similar recommendations to apply to the services sector; 
 Regular assessment of the levels of incentives to foreign industry, with a view to 
reducing same and greater control of tax-based lending mechanisms; 
 Better evaluation of the success of industrial policy; 
 The importance of a positive environment to achieve industrial policy objectives. 
 
In the period 1980-88 NESC produced a total of 41 reports (in the previous 28 years of its 
existence it had only produced 46 reports). Apart from the increased number there was also a 
greater professionalism and considerable step-up in the depth and breadth of analysis. The 
period under review contains reports across the entire social and economic spectrum: 
demographics, labour markets, the criminal justice system, social welfare, health, education, 
                                                          
33
 At interview Dr FitzGerald made the interesting observation that much of the malaise that permeated Irish 
industry in the 1980s was directly attributable to the effects of ‘free trade’ policies adopted in the 1960s in the 
move from ‘protectionism’. 
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housing, tourism, transport etc. Its major contribution has been in the area of economic and 
social policy assessment and it has never been slow to point out the failings of the state. 
 
Integral to NESC was bringing the social partners together and over time a certain level of 
respect began to build between them. As the various participants got to know one another a 
degree of mutual trust began to emerge. To the surprise of many they actually got to like one 
another! (Ahern, Cassells, Dunne and O hUiginn interviews). In November 1986 NESC 
produced A Strategy for Development 1986-90 and this proved to be a seminal document that, 
in the opinion of the writer deserves equal status with Economic Development.  It helped to 
ensure that the critical moment of that time became a critical juncture. It proposed a 
corporatist solution that will be dealt with in detail in the next chapter.  
  
Who were the ideational actors? 
At the first critical juncture it was seen that the writings of Professors Carter, Lynch and Ryan 
were highly influential, closely followed by FitzGerald and Whitaker and that their ‘ideas’ 
were widely disseminated across the then available media. By the second critical juncture 
there were many more channels available for the dissemination of ideas but there is a marked 
absence of dominant figures in ideational roles. Apart from Kieran Kennedy at the ESRI, 
Bridget Laffan writing on European affairs is the most cited author in all the articles 
reviewed. In the 1950s the ‘idea’ of free trade became a worldwide phenomenon and with the 
open nature of the economy Ireland could not remain immune to world influences. Even more 
so at the second critical juncture, because of the level of foreign direct investment that had 
taken place, outside influences became more significant. The new ‘idea’ for world economic 
revival was monetarism.   
 
Monetarism is an economic doctrine that holds that changes in the supply of money causes 
change in general price levels. Allied to this is a belief in minimal intervention by the state in 
the economy which is best regulated by free market forces. Very much associated with the 
Chicago School of economists such as Milton Friedman, monetarism holds that control of 
inflation can only be achieved by restricting the growth in money supply. By the 1970s this 
argument began to gain acceptance as the emergence of high levels of inflation and 
unemployment discredited Keynesian demand-management policies which had become 
embedded in the public sentiment as background underlying assumptions. The emphasis was 
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shifting to concentration on the supply side. The rise of Thatcher in Britain, Reagan in 
America, Mulrooney in Canada, Keating in Australia and Lange in New Zealand greatly 
boosted the cause of monetarism with Thatcher, in particular, having a significant influence in 
Ireland. 
 
Thatcher became Prime Minister of the Great Britain in 1979 and quickly earned the moniker 
of the Iron Lady because of her perceived inflexibility on policy matters. Her first term of 
office was dominated by three issues: monetary policy, public spending and trade union 
reform. She was the quintessential monetarist and the Conservative budget of 1980 spelled 
out the Medium Term Financial Strategy which was intended to set the monetary framework. 
‘The aim was to bring down inflation by decreasing monetary growth, while curbing 
borrowing to ensure that the pressure of disinflation did not fall solely on the private sector in 
the  form of higher interest rates’ (Thatcher, 1993: 96). Monetary policy had to be matched 
with fiscal policy which brought public expenditure under control. Her ideology may well 
have been more political than economic but she set about changing British society 
fundamentally.
34
 By the end of her first term she boasted, not without justification, that ‘like-
minded ministers and I had largely converted the Cabinet, the Conservative Party and opinion 
in the worlds of finance, business and even the media to a more restrictive view of what the 
state’s role in the economy should be’ (1993: 688).  
 
Her case was greatly helped by the behaviour of some of the trade union leaders, particularly 
in nationalized industries such as steel and coal. For Thatcher it was a fundamental question: 
who ran the country? She was in no doubt it should be the government. For her the unions had 
been ‘exploited by the communists and militants who had risen to key positions within the 
trade union movement’ (1993: 97). She had two simple solutions: break the power of the 
unions and privatise nationalised industries. She immediately set about changing the law on 
unfair dismissal and redundancy payments (deemed to be far too onerous on employers), 
secondary picketing, strike balloting and the ‘closed shop’ (which made union membership 
obligatory in certain industries). Allied to her fundamental abhorrence of socialism was that 
unions had in actual fact failed their members: ‘The unions had priced many of their members 
out of jobs by demanding excessive wages for insufficient output, so making British goods 
                                                          
34
 One of her more controversial pronouncements, pounced on by the press, was that there was no such thing as 
society. In her memoirs she attempted to set the record straight: ‘My meaning was... that society was not an 
abstraction, separate from the men and women who controlled it, but a living structure of individuals, families, 
neighbours and voluntary associations’ (1993: 626). 
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uncompetitive’ (1993: 272). She achieved all her aims on union reform and as will be seen 
when looking at the birth of Social Partnership in Ireland her actions had enormous influence 
on the attitudes of Irish unions.  
 
The sale of nationalised industry had begun in 1979 with the part privatisation of British 
Petroleum (completed by 1987), British Aerospace, Cable & Wireless, National Freight 
Consortium, Jaguar, British Telecom and many more. Her second term of office saw a 
dramatic increase in the sale and scope of state assets ‘the general emphasis switched from 
privatization of industries whose nationalization was justified only by socialist dogma, to that 
of public utilities where the arguments were more complex’ (1993: 679). She saw 
privatisation as ‘one of the central means of reversing the corrosive and corrupting influences 
of socialism’ (1993: 676) and her efforts were admired and feared in equal measure. Her 
privatisation vision saw increased efficiency and the widest possible share ownership by the 
general public. 
 
Rhodes (1994) coined the expression ‘The hollowing out of the State’ to describe Thatcher’s 
legacy: ‘Since 1979, over 50 per cent of the public sector, along with 650,000 employees, was 
transferred to the private sector’ (p.139). Over the same period the number of civil servants 
fell by 24 per cent and there was a 38 per cent drop in the numbers employed in non-
departmental bodies. Rhodes was one of the main writers of the ‘state retreat’ school that saw 
the ‘rolling back’ of the state. The ‘state centric’ scholars argue that in effect by divesting 
itself of non-core activities and putting a proper regulatory framework in place to monitor the 
privatised industries ‘the core is now more substantial than ever before’ (Holliday, 2000: 
175). Sorensen argues that both points of view may be right and not mutually exclusive and 
that what is happening is ‘state transformation’. Whichever view one takes the fact remains 
that Thatcher had enormous influence and her ideas on monetary policy, public expenditure 
and trade union reform spread across the Anglo-Saxon world.  
 
Given the disparity in size and the history of the two countries the Irish political elite, while 
casting anxious, but sometimes admiring, glances across the Irish Sea, would rather take their 
role model from another quarter. New Zealand, as an island nation geographically removed 
from its markets, with an agricultural based economy and a similar population offered some 
ready solutions. So enamoured did the administrative elite become with the New Zealand reforms 
that a group of 11 senior civil servants, who completed an M.Sc. in Strategic Management in Trinity 
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College Dublin in 1994, visited New Zealand to see the reforms at first hand.
35
 Their thesis was 
accepted by the government as the basis for ‘The Strategic Management Initiative’ which was to be 
the cornerstone for public sector reform. Mac Sharry (2009) spoke at interview about meeting Douglas 
and how much he was influenced by him. The New Zealand solution was  
... Rogernomics, the eponymous neo-liberal economic strategy of Minister of Finance, 
Roger Douglas. It deregulated financial markets, floated the New Zealand dollar, 
abolished agricultural subsidies, and generally followed neo-classical or monetarist 
economic policies aimed at correcting a legacy of neo-Keynesian government failures’ 
(Gregory, 2004: 154).  
 
In the words of Douglas himself ‘the government set aside traditional myths and went back to 
fundamentals’ which required ‘selling for commercial profit against competition on the world 
market’ (1990: 105). To achieve that would require economy-wide reforms designed to make 
short-term adjustments for the sake of medium-term benefits and the following measures 
would be necessary:   
 Firm anti-inflationary monetary policy; 
 Deregulate the financial sector; 
 Remove protectionism; 
 More productive government spending and a consequent reduction of the cost burden 
placed on private-sector initiative; 
 More transparency in government decisions; 
 Removal of all subsidies so that all exporters (including farmers) were forced to live 
or die in the market place: 
 Make labour market more responsive to market opportunity;  
 Lower taxes across the board; 
 Improve resource allocation by creating a level playing-field for everyone. 
 
What was unusual was that Douglas persuaded Prime Minister Lange and his government to 
do it all with one big bang. Within three years agriculture, the country’s biggest export 
industry was operating in the open market without government subsidy; import controls had 
been virtually abolished; the financial sector was totally deregulated; internal markets 
significantly deregulated with full deregulation of the telecom industry – the first country in 
the world to do so; monopoly rights of government departments in the provision of services 
                                                          
35
 The authors were Denis Byrne, John Dully, Donal Garvey, Walter Kirwan, Tom Mulherin, Gerry O’Hanlon. 
Seamus Rogers, Oliver Ryan, Catherine Treacy, Brendan Tuohy and Michael G, Tutty.  
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completely removed; the tax system totally overhauled and described by the OECD as the 
least distorted in the world; efficiency gains in the range 30-100 per cent achieved in state 
business enterprises; core public sector departments fully accountable on an outputs basis for 
the resources they use. The economic benefits were a reduction in the fiscal deficit of 9 per 
cent to a balanced budget with a small surplus; inflation reduced from 13 per cent to 4.4 per 
cent; overseas debt reduced from 41 per cent of GDP to 27 per cent; the economy growing at 
2.5-3.0 per cent per annum (Douglas 1990, Gregory 2000, 2004). 
 
A notable feature of the New Zealand reforms was the speed with which they were 
accomplished. Douglas (1990: 109) set out ten principles that underpinned the reforms: 
1. Move quality people into strategic positions to implement quality decisions. 
2. Implement reform in quantum leaps thereby preventing vested interests from 
mobilising opposition. 
3. Speed is essential. 
4. Keep the momentum going and never let it stop. 
5. Credibility is crucial, hard to win, easily lost and can only be maintained by 
consistency and openness. 
6. Let the dog see the rabbit – show people where you are leading them. 
7. Do not sell the public short. The will respect politicians with vision and courage. 
8. Do not blink. Get the decisions right and stick with them. 
9. Opportunity, incentive and choice mobilise the energy of people in the attainment of 
successful change. 
10. When in doubt, ask yourself: ‘Why am I in politics?’ 
In answer to the question at 10 above Douglas was quite clear: 
Conventional politicians ignore structural reform because they think they are in power 
to please people, and pleasing people does not involve making them face up to hard 
questions. They use the latest polls to fine-tune their image and their policies, in order 
to achieve better results in the next poll... their aim is really to be in perpetual power. 
It becomes increasingly clear to people that their problems have not been solved, and 
the opportunities have been thrown away (1990: 135) 
 
Against all the odds and the pain associated with the structural change that had been 
implemented the Labour government was returned to power in 1987 with an increased 
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majority on its 1984 landslide win thereby giving credibility to Douglas’ actions and his belief 
that voters will accept short-term pain for long-term gain.
36
 
New Ideas’ for the Transformation of Ireland 
Common to all the above ideational brokers was that in the world of the 1980s the Keynesian 
economic model was no longer working. Even though some may have been slow to admit it 
there was near unanimity that the Irish public finances were in a perilous and unsustainable 
position. The government of Garret FitzGerald (1982-87) continued Keynesian economic 
policies thereby exacerbating an already serious situation.
37
 In all the sources reviewed 
addressing the public finances was the predominant theme. The dominant economic model 
emerging was monetarism which holds that controlling the supply of money is the key to 
economic success because change in the supply of money causes change in general price 
levels. It also holds that there should be minimum intervention by the state (a principal tenet 
of Keynesianism) and that the economy is best regulated by the free market. One of the main 
economic stimuli of monetarism is the reduction in the rate of taxation and as was seen in the 
review of the literature reform of the taxation system was a common thread proposed for the 
Irish context. The Progressive Democrats were quintessential monetarists and, as will be 
demonstrated, their economic policies were central to the ‘new idea’ that was adopted by the 
main political parties. 
 
The other ‘idea’ to emerge was to locate a solution in a corporatist structure and how this 
evolved and was achieved will also be demonstrated in the next chapter. Monetarists believe 
in a minimal role for the state (‘rolling back’ or ‘hollowing out’ the state) whereas corporatists 
believe in the centrality of the state. Theoretically, at least, marrying both ideologies is an 
unlikely scenario.   
   
These were the proposals of the ideational actors for the transformation of Ireland that had 
largely received economic acceptability. In framing their proposals they were well aware of 
the opposition that would be encountered from various institutions of state. As set out in 
                                                          
36
 After the 1987 general election vested interests began to organise in opposition to the pace of change and 
Prime Minister Lange, without consulting his cabinet or party announced a ‘breather’ in the reform process. This 
led to a showdown in cabinet with Lange trying to remove Douglas from the Finance portfolio in September 
1988 but relenting in face of cabinet opposition. Douglas subsequently forced the issue by stating that he would 
not continue in Finance if Lange remained as Prime Minister and was removed from cabinet in January 1989. A 
party caucus engineered his return to Finance in August 1989 and the replacement of Lange by Geoffrey Palmer. 
Reforms resumed but public confidence had been eroded. 
37
 Coming to the end of their term they tried to rein in public expenditure and were accused of being monetarists 
by Fianna Fáil.  
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Campbel’s Typology of Ideas (2004: 94) they were proposing a major paradigm shift to 
replace the background underlying assumptions of Keynesianism embedded in the public 
sentiment with new foreground concepts and theories as elite prescriptions. This would enable 
political and administrative elites to frame those ideas as symbols and concepts that would 
enable decision makers to legitimize change to their constituents. 
Ireland had arrived at a critical moment, what Burch, Hogwood and Bulmer call a perceived 
opportunity for significant change.  
At such critical moments formerly rigid institutional hierarchies become more 
malleable and the bias of an institution is subject to pressure... The opportunity may 
not be realised and exploited: it may effectively be missed. However if it is realised, 
the outcome is a ‘critical juncture’, incorporating a clear departure from clearly 
established patterns (2003: 7). 
  
The critical moment did become a critical juncture when the ‘ideas’ of monetarism and 
neocorporatism, which had received economic acceptability, received administrative and 
political acceptability thereby conforming to Hall’s Framework (1989: 371) for the adoption 
and implementation of a new transformative idea. Referring to the unfolding events in 1959 
Professor Carter said of the Irish: ‘You are not afraid of socialism; or (to be more accurate) 
you are very much afraid of being called socialists’ (1959: 20). His words could usefully be 
adapted for 1986/7: the Irish were not afraid of monetarism or corporatism; they were afraid 
of being called monetarists or corporatists. Rather than use those particular monikers, the 
former because of its association with Thatcher and the latter because of its association with 
fascism, less emotionally charged terms found their way into everyday usage. Monetarism 
became ‘tax reform’ and corporatism assumed the mantle of ‘social partnership’. 
 
How these ‘ideas’ achieved political and administrative acceptability will be demonstrated in 
the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7: Achieving Administrative and Political Acceptability at 
the Second Critical Juncture in the Transformation of Ireland 
 
As at the first critical juncture administrative and political acceptability were inextricably 
linked and again highly dependent on two men. This time the roles of Lemass and Whitaker 
were played by Haughey and O hUiginn. The events that unfolded over the period 1986/87 are 
a neat encapsulation of cumulative causes having threshold effects (as described by Pierson) 
and needing to be understood in the context of their timing and sequencing i.e. situating events 
and moments in a temporal sequence can greatly increase the understanding of those events. 
The ideas of monetarism and corporatism achieved economic acceptability because they 
provided a credible solution for economic problems. Peters put it that ‘ideas tend to provide a 
set of ready solutions for problems that arise within their domain’ (2001: 66). O hUiginn 
certainly subscribed to this view. His role as Chairman of NESC came at a critical moment 
‘when a perceived opportunity arises for significant change. That is, an event takes place 
which raises a general expectation that significant change will follow’ (Burch, Hogwood and 
Bulmer, 2003: 7). That event was the publication by NESC of A Strategy for Development 
1986-90. 
 
On return to power in 1987 Haughey had accepted the ‘ideas’ of monetarism and corporatism 
– or to use the acceptable name of both, tax reform and social partnership. He was heavily 
influenced by O hUiginn and their  acceptance of the economic proposals was to prove crucial 
in gaining political and administrative acceptance and of the new ‘ideas’ and so complete the 
final strands identified by Hall for the viability and enactment of a new idea.    
 
Using process tracing and interviews with many of the key actors this chapter will trace the 
steps that ensured the political and administrative acceptance of the ideas of tax reform and 
social partnership that contributed to the transformation of Ireland at the first critical juncture.  
 
Political Dimension 
Haughey had been sacked from cabinet in 1970 for his alleged part in an attempt to illegally 
import arms for the nationalist community in Northern Ireland during the troubles in that part 
of the island. Following his acquittal in the subsequent trial Haughey spent a number of years 
in the political wilderness. He was restored to the cabinet in 1977 and two years later avenged 
his humiliation when he successfully challenged for and won the leadership of his party and 
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became Taoiseach. In looking at political culture in the previous chapter it was also seen that 
Haughey trebled the size of the Department of the Taoiseach and effected systemic, 
organisational, regulative and procedural levels as described by Bulmer and Burch. In the 
process he centralised power in his own hands. This point was very forcibly made by 
O’Malley (2009), who was a member of the cabinet at the time. Referring to Haughey’s style 
of leadership he said: ‘Overnight the country changed. We went from cabinet government to 
presidentialism – a presidentialism that was in clear breach of the constitution’. Brian Farrell 
titled his book on the role of the Taoiseach Chairman or Chief?; Haughey had decided to be 
Chief. (This point will be reinforced in Chapter 8 when dealing with the negotiations with the 
Progressive Democrats to form a coalition government in 1989). 
 
Haughey was known to have been very uneasy about the populist Fianna Fáil election 
manifesto of 1977 and as both an accountant and former Minister for Finance it was widely 
expected that he would tackle the mounting debt problem. On 9 January 1980 he went on 
television to address the nation. Beginning with a comment on the state of the nation he said 
‘the picture I have to paint is not, unfortunately, a very cheerful one... as a community we have 
been living beyond our means’. He went on to outline the parlous state of the public finances 
and the effects of the oil crisis on the balance of payments. ‘We will have to cut down on 
Government spending. The Government is taking far too much in by way of taxes from 
individual members of the community’. In attempting to reduce expenditure to manageable 
proportions ‘we will, of course, be paying particular attention to the needs of the poorer and 
weaker sections of the community and make sure they are looked after... but many things will 
have to be curtailed or postponed, until such time as we can get the financial situation right’. 
He went on to make a special plea for industrial peace believing it to be central to future 
prosperity and concluded his address with the following exhortation: ‘Let us make it the year 
of industrial peace. If we do, I am certain the improvement in our affairs by the end of 1980 
will have been dramatic’ (Quoted in Mansergh, 1986: 323-6). 
 
His address was widely praised as being realistic and timely. It was a critical moment which 
could be transformed into a critical juncture if action was taken. As Collins (2001: 139) put it 
‘The diagnosis was correct, but having identified the problem Haughey proceeded to 
implement a policy which was precisely the opposite’. A plan to introduce a tax on farmers 
was abandoned; between special awards and national pay agreements public sector pay rose by 
a staggering 34 per cent in 1980 alone; the exchequer borrowing requirement, targeted to be 
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reduced from £1,009 million to £896 million, increased to £1,217 million.
1
 The end result was 
a further increase in borrowing and taxation. The above is included to set the context for what 
happened when Haughey returned to power in 1987 – another critical moment, but this time 
the opportunities were seized and a critical juncture arose through the adoption and 
implementation of new ideas which punctuated institutional path dependency and propelled 
the country down a new developmental pathway. 
 
Administrative Change 
To drive administrative change requires strong leaderhip, a role filled by Whitaker at the first 
critical juncture. This time the role fell to Pádraig O hUiginn in his role as Secretary General 
in the Department of the Taoiseach. A very able and politically astute civil servant he 
developed a strong bond with Haughey and their relationship was to prove critical.  
 
O hUiginn joined the civil service in 1941 and served in the Departments of the Environment, 
Industry and Commerce, Lands, Economic Planning and Development. He also served 
overseas on secondment to the UN Economic Commission in Geneva as Economic Affairs 
Officer, UN Headquarters in New York as Officer-in-Charge of Housing, Planning and 
Building, EC Council of Ministers in Brussels as Director of Regional Policy. He holds an 
MSc in Economics and Social Planning and is a multi-linguist. On his return to Ireland he was 
appointed Assistant Secretary in the newly formed Department of Economic Planning and 
Development following the 1977 general election. When this Department was abolished by 
Haughey in 1979 O hUiginn moved to the Economic Planning Unit established in the 
Taoiseach’s Department.2  He was subsequently appointed Secretary General of that 
Department in 1982, a position he retained until his retirement in 1993 – a retirement that was 
postponed twice at the request of both Haughey and Reynolds as Taoiseach because of the 
perceived centrality and importance of his role – a role perceived by some as being as central 
as Whitaker’s. 
 
                                                          
1
 An example of the profligacy was the approach to a teachers’ pay award. A recommendation from a special 
arbitration board was rejected by the teacher unions. In response to teacher intransigence Haughey instructed 
John Wilson, Minister for Education, to concede an award greater than the original demand from the union. This 
both stunned the unions, who gladly accepted the award, and the arbitration board who resigned in protest.  
2
 At that time there was widespread media coverage of refugees from South Vietnam in particular who escaped 
by boat, many of them drowning in the process and becoming  known as ‘the boat people’. This particular 
moniker was somewhat cruelly applied to the banished staff of the abolished department many of whom had 
difficulty in finding a new home in other Departments of Government having been tainted by the perceived 
failure of their own Department. 
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But O hUiginn was a much more divisive character and seems to have alienated quite a few of 
his civil service colleagues. It is hard to judge if this was just begrudgery at the new 
importance of the Department of the Taoiseach as in civil service politics any change of 
reporting arrangements or structures is perceived in zero sum terms: if one Department gained 
then clearly another Department must have lost.  It would also appear that having spent time 
overseas O hUiginn had a great deal of exposure to new ideas and different ways of doing 
things. He was impatient of many of the practices and ways of doing business that had evolved 
and become path dependent. There may have been some acceptance by his colleagues that 
there might be a better way of doing things but they were loath to change the status quo. He 
refused to get bogged down in detail and was dogged in implementing new ideas – 
institutional veto points were there to be overcome. It is alleged of him that when he met with 
opposition he opined to his objecting colleague that the next phone call that would be made 
would be from Haughey.  
 
(Above information, as indeed a lot of other background information, was obtained in 
interviews with various serving and retired officials who did not wish to be named. They 
included two former Departmental Secretary-Generals, one serving and two retired Principal 
Officers and two serving senior officials in the NTMA and CSO).  
 
An earlier paper by O hUiginn, The Way Forward, had been enthusiastically embraced by 
Haughey and adopted by Fianna Fáil in their election manifesto of 1982.
3
 When Fianna Fáil 
lost the election it was never likely that The Way Forward would be adopted by the incoming 
government of Garret FitzGerald.
4
 It also somewhat politicised O hUiginn as he was seen as 
being close to Haughey and certainly when Haughey returned to power in 1987 O hUiginn 
played a much more central role than hitherto. In his memoirs FitzGerald expresses his 
disaffection with the structure of the Department of the Taoiseach with its government 
secretariat and economic planning unit: ‘I was never happy with the resultant dual structure, 
                                                          
3
 The Way Forward looked at corrective measures being taken in Germany, Denmark, France, Belgium, 
Luxembourg, Netherlands, UK, Japan, Italy and USA. It spelt out the starkness of the situation facing Ireland and 
that ‘timely and well considered action is needed to protect our economic welfare and security’ (p. 7). 
Unemployment, tax inequity, current budget deficit and rising exchequer borrowings would all have to be 
addressed through the competitive production of goods and services and not ‘by employment in the public 
services based on increased taxation and borrowing’ (p. 16). 
4
 Instead FitzGerald set up the National Planning Board under the chairmanship of Professor Louden Ryan. He 
wanted a board that operated independently of government. His criticism of The Way Forward was that it had 
been prepared within the government framework and ‘bore all the marks of having been filtered through 
processes designed to ensure it said nothing that would be either politically embarrassing or contrary to 
Department of Finance orthodoxy’ (FitzGerald, 1991: 450).  
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which seemed to me to be top heavy, although both parts of the department had some able 
staff’ (1991: 366). FitzGerald only accords O hUiginn one mention merely naming him as 
Secretary General of his Department in succession to Noel Whelan. (I chose not to raise their 
relationship with either FitzGerald or O hUiginn at interview). In any event O hUiginn was 
increasingly marginalised under FitzGerald’s premiership and had ample time on his hands to 
devote to his role as Chairman of NESC.
5
 In a neat ironic twist the end result was the 
production of a document which was to prove seminal in the transformation of Ireland. It was 
also a good example of Pierson’s (2004: 18) importance of timing and sequencing and ‘how 
large consequences may result from relatively small or contingent events’.  
 
A Strategy for Devlopment 1986 – 1990  
In November 1986 NESC produced what proved to be a key report: A Strategy for Devlopment 
1986 – 1990. Reflecting the level of research then available, and the improvements in data 
collection since the 1950s, in its scope and depth the level of analysis far exceeds Economic 
Development. The chief architect of the report was O hUiginn. Apart from his not 
inconsiderable skills O hUiginn was also able to call on the brightest and best across the civil 
service for support. Council members of NESC included five members each from the union, 
employers and farming associations, and seven nominations by the government (six senior 
civil servants and Dr Hederman-O’Brien who had chaired the Commission on Taxation).  
  
The report runs to a total of 348 pages and following a brief overview of economic 
performance is broken into four sections: 
Review –offers 85 pages of in-depth analysis of performance in the period 1980-85 across all 
sectors of the economy and the effects on (un)employment. Budgetary and fiscal policy 
is dissected and criticised as is the level of borrowing and the cost of same (in 1981 
interest rates were at 17 per cent and only decreased to 10.5 per cent by 1985). Rising 
unemployment levels together with increased welfare provision meant that the cost to 
the exchequer increased from 29.8 per cent of GNP in 1980 to 35.6 per cent by 1985. 
The tax system is also extensively examined.
6
 Personal tax rates at 24.6 per cent for a 
                                                          
5
 At interview O’Malley was quite scathing of Haughey’s politicisation of senior civil servants. I also raised the 
situation with other civil servants who did not want to be named and they are the source for the comments above 
in relation to the amount of time O hUiginn was able to devote to his role in NESC. 
6
 The Commission of Taxation reports had all been completed by the time the NESC report was issued and the 
Commission recommendations are duly noted. Dr Miriam Hederman-O’Brien, who chaired the Commission was 
also a council member of NESC. 
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single person against an EC average of 18.4 per cent. Only Denmark at 29.6 was 
higher.  
Outlook – offers 45 pages on the prospects for economic growth 1986-90. Whereas inflation 
was at last coming under control unemployment was likely to remain stubbornly high 
and the economy remained extremely vulnerable to outside influences. Retrenchment 
in the USA saw capital investment by American companies in Ireland drop from a 
peak of £229m in 1981 to £123m in 1984. The analysis of the life-cycle trends in such 
companies from set-up to full production to decline is particularly informative and 
pointed to the necessity for a different strategy in attracting new industries. The 
forecast for economic growth for the period 1986-90 ranged from an ‘Optimistic’ 3.2 
per cent per annum to a ‘Pessimistic’ 1.9 and over the same period numbers employed 
would at best increase by 16,000. The overall conclusion was that ‘the continuation of 
existing policies offers little prospect of ameliorating the two most serious problems 
currently facing the Irish economy’ [the public finances and unemployment] and ‘the 
principal mechanism which is likely to at best contain the growth of unemployment, is 
emigration’ (NESC 1986: 141). Their analysis painted ‘a picture of the current state of 
the Irish economy which is almost unremittingly grim’ (ibid: 145). 
Policies – offers over 150 pages of a four pronged strategy to simultaneously address the twin 
problems of unemployment and the public finances. These are dealt with below. 
Conclusion – draws the whole report together. 
 
Any strategy for economic recovery would have to include three essential elements: an 
acceleration of output growth with a consequent employment growth; a realistic approach to 
the range of variables that impinge on the formulation of budgetary policy; to achieve both of 
above would require sacrifices shared equitably across society. 
 
‘Against the background of these three essential elements the Council has, in this report, put 
forward an overall strategy for economic and social development’ (p. 306.).  It contained four 
major pillars: 
 An integrated macro-economic policy that addressed the imbalances in the public 
finances while at the same time promoting the development of the traded sector. 
 Fundamental reform of the tax system that enhanced equity and efficiency of the 
present system. 
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 Creation of an improved business environment together with improved sectoral 
policies that directed state intervention to structural deficiencies in the productive base 
of the economy. 
 Progressive removal of the major inequities in society. 
(It is also worth noting that A Strategy for Development 1986 – 1990 devoted a whole section 
to the role of women in Irish society and made a total of eighty recommendations on 
employment, education, health services, child care services, social welfare/social protection, 
rural women, women in the home, single parents, family law reform and women’s status.) 
  
Having acknowledged the scale of the problem and proffered solutions the Council was 
realistic. ‘Remedial action is only possible in the medium term... The return of confidence ... is 
crucial ... [and achieved only] if markets and individuals believe in the overall strategy ... 
Another major requirement for a successful strategy is acceptability’ (p. 321).  This applies 
particularly to those who will have to make sacrifices and the burden of adjustment must ‘not 
be borne by the less advantaged members of society’ (ibid.). Having reached unanimous 
acceptance of the measures necessary to confront economic and social problems 
... [the Council] is of the view there is a need to foster a greater degree of consensus in 
Irish society if these measures are to be implemented without giving rise to conflict. 
This consensus is necessary both on the national level and the level of the workplace. 
The Council intends to pursue this issue further, through examining the institutional 
arrangements for economic and social planning in a number of European countries and 
particularly at the mechanisms in place for the achievement of consensus (p. 321). 
 
A critical factor was getting unanimous agreement from the group on the extent of the 
problems facing the country and this was to prove critical. Writing on the state of industrial 
relations at the time Roche (2009: 191) said: 
Governments had become prone to buying off pressure by offering inconsistent and 
ultimately unsustainable concessions to a range of different interest groups. Unions and 
employers had never arrived at anything resembling a common analysis of the roots of 
the mounting economic crisis. Both parties were unable or disinclined to deliver on 
their pledges in the areas of pay moderation or industrial peace. 
 
Ray Mac Sharry, who became Minister of Finance in the 1987 government of C.J. Haughey, 
said of the NESC report: 
Its significance lay not just in its stark analysis of the economic problems facing the 
country, but in the fact that the NESC members were also ready to support the report’s 
tough recommendations in tackling them... not only had [the members] diagnosed the 
problem, but prescribed the remedy. That was exceptional (2000: 44). 
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On the role of O hUiginn he said that ‘a major part of his contribution lay in convincing the 
Taoiseach that the economic strategy proposed was the right one’ (2000: 54). All sources 
consulted were unanimous that it could not have happened without O hUiginn. His conviction 
that the only future for the country ‘lay in economic consensus’ (interview with author) was 
the motivating factor that kept all parties at the table while he sought, and ultimately achieved, 
consensus. The ‘ideas’ contained in A Strategy for Development 1986-90 ultimately gained 
economic, administrative and political acceptability and played a major part in the 
transformation of Ireland at the Second Critical Juncture.  
 
With its analysis of economic and social conditions it formed the basis for the negotiation of 
the first social partnership agreement, The Programme for National Recovery, and became a 
template for subsequent three-yearly reports which in turn became the agreed basis for all 
subsequent social partnership agreements.  
  
Political Acceptability 
Pierson (2004) argues that timing and sequencing matter and there are strong theoretical 
grounds for believing that when things happen affects how things happen. (He offers the 
useful analogy of the good cook knowing that the order in which ingredients are added to the 
mix greatly affects the finished product). The events of 1986/7 offer a neat illustration of this 
point. A Strategy for Development 1986-90 could have remained as merely ‘interesting’ and 
then gather dust on a shelf. However, within four months of its publication, Haughey was 
Taoiseach (on the casting vote of the Ceann Comhairle on 10 March 1987) and O hUiginn 
was secretary of his Department – and very much Haughey’s right hand man.  
 
Interviews were conducted with the following political actors to ascertain their influences and 
‘ideas’ at the time. Haughey had died in 2006. 
 Bertie Ahern – Taoiseach from 1997 – 2007, Minister for Finance 1991 - 94, Minister 
for Labour 1987 – 91. 
 Alan Dukes – Minister for Finance 1982 – 86, also served as Minister for Justice and 
Minister for Agriculture, leader of Fine Gael and in turn leader of the opposition. 
 Garret FitzGerald – Taoiseach 1981 and 1982 – 87, Minister for Foreign Affairs 1973 -
77, leading economic commentator from the 1950s onwards. 
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 Ray Mac Sharry – Minister for Finance 1982 and 1987 – 88, also served as Minister 
for Agriculture and as EU Commissioner for Agriculture. 
 Des O’Malley – founder of the Progressive Democrats, former Minister for Justice and 
Minister for Industry and Commerce 
On his first day as Taoiseach in March 1987 Haughey had lunch with Mac Sharry and O 
hUiginn where he spelt out the strategy for government. The primary goals were tackling the 
current budget deficit and implementing the NESC report. (Haughey, 2006; Mac Sharry, 2000 
and 2009; O hUiginn, 2009).
7
  O hUiginn assured the Taoiseach that he could deliver the main 
proposals in the NESC document and do so expeditiously. Haughey instructed him to proceed 
immediately and to report directly to himself and to also keep Mac Sharry in the loop. They 
also agreed that the forthcoming budget would have a lower budget deficit than that proposed 
by the outgoing government; to develop the traded sector, as suggested in the NESC report, by 
the creation the Irish Financial Services Centre (IFSC); introduce measures to restrict cross-
border shopping – even though they knew that what they were proposing was in breach of EU 
law.
8
 Given Haughey’s prior record as Taoiseach there was considerable scepticism that he 
would deliver on his economic promises and his television address to the nation in January 
1980 was regularly cited by his detractors.
9
   
 
In the Haughey document that I received from O hUiginn, Haughey, referring to the time spent 
in opposition prior to 1987, claims (p. 10) ‘the vital establishment of the National Treasury 
Management Agency (one of the most important steps taken) whose contribution in managing 
the National Debt was of crucial importance’. He was right in his assessment of the 
contribution but there had been no mention of such an agency at that time and it was not set up 
until 1990. Both Mac Sharry and Reynolds credit Michael Somers, who headed up the agency 
for twenty years, as the originator of the idea.
10
  
 
Conor Brady, as editor of the Irish Times, was taken by John Healy for a private dinner at 
Haughey’s house in early 1987. Haughey outlined his plans for economic recovery. He was 
                                                          
7
 Haughey (2006: 7) states: ‘In discussions I had with Mr. O hUiginn before taking up office in 1987, I was 
assured by him that there was a full commitment by the social partners and that he was confident that a new 
National Plan could be negotiated based on that strategy’.  
8
 Confirmed by Mac Sharry at interview. ‘We knew that by the time they got around to doing anything about it 
that we would have saved a lot of money’. He also refers to it in The Making of the Celtic Tiger (p.96). 
9
 The Fianna Fáil election slogan had been: Expenditure Cuts Hurt the Sick, the Poor and the Elderly. 
10
 In correspondence I received from Mr. O hUiginn after our interview he claimed that the idea of the NTMA 
originated in the Department of the Taoiseach.  
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confident that the tide was already turning: interest rates were falling and would continue to 
fall; ‘Mac Sharry will cut back a bit here and there’ (Brady, 2005: 7); the IFSC and the Temple 
Bar areas would be developed and the beef industry reorganised – all of these would inspire 
confidence which, for Haughey was the most important ingredient of all.
11
 There was no 
mention of social partnership as part of the grand plan.  
 
The economic policy of Garret FitzGerald’ government focussed on low wage levels and 
reducing unemployment (in which they failed). Haughey by contrast was prepared to gamble 
on low inflation and tax cuts to moderate pay cuts. FitzGerald got lost in the detail whereas 
Haughey looked at the bigger picture and had a better political understanding of the situation – 
confidence would be the key.
12
 
 
The Beginnings of Economic Reform 
The budget of 31 March 1987, just three weeks after the Fianna Fáil return to power, was 
delivered by Mac Sharry as Minister for Finance.
13
  It was even more draconian than that 
proposed by the outgoing government. It proposed a 6.9 per cent current budget deficit (a full 
0.5 per cent below the outgoing government’s proposal); a two per cent pay increase due 
under an existing public sector agreement would be honoured but there would be no more 
‘special awards’; no filling of civil service vacancies without the express permission of the 
Minister; no filling of vacancies in the Health Boards. Probably the most galvanising feature 
of the budget was the announcement of an early retirement and voluntary severance package 
for public servants (subsequently availed of by 20,000).
14
 The government had given a clear 
signal that it was serious about addressing the public finances and this was welcomed, 
particularly by employer groups.  
  
                                                          
11
 Reading Brady’s account of the meeting there is no doubt that he too was sceptical of Haughey’s ability to 
deliver economic recovery.  
12
 In March 1987 Conor Brady was invited to lunch at the IDA headquarters. The lunch was memorable for two 
reasons: the IDA chiefs were very upbeat about the economic prospects believing that their work in America was 
about to deliver enormous investment (in this they were right); there was no alcohol served at lunch - a 
scandalous break with tradition! At the time Brady thought that the IDA people were deluded in their optimism as 
it flew in the face of all the perceived wisdom.   
13
 He had also served in that capacity between March and December 1982.  
14
 The irony of this was not lost on Mac Sharry who commented at interview: ‘I had created most of that 20,000 
back in the early eighties!’ 
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Mac Sharry had accepted the Finance portfolio without preconditions but there was an implicit 
understanding that he would have authority to do what was necessary either in expenditure 
cuts or tax reforms and he would have the support of the Taoiseach.  
I recognized that we were at a major turning point in our economic history. I knew the 
day of fiscal reckoning had arrived. It was time to call a stop - and mean it. For tough 
and unpopular decisions could no longer be avoided (2000: 44).  
In his budget speech he told the Dáil:  
The message I have to deliver is unpalatable but it is critical to the revival of our 
economic prospects. We cannot be content to announce our intention to curtail 
spending while at the same time deferring action. We have to act now. Some schemes 
must be terminated, others must be reduced in scope and all public services must 
become more cost-effective. I am only too well aware of the number of lobbies for 
increased spending and how vigorously they will contest any curtailment of State 
services. But the national interest must take precedence over sectoral concerns (Dáil 
Debates, 31 March 1987).  
 
He shared Haughey’s belief that the climate was right for the implementation of the NESC 
proposals. However the spending departments would also have to be reined in. This would 
require ‘that we cut down to the bone – not just the fat’ (2009). He quickly earned the 
soubriquet ‘Mac the Knife’ for his unflinching approach to the public finances. He set up a 
high-level review group of himself, Haughey, O hUiginn, Seán Cromien – Secretary General 
of the Department of Finance, Maurice Doyle – Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland and 
Seamus Paircéir – chairman of the Revenue Commissioners. They met regularly, often 
weekly, always with the following agenda: 
 Control of Expenditure; 
 Tax revenues on target and what tax changes might be implemented; 
 Central Bank view on interest rates; 
 Progress on social partnership. 
                          (Mac Sharry, 2000, 2009; Cromien, 2009). 
 
The formation of the review group was an example of procedural and regulative change as 
described by Bulmer and Burch and of the cumulative causes described by Pierson that lead to 
threshold effects that transform a critical moment into a critical juncture.  
 
Reference was made in a previous chapter to the influence of Roger Douglas and the reforms 
he was implementing in New Zealand.  At interview Mac Sharry was enthusiastic about the 
New Zealand influence and recounted meeting Douglas at an IMF conference in New York to 
179 
 
discuss the reforms with him. Given the apparent success of the New Zealand reforms they 
were much admired and copied, particularly in Anglo-Saxon countries and Ireland was no 
exception.
15
 Mac Sharry was also influenced by what he saw in the American tax system and 
this will be explored further when dealing with the implementation of tax reform. 
 
Dukes succeeded FitzGerald as leader of Fine Gael after the 1987 general election in which 
there was a 12 per cent drop in its share of the vote. Reflecting on the mood at the time, at 
interview he said ‘in everyone’s mind was what was happening in the UK with Thatcher and 
the rise of the Progressive Democrats at home and because of the budgetary cuts I introduced I 
was often called Thatcherite and it was not meant as a compliment’. Also, the Progressive 
Democrats had confounded all their critics and gained fourteen seats in the general election, 
with many of those seats gained at the expense of Fine Gael. After five acrimonious years in 
government with Labour, Fine Gael had fought the election on a manifesto of severe cuts in 
public spending, borrowing and wage rates.
16
 As a new leader of his party Dukes found 
himself in a very difficult political position: Fianna Fáil was implementing the policies that he 
advocated so how could he credibly oppose them? To the consternation of many in his own 
party he decided that he would support the government as long as it adopted a responsible 
economic policy. He outlined his strategy on 2 September 1987 at a Chamber of Commerce 
meeting in Tallaght: 
... If [the government] is going in the right direction, I do not believe it should be 
deviated from its course, or tripped up on macro-economic issues... It means that, if in 
1988 the government introduces a budget which: opens the way to a reduction in 
taxes... brings about a significant reduction in the current budget deficit... holds out a 
strategy for real employment expansion... does not add to the burden of debt service 
costs, I will not oppose the general thrust of its policy... I will not play the political 
game which produces the sort of phoney economic analysis which has passed for 
opposition in the past... I will not pretend that economic reality has changed just 
because I now find myself in opposition. That is the way my party will conduct its 
business (Cited in Great Irish Speeches by Richard Aldous).   
 
This was a very clear punctuating of institutional path dependency. At interview he informed 
me that he had only told his own front bench on that particular day what he had in mind. For a 
                                                          
15
 By the start of the twenty first century many of the New Zealand reforms had to be reversed. At a 
Commonwealth Business Forum on 10 May 2002 Deputy Prime Minister, Jim Anderton, in a wide ranging 
address (O’Toole, 2003: 138-142) outlined how the state has had to re-enter the telecom, banking, and utility 
industries. It has also had to re-nationalise the rail system and Air New Zealand. (See also Sweeney, 2004: 151-
2). 
16
 Commenting, at interview, on his time government with Labour, Dukes said: ‘Labour’s answer to everything 
was to raise taxes or find a new one. They would not countenance any cut in expenditure’.  
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while opinion polls showed him as the most popular politician in the country. In his own 
words: ‘the people understood it; the politicians did not’. His party never forgave him and he 
was ousted in 1990 and the ‘Tallaght Strategy’ discontinued.17 
 
Mac Sharry believes that Dukes ‘deserves more credit than he has received for his courage’ 
(2000: 78). O’Malley believes that his actions were prompted by fears of the Progressive 
Democrats (Interview with author).  O Cofaigh, reflecting on the subsequent success of the 
Irish economy, said: ‘It could not have happened without Dukes. His role was critical and 
patriotic’ (Interview with author). No matter what his motivation, and his own view of his 
actions is the most widely accepted, what Dukes did was a clear breach with the path 
dependent nature of party politics. 
 
Apart from the enormous cultural shift involved in Dukes’ action the change that ensued was 
manifest at the systemic, organisational, regulative and procedural levels on the Bulmer and 
Burch template as the operation of the Dáil was transformed in its legislative ability, how it 
organised its affairs, its regulations and procedures as the government had the support of the 
main opposition party in implementing its economic policy.  
 
The Political Beginnings of Social Partnership  
It is difficult to know what Haughey’s attitude really was to developing a corporatist structure 
even though his instructions to O hUiginn on delivering the NESC proposals were quite 
unambiguous. As Roche (2009: 193) puts it ‘Enter Charles Haughey – whether at stage left or 
stage right remains a matter of contention’.  Haughey recalls being at a European Summit in 
Brussels on 28/29 June 1982 and he was chatting with Chancellor Schmidt of Germany. 
Schmidt informed him that he would be spending the week-end with unions and employers 
hammering out an agreement on pay for the year ahead. ‘I was immediately struck with this 
commonsense approach and began, in my mind, as I listened to Chancellor Schmidt, to 
develop and expand the concept’ (Haughey, 2006: 6). At interview O hUiginn insisted that 
Haughey was committed to the idea of social partnership from this time but Ahern paints a 
somewhat different picture of Haughey’s early stance.  
 
                                                          
17
 He professed to absolutely no regrets: ‘I would do the exact same again’. 
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Ahern (2009a) recalls persuading Haughey (then in opposition) with some difficulty to meet 
with ICTU on a formal basis. As Lord Mayor of Dublin in 1985/6 Ahern set up a number of 
meetings in the Mansion House at which Bill Attley and John Carroll, both trade union 
leaders, met with Haughey and Ahern. Fianna Fáil set up a think-tank in 1985 of sympathetic 
trade unionists and brought in some outside help to formulate a framework. ‘I remember we 
used to meet upstairs in Scruffy Murphy’s. As Lord Mayor I was ex-officio a member of 
governing bodies such as UCD. I picked the brains of some of their people and of Brian 
Patterson of the IMI’ (Ahern, 2009a). They looked at a number of European countries and the 
model they favoured and ‘the one that was ultimately implemented was based 50/50 on the 
Finnish/Swedish models’. In the background was ‘the theory that if we got private sector 
growth through deferred increases, then employment growth would follow’. Tax reform would 
have to be an integral part of the process. 
 
As Minister for Labour from 1987 to 1991, and then as Minister for Finance, Ahern, more so 
than any other politician, is seen as integral to social partnership. He was not formally part of 
the negotiations of the first agreement, a point stressed by O hUiginn at interview, but the 
back- channels he had built with the unions and employers were critical.
18
 At interview he 
gave a very useful insight into the entire public policy process: ‘You’ve got to understand that 
in the entire policy area, and in particular social partnership, most of the stuff has to be pre-
cooked. Going into the formal meetings things had to be already sorted’. He also confirmed 
that his officials in the Department of Labour advised him to have nothing to do with a 
national wage agreement as experience showed that the parties to previous agreements only 
played lip service to same. ‘I decided to do it anyway because I believed I could get the unions 
on board’. 
 
Whether or not Haughey was a late convert to the concept of social partnership is debatable. 
Nevertheless, in an address to a party meeting in Athlone on 17 October 1986, referring to 
comments made by the union leader Bill Attley, Haughey said ‘that those countries that have 
been least damaged by the present recession and that have had the lowest increase in 
unemployment are small European countries... where there is continuous and close 
cooperation between the Government, the employers and the trade unions’ (Quoted in 
                                                          
18
 Confirmed by both union and employer representatives at interview. 
182 
 
Mansergh, 1986: 1161). Roche offers the following summation of Haughey’s attitude to social 
partnership, and the research undertaken for this thesis suggests that Roche is right:  
Rather than viewing Haughey as a fiscal conservative, or as a monetarist in corporate 
drag, wedded to little more than the rhetoric of social partnership, it appears more valid 
to view him as a political opportunist or political adventurer... And I wish to suggest 
that it was more as a political opportunist than as a monetarist or corporatist visionary 
that Haughey embraced social partnership in 1987 (Roche, 2009: 193).  
  
FitzGerald’s attitude to social partnership was sceptical and coloured by his belief that earlier 
‘national understandings’, as they were then known, were inflationary post 1964 (Interview 
with author). This was confirmed by Dukes at interview: ‘My suspicion is that the trade unions 
and employers felt that if they came to any kind of understanding it wouldn’t last as the 
government wouldn’t be around for long. We had arguably left it too late’. He also referred to 
tensions between Labour and the unions and the unions seemed to be more predisposed to 
Fianna Fáil. Unlike the situation in other countries links between unions and the Labour party 
were not close and sometimes even quite distant.
19
 
 
For O’Malley ‘the only value of social partnership was when we introduced tax reductions but 
of course it also bypassed the democratic process’ (Interview with author). He was also critical 
of the role of the Commission on Taxation because ‘it was composed of experts on taxation, 
not on tax policy and did not take a broad enough view of what taxation should be about’.  
  
Mac Sharry was also integral to the process as tax reform was a prerequisite for social 
partnership. Known as ‘Mac the Knife’ for the swingeing cuts he introduced in his 1987 
budget, he nevertheless held the respect of the unions because he always kept them in the loop 
(Hastings, Sheehan and Yates).  Mac Sharry (2009) saw his role as ‘paring expectations 
through Social Partnership’.  
  
The economic stance taken by Haughey and Mac Sharry came as a surprise to many and in 
their actions they demonstrated a clear breach with the past. Dukes facilitated them in their 
endeavours and contributed in no small way. O’Malley believed that the actions of both Mac 
Sharry and Dukes were very much circumscribed by the presence of the Progressive 
                                                          
19
 At interview O hUiginn recalled a conversation with Bill Attley, then president of ICTU. Attley was 
apologising for non attendance at a meeting of NESC as he was meeting Dick Spring, Tánaiste and leader of the 
Labour party. It was their first time meeting in three and a half years. Cassells (2009) described ICTU’s position 
as being pragmatic: ‘We have a two and a half party system and in this situation Labour will always be marginal’. 
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Democrats and there can be no doubt that this was also part of the equation, as was the role of 
Thatcher in the United Kingdom and Douglas in New Zealand. Monetarism was alive and well 
and living in Ireland and the country was at a critical moment, ‘when a perceived opportunity 
arises for significant change’ (Burch, Hogwood and Bulmer, 2003: 7).  Significant change was 
under way in 1987 and it is ‘the accumulation of pervasive changes that accounts for the 
realisation of a critical moment as a critical juncture’ (ibid: 14). Timing and sequencing, as 
described by Pierson, were also central. The finalisation of the first social partnership 
agreement in October of that year, together with administrative acceptance of the ‘ideas’ of 
monetarism and corporatism ensured the completion of the three strands of Hall’s Framework 
(1989: 371). New ideas had gained viability and in the process punctuated institutional path 
dependency that led in turn to the transformation of Ireland at the second critical juncture. 
 
Programme for National Recovery – the first Social Partnership agreement 
O hUiginn wasted no time in entering into negotiations with the social partners and the 
contacts and understandings built up in the NESC process, together with the work completed 
by the Commission on Taxation were invaluable. 
 
Phil Flynn of the Local Government and Public Services Union (LGPSU) invited Haughey to 
address the union conference dinner soon after the budget. It was the first time a Taoiseach 
ever did so and Haughey gave a bravura performance that inspired confidence (Hastings, 
Sheehan and Yates, 2007: 37). He advised that the government’s proposals for recovery were 
based on the four principles underpinning the NESC report: fiscal policy, tax reform, social 
equity and development measures. The union movement generally was willing to pursue any 
avenue that would improve the lot of its members. It had engaged at national level over a 
number of years and even though there was a plethora of small unions (up to one hundred in 
all) since the early 1960s their umbrella body, the Irish Congress of Trade Unions (ICTU) 
played an increasingly important role.
20
 Cassells (2009), former general secretary of ICTU, 
and lead union negotiator for five Social Partnership agreements commented as follows: 
  
                                                          
20
 ICTU was formed as an all-Ireland body in 1959 with the coming together of the Irish Trade Union Congress, 
founded in 1894, and the Conference of Irish Unions, founded in 1945. Ninety unions with over half a million 
members affiliated to ICTU and shortly after its foundation it was invited by Lemass, as Taoiseach, to discuss 
development and co-operation of the various economic actors (Murphy, 2009: 179). ICTU has an executive board 
drawn from the various unions and its own full-time executive under the direction of a general secretary.  
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‘When we got to 1987 we had the irony of having negotiated pay increases of 77 per cent over 
the previous seven years yet our members were now seven per cent worse off. We also saw 
that the NUM would not engage with Thatcher and what was happening there and we could be 
part of the problem or part of the solution’.21 Union membership was declining with the 
growth of foreign owned companies and a decline in private sector membership. ‘We also had 
the rise of the Progressive Democrats and monetarism so our approach was in many ways 
pragmatic’. But there was also an ideological influence. ‘Many of us had a Workers Union 
background that believed in getting the broader social issues on the table – people wanted to 
have a job, get a house and a future, educate their children. Take home pay was what mattered 
and the level of taxation. Integrate all of the above into the core business of unions – the social 
way’. The unions were anxious to influence events: ‘Big strikes were out and were 
counterproductive. [With social partnership you had the possibility] of dipping into 
government policy – health, education, tax policy and trying to influence things. With three 
year agreements you could plan for real differences and employers could plan their wage bill 
for three years’. In ways the process was ‘not immediately addressing issues but holding out 
hope. [Real] improvements would take years to work through’.  
 
Getting the employers on board is attributed to a mixture of diplomacy and ‘realism’ applied 
by O hUiginn and Haughey. The various employers’ groupings were reluctant to re-enter 
national pay bargaining because, from their perspective, local bargaining had worked very 
well.
22
 John Dunne, former director-general of the Irish Business Employers Conference 
(IBEC), confirmed IBEC’s fears that any national agreement would be a third tier because in 
addition to local bargaining there was also sectoral bargaining. Their ‘key objective was 
damage limitation – could we live with it’ (Interview with author). Within IBEC support for 
becoming involved was very cautious.
23
 For a while they were fighting a rearguard action as 
                                                          
21
 Attley of SIPTU recalls that shortly after her election Thatcher met with the TUC and promptly read to them 
her election manifesto, refused to engage in any dialogue and never again formally met a union official (Hastings, 
Sheehan and Yates, 2007: 9). 
22
 The main employers’ representative body, IBEC, (Irish Business Employers Conference) was formed by a 
merger of the CII (Confederation of Irish Industry) and the FIE (Federation of Irish Employers). The FIE was a 
rebranding of the FUE (Federated Union of Employers) which had been formed in 1942 and was the dominant 
employers’ body. As with ICTU, IBEC had a board representing the various industries, sectors, etc and a 
president who would serve for a short period. The main negotiations were carried out by the full-time staff under 
the control of the Director General. For the relevant period John Dunne was Director General of IBEC. 
23
 Dunne recalled an earlier attempt at a national agreement in 1982. Haughey, as Taoiseach, was trying to get the 
executive of the then FIE to sign up. When they advised that they could not without first going back to their own 
board, which was meeting the following day, Haughey requested a right of audience at same. This caused 
difficulty for some members of the board and approval for Haughey’s attendance was not unanimous. In the 
event the government fell soon after and it would be another five years before the birth of Social Partnership. 
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the Government and the public sector unions had reached broad agreement on a reduction in 
the working week from 40 to 37.5 hours per week. This was a bridge too far for the employers 
as, without substantial increases in productivity, it represented a 6.25 per cent increase in 
costs. In the event the agreement reached was for a 39 hour week (which still remains) and the 
unions did deliver substantial cost savings through changes in work practices. Dunne (2010): 
‘You would always pay a premium for peace and certainty and the multi-national companies 
loved it even though they remained at arm’s length from the entire process. But through it, 
even though they were non-union employers, they were assured of certainty of delivery of raw 
materials, supplies etc from local firms’.  
 
According to Dunne the employers were ‘very cognizant of the situation across the water and 
no one wanted to go down that road’.  Their recent experience in NESC had been very positive 
and they were also very impressed with the quality of trade union leadership.
24
  Apart from the 
obvious headline advantages there was also substantial benefit from the level of trust built up 
between unions and employers. ‘There were early warning systems, backchannels that helped 
one another out. No one could win, had to be seen not to win all the time. Integrity was so 
important as you’re only as good as your integrity’. From his point of view it was a very 
worthwhile and rewarding exercise which was also enjoyable and formed some very long 
lasting friendships. ‘There was a sense of fun and perspective and we were not trying to 
change the world’. (Ironically, they did change Ireland).  
 
Cassells (2009) also acknowledged the role of NESC and the work that had gone on there. 
This contributed to widespread acceptance of the key analyses that had been completed by 
NESC staff. ‘The key strategic issues were all agreed and also the [economic] outlook’.  There 
was also a predisposition to consensus arising from a history of previous national 
understandings. Between NESC and the negotiations for social partnership mutual trust and 
understanding was built up (as well as some surprising friendships) through day to day 
contact. ‘We were all obligated to work to solve problems that arose and that included 
government and IBEC. You had now a framework where problems could be dealt with as they 
arose and we often had to work beneath the radar’.  
 
                                                          
24
 Hastings, Sheehan and Yates (2007: 41) quote Dunne’s comments on trade union leadership: ‘The same people 
... would have been CEOs of some of Ireland’s biggest companies. That’s a reality. They were substantial people. 
They showed and demonstrated very considerable leadership qualities’. 
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Agreement came quickly in the end and the first Social Partnership agreement, Programme for 
National Recovery, was formally launched in October 1987.
25
  Having outlined the current 
economic situation and acknowledging the continuing importance of membership of the EU its 
main proposals were as follows: 
Macroeconomic Policies – stabilising the debt/GNP ratio, reducing exchequer borrowing 
requirement to between five and seven per cent, firm adherence to exchange rate in the 
European Monetary System (EMS), pay increases not exceeding 2.5 per cent for each 
of the three years of the agreement, reduction in number of public servants. All of the 
above were designed to contribute to a lowering of inflation and interest rates. 
Tax Reform – specific income tax reductions of £225 million and reductions in rates, tax 
deduction at source on professional fees paid by public bodies, farmers to be included 
on the same basis as other self-employed, amendments to corporation and capital 
taxation, measures to counteract tax evasion and to improve collection and 
enforcement (In effect implementation of some of the proposals from the Commission 
on Taxation). 
Greater Social Equity – commitments on maintaining and improving social welfare benefits 
and the payment of PRSI by farmers, a major review of health policy, exempting the 
disadvantaged from cuts in the education budget, the introduction of a housing bill 
making special provisions for the homeless. 
Employment – continuing to attract FDI, moves to address the high cost of liability insurance, 
State Sponsored Bodies to be more actively involved in development, radical 
reorganisation of the industrial promotion agencies, priority to the development of an 
indigenous food industry. 
Labour Legislation – a complete review of legislation in relation to unfair dismissals, 
employment equality and worker participation. 
Review and Monitoring Committee – the setting up of a Central Review Committee (under the 
chairmanship of O hUiginn) which would review and monitor progress in 
implementing the agreement. 
 
                                                          
25
 Hastings, Sheehan and Yates (2007) describe the scene. The Social Partners and the media are assembled in the 
conference room of the Burlington Hotel. There is a sound track of the ‘Mise Ēire’ theme music and Haughey, in 
the words of Bill Attley, arrived in like ‘Julius F***ng Caesar’, pressing the flesh, ‘and I was sitting there 
watching all this and thinking this is like a f***ng play’ (p. 41). It was to be the first of seven agreements over the 
next twenty years. 
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Delivering on lower taxation levels, while at the same time addressing the public finances, 
seemed, at best, utopian. The challenge was to find a solution that tackled the national debt 
while cutting public expenditure and boosting growth. The answer was provided by Jim 
O’Leary, an economist working with NESC, who came up with a formula that tackled the 
national debt by reducing the debt-GNP ratio (then running at over 140 per cent), i.e. if GNP 
could be increased without increasing debt the ratio would be automatically decreased.
26
 All 
sides were able to buy into this because it meant that reducing expenditure, which the 
employers favoured and the unions did not, could be counterbalanced by a growth in GNP 
(Hastings, Sheehan and Yates 2007, Cassells 2009, Dunne 2010). 
  
Seen as a win-win for all concerned, and there were undoubted benefits for government 
employers and unions, the big winners were the unions as their influence on public policy was 
greatly enhanced. It is a neat illustration of the asymmetrical nature of power that historical 
institutionalism sees as fundamental to understanding institutional change. 
 
Administrative Acceptability 
As has been demonstrated O hUiginn was central to both NESC and social partnership. The 
economic prescriptions of A Strategy for Development 1986-90 achieved economic and 
political acceptability. Given the increasing role, conferred by Haughey and gladly accepted 
by O hUiginn, of the Secretary General of the Department of the Taoiseach administrative 
acceptability was always likely. He came to play an increasing prominent role in Irish public 
life. Pádraig White said of O hUiginn: 
He was the Taoiseach’s right hand man and he had a reputation for getting things done. 
He was past master at crafting solutions, but perhaps most important, he spoke with the 
authority of the Taoiseach. Although listeners were often unsure whether his 
declarations were those of the Taoiseach or his own... O hUiginn’s natural instincts 
were naturally developmental and entrepreneurial rather than restrictive and 
bureaucratic. To any assignment he brought high intelligence, humour and a mastery of 
language (Mac Sharry and White, 2000: 328) 
 
Charlie McCreevy, who served as Minister for Finance, thought that ‘O hUiginn is the 
smartest civil servant, the smartest person I ever met. If he didn’t have a solution, then there 
“ain’t no solution”. His role was at least equal to [Ken] Whitaker if not greater’ (Hastings et al 
2007: 34). All parties and sources consulted about the NESC process and the origins of social 
                                                          
26
 Ironically O’Leary, now a lecturer at National University Ireland Maynooth and an economic commentator for 
the Irish Times, became a staunch critic of social partnership.  
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partnership are unanimous that without him there would not have been social partnership. He 
was the essential iron fist in a silk glove: his determination to succeed had a sufficient veneer 
of diplomacy and tact to keep all sides at the table.  
 
At interview O hUiginn was very modest about his contribution and yet had a quiet pride in 
what had been achieved. For him its abiding legacy was that apart from bringing a degree of 
certainty to wages and industrial relations ‘it made us competitive’. He also confirmed that the 
employers were the hardest group to get to the table and ‘required some straight talking’. The 
Programme for National Recovery was the culmination of work that had begun for O hUiginn 
seven years earlier with his work on The Way Forward but it was only part of a much larger 
project to redefine the tax system and address the public finances.  
 
The rise of O hUiginn is also interesting from a historical institutionalist perspective as it is a 
neat illustration of institutional change and the asymmetrical nature of power. Haughey’s 
hands-on style of leadership meant that the nexus of power was shifting from the Department 
of Finance and O hUiginn was becoming the de facto head of the civil service. He in effect 
became an institutional veto point, as described by Bulmer and Burch, and increasingly central 
to the administrative functioning of the state. But change was also happening within the 
Department of Finance: Secretary General Maurice Doyle became Governor of the Central 
Bank of Ireland and was replaced in Finance by Seán Cromien. This was another illustration 
of the importance of timing and sequencing as the relationship between Cromien and Mac 
Sharry was harmonious and mutually respectful.
27
  
 
Cromien entered the Department of Finance in 1952 having graduated from UCD with a first 
class honours degree in economics two years earlier. He rose through the ranks, being 
appointed Second Secretary in the budget division in 1977, and gaining the top post in 1987. 
He was described by a former colleague (who wished not to be named) as ‘the civil servants 
civil servant’ as he was totally non-political. On the instructions of Haughey an Expenditure 
Review Group was established in May 1987 – the group became known as An Bord Snip.28 
The Taoiseach informed his cabinet colleagues that ‘any Minister who came to Cabinet with 
                                                          
27
 Confirmed by both at interview. Physically they were both tall, thin men and non-drinkers. Both wore pioneer 
pins and this was sometimes parodied in the press as an icon of the times as the cuts they introduced began to 
bite. The late Brian Lenihan said of the two of them: ‘Both of you are mean-looking hoors’ (Cromien, 2009a: 2) 
28
 Given the supposed centrality of the Irish language in Irish public life a practice emerged of naming public 
bodies in Irish. An Bord is the Irish for The Board. Thus the colloquialism of calling the Expenditure Review 
Group An Bord Snip – The Board for Cuts! 
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proposals for increased expenditure should bring his seal of office with him and any Secretary 
who proposed increased expenditure would be sacked’ (Cromien, 2009a: 1).  
 
An Bord Snip was chaired by Cromien and had three other members – Kevin Murphy and Bob 
Curran from Finance and Colm McCarthy an economist with Davy Kellehr McCarthy, an 
economic consultancy firm.
29
 They reviewed every item of expenditure for each department. 
The review confirmed what Cromien already suspected: ‘Many of the schemes were more 
trouble than they were worth but no politician likes to cut existing schemes’ (2009). Their 
deliberations were circulated to the relevant department and a meeting was then held with the 
Secretary General and his senior staff at which agreement was usually, but not always 
reached.
30
 After these meetings Finance prepared a Memorandum for Government: Section I 
set out what was agreed between the relevant department and the review group; Section II was 
to list the proposals which Finance wanted but the other department would not agree to. 
Haughey had specifically instructed that explanations in the second section were not to include 
any political considerations of curtailing or dropping a scheme; the relevant minster would 
deal with that at cabinet. Heretofore, Memoranda to Government were normally submitted in 
the name of the relevant minister – Haughey instructed they were to be submitted in the name 
of the secretary of the Department of Finance. This is another example of breaking the path 
dependency of institutions and also of Haughey’s determination. 
 
Cromien (2009a) recounts an early cabinet meeting which became part of civil service 
folklore. The review group and an unnamed Secretary General had agreed cuts but the relevant 
minister attempted to overrule this and amend the list. ‘What happened at the Government 
meeting, I gathered, was that Mr. Haughey savaged the Minister concerned for intervening in 
the process and threatened to take his seal of office from him’. Any doubts that may have 
lingered in the civil service about the seriousness of the reforms or temptation to ‘play politics’ 
with the process were quickly dispelled. 
 
Organisational, regulative and procedural level change, as described by Bulmer and Burch, 
was underway and institutional veto points disappeared overnight. This time it truly was 
                                                          
29
 Colm McCarthy chaired the latest Expenditure Review Group, which, unsurprisingly, became known as An 
Bord Snip Nua – the New Board for Cuts. He consulted with Cromien during the process (Cromien, 2009).  
30
 One of the most surprising features of my interview emerged as we talked about these meetings. I had assumed 
that in the closed world of the civil service all the senior people would have known each other. I said ‘and of 
course you all knew one another well’. Mr. Cromien replied ‘I knew very few of them as I had spent most of my 
time in the Budget Division and had had no dealings with them’ 
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different. The ‘ideas’ of monetarism and corporatism had gained administrative acceptability 
and were being insinuated into the public policy process. 
 
Next Steps 
In 1987 the country was at, what historical institutionalists call, a critical moment ‘when a 
perceived opportunity arises for significant change. That is an event takes place which raises a 
general expectation that change will follow’ (Burch, Hogwood and Bulmer, 2003: 7) Even 
though new ideas were advanced by ideational actors such as the ESRI and NESC breaking 
the path dependent nature of Irish institutional life was constrained by cultural boundaries, 
logic of appropriateness, and background underlying assumptions. All of these were deeply 
ingrained in the public sentiment. What happened in Ireland in the period 1986/7 was a series 
of cumulative causes, what Burch, Hogwood and Bulmer called ‘the accumulation of 
pervasive changes’ (2003: 14) that effected dramatic change over time, albeit sometimes at a 
slow pace; processes sometimes had modest, incremental effects until they reached critical 
levels that triggered major change - threshold effects. All of the above neatly illustrated 
Pierson’s view of the importance of timing and, sequencing. Sometimes, seemingly 
insignificant institutional change can lead to profound societal change. Pierson puts it as 
follows: 
Although analyses invoking the language of “critical junctures” sometimes focus on 
large-scale events, those qualities are neither necessary nor sufficient to generate path-
dependent dynamics. In fact, the point in path-dependent analyses is that “causes” may 
often seem relatively small compared with their effects. What makes a particular 
juncture “critical” is that it triggers a process of positive feedback (2004: 51).  
 
To distinguish between a critical moment and a critical juncture Bulmer and Burch (2001:81) 
offer the following:   
 
A ‘critical moment’ is when an opportunity arises for significant change. Such 
opportunities may not be realised and exploited but, if they are, the outcome is a 
‘critical juncture’ at which there is a clear departure from previously established 
patterns. Critical junctures create branching points at which institutional development 
moves on to a new trajectory or pathway which is then followed incrementally until a 
new critical moment arises and (potentially) a new critical juncture follows and a new 
direction is taken 
  
This thesis contends that the causal chains linking ideational actors and administrative and 
political elites, precipitated a critical juncture when there was ‘a clear departure from 
previously established patterns’ (Burch, Hogwood and Bulmer, 2003: 7). The ideas of 
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monetarism and corporatism had achieved economic, political and administrative 
acceptability. But acceptance of ideas is not enough. To make things happen would require 
political and administrative will to implement those ideas. The next chapter will show that the 
critical moment became a critical juncture that led to the transformation of Ireland.   
 
An adaptation of Hall’s Framework (see Table 7.1 on page) shows a three legged model 
achieving equilibrium. On the economic front events in Britain and New Zealand together 
with the work of the ESRI and NESC ensured acceptability in that quarter. Administratively O 
hUiginn and Cromien overcame the various institutional veto points. On the political front 
Haughey ruled his party with an iron fist, Mac Sharry ensured delivery and the ‘Tallaght 
Strategy’ of Dukes facilitated them in gaining acceptability. As with a three-legged stool, 
equilibrium can be found on uneven ground, and the Irish political landscape was uneven 
ground and, as will be demonstrated in the next chapter, some of the causal chains had slow-
moving outcomes and had to overcome many institutional veto points. The research also 
shows the importance of viewing events as a moving picture as advocated by historical 
institutionalists rather than taking a snapshot in time as favoured by rational choice theory. 
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Table 7.1: Hall’s Framework applied to Ireland 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Adapted from Hall, 1989: 371) 
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Chapter 8: Second Period of Change – Implementation of the 
‘ideas’ of a low tax economy and social partnership 
 
 
 
In the previous chapter it was shown that the ‘ideas’ that emerged and achieved economic, 
political and administrative acceptability were the unlikely bedfellows of monetarism and 
neocorporatism. Given the pejorative connotations of both terms the accepted euphemisms 
were tax reform and social partnership, both of which were to be delivered in the context of 
addressing the major imbalances in the public finances. Tax reform was an easy political sell 
as every tax payer wished to pay less tax. But reform would come at a price as paying less tax 
would mean cutting public expenditure and some of the cuts took effect before the tax reforms 
impacted on disposable incomes. Social partnership promised a framework in which it was 
theoretically possible to deliver tax reform while addressing the public finances. This chapter 
will use Bulmer and Burch’s template to track the changes that then ensued at the systemic, 
organisational, regulative and procedural levels and prove that a critical juncture took place 
that punctuated institutional path dependency and led to the transformation of Ireland. In 
addition to the above four levels of change Bulmer and Burch argue there is an overarching 
cultural level which constrains change. To implement the ideas of tax reform and social 
partnership would require a change in political culture. 
 
Political Culture 
Coakley posits that political culture does not arise by accident and ‘The same kinds of 
structural forces help to shape it as influence political life more generally’ (2006: 37). The 
main forces are socio-economic development – particularly industrialisation/urbanisation and 
its effects on social structure; cultural evolution – how and what values have become 
dominant and how those values are challenged; political experience – external influences 
and/or past experiences of domination or colonisation.  
 
By the end of 1987 a significant shift in political culture was already under way – in effect a 
cultural evolution that challenged dominant values. The budget of March had clearly spelt out 
the steps that were necessary and were now being implemented with the support of Fine Gael 
and the ‘Tallaght Strategy’. Fianna Fáil, which had campaigned on a slogan of ‘Expenditure 
Cuts Hurt the Sick, the Poor and the Elderly’ had a complete volte face and was implementing 
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the policies proposed by Fine Gael leaving Dukes with the unpalatable but necessary decision 
to support Haughey’s government. This was a significant change in political culture and 
unprecedented in Irish political life as Haughey in opposition, especially from 1982-87, had 
deliberately misrepresented the economic situation and constantly hampered the government’s 
attempts to convince the electorate of the necessity for cutbacks. ‘He also offered open 
support to any and every interest group which engaged in confrontation with the government’ 
(Collins, 2001: 171).
1
 
 
Increasing secularisation and urbanisation; the rise of an enlarged, well-educated middle 
class; a changing role for the media, which increasingly became part of the story rather than 
just reporters of it;  the rise of feminism – all of these were symptoms of socio-economic 
development that impacted on the political culture. Allied to these were the concentration of 
power in the Department of the Taoiseach and the birth of the Progressive Democrats as 
further signs of a changing political culture that made change to Irish institutional life 
possible.  
 
Mair and Weeks, writing on the political party system in Ireland, identify three critical 
moments: 1927 Fianna Fáil abandoned its abstentionist policy and took its seats in the Dáil; 
1948 the participation of the smaller parties with Fine Gael to form a coalition government 
meant the future key element of party competition would be Fianna Fáil against the rest; 1989 
when Fianna Fáil decided to enter coalition with the Progressive Democrats. 
This new watershed was important in two ways. Competition no longer revolved 
around ‘Fianna Fáil versus the rest’. From this point on, Fianna Fáil was to become 
‘just another party’, bigger and more successful than its opponents, to be sure, but 
certainly no different from them in any other important sense. Second, by playing the 
coalition game Fianna Fáil opened up the possibility that it could now remain almost 
permanently in office. As the biggest single party and as the party which was perhaps 
closest to the centre of the political spectrum, it would probably always seem easier 
for Fianna Fáil to find a coalition partner than would be the case for most of the other 
parties (2006: 154).  
 
                                                          
1
 When confronted with his actions in implementing policies that he had previously opposed Haughey regularly 
repeated the mantra: it is the opposition’s duty to oppose. He had opposed the setting up of the National Lottery 
and the Deposit Interest Retention Scheme (DIRT), both of which proved to be major successful revenue 
earners, and promised to reverse the decisions. He did not keep this promise. By then a backbencher Garret 
FitzGerald said: ‘There seemed to be two Fianna Fáil parties, Fianna Fáil in opposition and Fianna Fáil in 
government, and any resemblance between them has become totally coincidental; in fact not only coincidental 
but unfindable at this stage’ (Collins, 2001: 179).  
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Between March 1987 and June 1989 the Haughey government had, with the support of the 
‘Tallaght Strategy’, confounded its critics, and indeed many members of the governing party, 
by introducing radical cuts in public expenditure. The current budget deficit, which stood at 
7.9 per cent of GNP in 1986, was reduced to 1.2  per cent by 1988. The government won all 
the critical votes in the Dáil and seemed set to run its full term. Having delivered a significant 
turnaround in the public finances Mac Sharry had been rewarded with the agricultural 
portfolio in the EU and was replaced as Minister for Finance by Albert Reynolds on 24 
November 1988. Mac Sharry’s departure not only meant the loss of a very able minister but 
possibly the one person who could have stayed Haughey’s hand as events began to unravel – 
another example of Pierson’s timing and sequencing being important. The government lost a 
number of votes of a non-consequential nature when Fine Gael was embarrassed by Labour 
into voting against the government. In a fit of hubris on losing a vote on an allocation of 
£400,000 for haemophiliacs Haughey called a general election in the belief that Fianna Fáil 
would win a clear majority.  The result was a disaster for Haughey as the party lost four seats 
and got only 44 per cent of the vote.
 2
  Fine Gael’s paltry reward for the ‘Tallaght Strategy’ 
was an increase of four seats from 51 to 55 – a result which meant the end of Dukes’ 
leadership some months later and the abandonment of the ‘Tallaght Strategy’. The Dáil failed 
to elect a Taoiseach when it met on 29 June, 3 July and 6 July  but there was a lot of behind 
the scenes manoeuvrings.  
 
Even though the Progressive Democrats lost eight of their 14 seats the unthinkable happened 
when, after a period of high uncertainty and brinkmanship they formed a coalition with 
Fianna Fáil to form a new government on 12 July.
3
 The Progressive Democrats got two 
cabinet posts and a junior ministry but their major achievement was in getting their policies 
accepted in the programme for government.
4
 They were somewhat sceptical about social 
partnership but prepared to live with it as it delivered industrial peace. ‘The Progressive 
Democrats were effectively allowed to write the joint programme for government and all the 
                                                          
2
 Their private opinion polls were showing that the party had the support of 51 per cent of the electorate.  
3
 The story of the formation of the government is best told by Collins (2001, 2005). Haughey rode roughshod 
over his party, kept his chief negotiators Reynolds and Ahern in the dark, alienated most of his party for whom 
coalition was anathema and a coalition with the traitorous Progressive Democrats unspeakable. At the end of the 
negotiations Haughey rather smugly said to the Progressive Democrats’ team: ‘You know, nobody but myself 
could have done it’ (Collins, 2005: 107).  
4
 Control of public spending (already well under way), current budget deficit not to exceed 3 per cent of GNP, 
debt/GNP ratio not to exceed 120 per cent, the gradual introduction of just two rates of income tax with the 
lower rate at 25 per cent were the main financial targets. The sale of state assets was also broadly agreed but only 
with the consent of the social partners. On the North there was agreement on opening dialogue with the 
Unionists and also agreement on a number of worthy objectives in education, health and social welfare. 
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party’s pet policies, particularly its tax-cutting agenda were included’ (Collins, 2005: 107). At 
interview O’Malley confirmed that during the negotiations to form a government they soon 
realised that Haughey was determined to cling to power: ‘Haughey wanted power at any 
price. He needed it for personal financial reasons. He had become and had to remain the alpha 
male of the pack. In retrospect we could have asked for more’.5 It is to the credit of O’Malley 
and Haughey that they put their personal animosity to one side and worked well in cabinet.  
 
The formation of the Fianna Fáil/Progressive Democrats government in 1989 ensured a 
significant shift in political culture as Fianna Fáil abandoned one of its core principles. As the 
Progressive Democrats were strong believers in monetarist policies and ‘rolling back the 
state’ it also further cemented the ‘idea’ of tax reform as a background underlying assumption 
that became embedded in the public sentiment. It also brought major change at organisational 
level on the Bulmer and Burch scale.  
 
A further indication of a changing political culture occurred on 9 November 1990 when Mary 
Robinson was elected President. Her election was noteworthy on several fronts: she was the 
first woman to hold the post; all previous incumbents had been members of Fianna Fáil, she 
was a member of the Labour Party; in her campaign she appealed to mná na hĒireann (the 
women of Ireland) to come out and support her, and they did. Her election was an important 
milestone in Irish political life and a further example of punctuating institutional path 
dependency. 
 
Making Change Happen 
Having achieved economic, political and administrative viability, and the beginnings of a 
changing political culture, implementing the ‘ideas’ of tax reform and social partnership, both 
designed to restore order to the public finances and kick start the economy, would require 
political and administrative will. It would also require systemic, organisational, regulative and 
procedural level changes as outlined by Bulmer and Burch. The NESC report, A Strategy for 
Development 1986-90, was the broad framework to be followed. Following the 1987 election 
Haughey ruled over his cabinet with an iron fist and brooked no opposition to his policies.
6
 
                                                          
5
 At interview O’Malley also made the point that the minority Fianna Fáil government of 1987/89 was the last 
time that the country had single party government and that it was also the most corrupt in the history of the state.  
6
 In the process he made many enemies within the cabinet. Following the 1989 general election, which most of 
his cabinet had opposed, and the subsequent humiliation of going into government with the Progressive 
Democrats, that tension became more pronounced. Asked by a backbench TD if the cabinet would go along with 
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He was ably assisted and supported by Mac Sharry who was probably the only minister who 
could be reasonably confident that he had the support of the Taoiseach. On the administrative 
front the relationship between Haughey and O hUiginn grew stronger by the day and as 
Haughey arrogated more and more power to himself and his Department, O hUiginn 
exercised enormous power across the entire public service and the hitherto path dependent 
operation of many institutions was broken. O hUiginn had the authority to challenge every 
department in the name of the Taoiseach. Long established reporting arrangements were 
discarded (e.g. Memos to cabinet in the name of the departmental secretary rather than that of 
the minister) leading to widespread procedural level change. There was a very perceptible 
transfer of power to the Department of the Taoiseach there was also organisational level 
change on the Bulmer and Burch template. How this was perceived in the Department of 
Finance is not known. At interview Cromien, who had succeeded as Secretary General in 
Finance in 1987, seemed quite happy with the arrangement. For him the critical issue was his 
relationship with Mac Sharry and the tackling of the public debt. He offered an interesting 
insight into the minister/secretary relationship: ‘Contrary to the Yes Minister image as a civil 
servant you actually want an effective minister who could get things done, make things 
happen. Civil servants do not want a weak minister because he will be weak at cabinet and 
with pressure groups’. There was a high degree of mutual respect between himself and Mac 
Sharry that was very obvious at interviews with both of them. Haughey and O hUiginn, 
together with Mac Sharry and Cromien, were the people who ensured that the critical moment 
of 1987 was transformed into a critical juncture. 
 
One of the main instruments used to effect change at the first critical juncture in 1958 was the 
establishment and/or reconstitution of a large number of state-sponsored bodies. This was not 
the route followed at the second critical juncture. The five years 1988-92 saw the 
establishment of just four state-sponsored bodies: The National Treasury Management 
Agency in 1990; An Bord Glas in 1990; the Competition Authority in 1991; the 
Environmental Protection Agency in 1992.
7
 This was a clear break from the traditional way of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the coalition Haughey replied: ‘They are only a bunch of gobshites’ (Collins, 2001: 198). In response to a query 
from a member of the Progressive Democrats’ negotiating team about cabinet hostility to the deal Haughey said: 
‘It’s alright. I just haven’t told them yet’ (Collins, 2005: 105). This dictatorial attitude and disdain for his cabinet 
led to his downfall in 1992.  
7
 Legislation had been introduced in the 1986 Finance Act by Garret FitzGerald’s government that enabled the 
establishment of the Customs House Docks Development Authority. The establishment of the International 
Financial Services Centre (IFSC) in 1987 was under the 1986 legislation and the Finance Act 1987, s. 30 (Relief 
in relation to income from certain trading operations to be carried on in the Customs House Docks Area) set out 
the tax breaks and incentives that would be available.  
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doing things. In 1987 An Foras Forbartha (the National Institute for Physical Planning and 
Construction Research) was abolished, ‘a move that sent tremors of apprehension through the 
whole public service. Closing down parts of the public service, even a state research institute, 
was unheard of at that stage’ (Mac Sharry and White, 2000: 72).  Bord na gCapall (The Irish 
Horse Board) was abolished in 1989 and Foir Teoranta (literally Aid Limited) in  1990.
8
 were 
also abolished. The Department of the Public Service was also closed down and its role 
returned to the Department of Finance where it has remained ever since.
9
 At interview O 
hUiginn, while not philosophically opposed to state-sponsored bodies, was quite matter of 
fact about developments: ‘We were trying to cut costs, not increase them. We saw tax 
incentives and reliefs as the most effective and efficient means of stimulating the economy’. 
How that tax reform was delivered is covered in the next section.  
 
From interviews with other senior retired civil servants there was a sense that state-sponsored 
bodies had become over time too unresponsive to changing needs  and incapable of delivering 
quick solutions. There was also a fairly early realisation that the cuts introduced in 1987/88, 
though required, were too blunt an instrument. The effects were disproportionately felt by 
some sectors of society. It was also realised that management information systems in the 
public service generally were inadequate and that better systems could have delivered the 
same general level of savings with less harmful effects. One of the unintended consequences 
of the cutbacks was that a group of senior civil servants, concerned about the quality of public 
service management, undertook an M.Sc programme in Trinity College Dublin and the 
ensuing thesis, Strategic Management in the Irish Civil Service, became the blueprint that was 
adopted by the government in 1994 as the Strategic Management Initiative for reform in the 
public service generally. (Previously referred to on p. 163).  
    
Tax Reform 
The first real attempts to stimulate the economy through tax incentives began in 1984 with the 
introduction of a number of reliefs under the Business Expansion Scheme. The first Urban 
Renewal Scheme, intended to stimulate the construction industry, came in 1986. But it was to 
                                                          
8
 An Foir Teoranta was literally a lender of last resort providing financial aid to distressed indigenous 
companies. It was particularly susceptible to political pressure.  
9
 Haughey had abolished the Department of Economic Planning back in 1979. 
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be 1988 before widespread tax reform got underway.
10
 In his budget speech of 31 March 1987 
Mac Sharry outlined his thinking on tax reform.  
Personal taxation is at an all time high and is a serious deterrent to our development. 
There must be reform in order to remove barriers to economic activity and to make the 
system demonstrably fairer. There must also be radical improvements in tax 
collection. In the short-term it is not possible to reduce taxes. The Government will, 
however, give early consideration to major changes, as soon as the budgetary position 
allows. We have now reached a point of diminishing returns in relation to some 
taxes... [In relation to income tax] First of all I have to say that, because of the difficult 
budget situation, it is not possible on this occasion to provide for reductions in income 
tax. A choice has had to be made between reducing borrowing and reducing income 
tax and the more responsible course for all concerned at this time is to lower the 
borrowing figure (Dáil Debates 31/03/1987). 
 
But he did offer some hope: ‘It is the Government's intention, as soon as circumstances 
permit, to move to a stage where two-thirds of taxpayers will pay tax at the standard rate only’ 
(ibid.).  
 
Income Tax 
The most obvious, and politically desirable, change was to come in the area of direct personal 
taxation.
11
 Mac Sharry was as good as his word and his next budget began a series of personal 
tax cuts which were to become the norm for the next several years. In 1987/88 the rates of 
taxation for a single person were 35 per cent on the first £4,700 of taxable income, 48 per cent 
on the next £2,500 and 58 per cent on the balance. By 1992/93 the rates were 27 per cent on 
the first £7,425 of taxable income and 48 per cent on the balance. The net result for a single 
person with a taxable income of £10,000 was that tax paid reduced from £4,439 to £3,240.75 
– a reduction of 27 per cent. Exemption limits were also increased over the period as were key 
allowances. The ‘housekeeper allowance’ was doubled and intended to facilitate the return of 
married women to the workplace. A child’s income allowance was trebled and this was 
widely exploited as friends set up mutual covenanting arrangements. ‘A’ could covenant 
income up to the full allowance to ‘B’s’ child and ‘B’ reciprocated the arrangement with ‘A’s’ 
child. The reality was that no money changed hands but ‘A’ and ‘B’ were enabled to legally 
reduce their respective tax bills by the full amount of the allowances. Originally devised by 
                                                          
10
 Reference has already been made to the influence of the New Zealand reforms and the meeting between Mac 
Sharry and Douglas. Mac Sharry contemplated emulating Douglas’ ‘big bang’ approach but deemed the public 
finances too precarious to do so and instead opted for an incremental approach. 
11
 One of the frustrations articulated by Dukes at interview about his time as Minister for Finance was that the 
Labour party, who were in government with Fine Gael, would not countenance public expenditure cuts. ‘Their 
answer to everything was to keep increasing taxes’.  
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the wealthy in society, who had access to the best tax advice, it quickly spread to all strata of 
society and was eventually withdrawn. 
 
In the context of the times these tax changes were truly seismic as the population had become 
accustomed to annual tax increases. Here was systemic, regulative and procedural level 
change in action as described by Bulmer and Burch. Organisational change was also to 
follow. Table 8.1 on the following page gives a listing of the major personal tax changes.  
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Table 8.1: Income Tax Allowances and Rates 
 
 
 1987-88 
 
1988-89 1989-90 1990-91 1991-92 1992-93 
Allowances* 
 
 Personal 
 Child’s Income 
 Housekeeper 
 
 
 
2,000 
720 
2,500 
 
 
2,050 
720 
2,500 
 
 
2,050 
720 
2,500 
 
 
2,050 
720 
5,000 
 
 
2,100 
2,100 
5,000 
 
 
2,100 
2,100 
5,000 
Exemption Limits 
 
 Under 65 
 65-75 
 Over 65 
 
 
 
2,650 
3,150 
3,675 
 
 
 
 
2,750 
3,250 
3,800 
 
 
3,000 
3,400 
4,000 
 
 
3,250 
3,750 
4,350  
 
 
3,400 
3,900 
4,500 
 
 
3,500 
4,000 
4,600 
Rates of Tax** First 4,700  35% 
Next 2,800  48% 
Balance  58% 
First 5,700  35% 
Next 2,900  48% 
Balance  58% 
First 6,100  32% 
Next 3,100  48% 
Balance  56% 
First 6,500  30% 
Next 3,100  48% 
Balance 53% 
First 6,700  29% 
Next 3,100  48% 
Balance  53% 
First 7,425  27% 
Balance 48% 
 
* All Allowances, Exemptions are for single people and are doubled for married couples 
** Rates of Tax are common to single and married. The amounts shown are for single people and are doubled for married couples 
 
(Adapted from Butterworth Ireland Tax Guide) 
 
 
 
  
202 
 
Other Taxes 
Government needs a continuing and increasing stream of tax revenue. Total tax take increased 
from £10.1 billion in 1987 to £13.87 billion in 1992, an increase of 37 per cent. Over the same 
period the Consumer Price Index (CPI) rose by 15.7 per cent (Figures obtained from CSO 
website). The changes in the personal tax regime received most of the headlines but there was 
a more subtle and far-reaching change regime underway with a shift to indirect taxes.  
 Excise duties on the ‘old reliables’ of tobacco, alcohol and petrol were increased in 
1988, 1989, 1991 and 1992. 
 Value Added Tax introduced on electricity bills at 5 per cent in 1988, increased to 10 
per cent in 1989 and extended to telephone bills also.  It was further extended to 
veterinary bills in 1991 and to commercially organised sporting and leisure activities 
in 1992.  
 Value Added Tax Rates were amended as follows: standard rate of 25 per cent rate 
reduced to 23 percent in 1990 and to 21 per cent in 1991; the reduced rate of 12.5 per 
cent was increased to 16 per cent in 1992. 
 Corporation Tax – standard rate of 50 per cent in 1988 reduced incrementally to 40 
per cent by 1991. There were also extensive changes in reliefs and allowances over the 
period and the 10 per cent rate applicable to companies setting up in the IFSC was 
guaranteed out to 2005.  
 Capital Gains Tax and Capital Acquisitions Tax – top rate of 60 per cent reduced to 40 
per cent between 1990 and 1992. 
 Farmer Taxation – various amendments made over the period to bring farmers into 
the tax net and ensure equal treatment with other taxpayers. 
 Sundry Tax Measures – in addition to the foregoing there were a number of other 
significant changes: a withholding tax of 35% on professional fees paid by all public 
bodies; a requirement to hold a tax clearance certificate when tendering for public 
works; restrictions on duty-free allowances for cross-border shopping.   
 
Many of the changes introduced in the period had been recommended in the various reports of 
the Commission on Taxation. All tax changes involved systemic level change as they required 
legislation. There were accompanying changes in the social welfare regime designed to 
remove disincentives to return to the workplace. High rates of marginal tax had made 
returning to paid employment, remunerated at a level not far below the average industrial 
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wage, not worthwhile and the result was a booming black economy. The changes introduced 
were largely successful in tackling the black economy. 
  
Self-Assessment 
A major organisational level change occurred with the introduction of self-assessment for the 
self-employed in 1988. The system heretofore was that the Revenue Commissioners assessed 
the level of tax due by the self-employed and sent out a demand for that amount and the tax-
payer was then free to appeal the request. The appeals system was being used as a delaying 
mechanism to postpone payment. Under the new system the tax-payer assessed the amount 
due and paid that amount. There were strong incentives for honesty because very severe 
penalties applied if the final assessment by the Revenue Commissioners varied by more than a 
given per cent. Prior to 1987 only half of the self-employed made their returns on time. 
Following the changes introduced in the 1988 budget compliance greatly increased. The 
number of appeals dropped from 59,888 cases in 1986 to 1,181 in 1988 and the amount 
collected was £70 million ahead of projections (MacSharry: 93). At interview Mac Sharry 
recounted that on a trip to New York for an IMF meeting he had discussions with American 
Revenue officials. ‘I discovered we had almost as many tax officials dealing with tax appeals 
as the Americans with over 250 million people and came home and just changed the system’.  
 
In addition to being a major organisational level change as described by Bulmer and Burch 
the new self-assessment regime, with its carrot and stick approach, produced a marked change 
of attitude by the self-employed and ‘went some way to assuring the hard-pressed PAYE 
taxpayer that serious attempts were being made to broaden the tax base’ (Mac Sharry, 2000: 
93).  
  
Tax Amnesty 
The Commission on Taxation final report, Tax Administration, 1985, acknowledged that ‘the 
administration of taxation in Ireland has virtually broken down. Non-compliance is a major 
problem’ (p. 21). The 1988 budget announced a major change with a Tax Incentive Scheme, 
in effect a tax amnesty, to allow those with ‘tax issues’ to bring their affairs up to date. 
Interest and penalties would be waived if errant tax-payers complied. The end result was a 
bonanza of almost £500 million for the Exchequer with £400 million being collected in the 
last week alone.  
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Mac Sharry, at interview and in The Making of the Celtic Tiger, cites his reasons for 
introducing the scheme: he knew from constituency clinics and talking to other TDs ‘that 
many people wanted to come clean on their tax’ and had the money set aside to do so but 
penalties and interest in many cases would double the amount due. His budget speech 
indicated an expected return of £30 million. At interview he informed me that the highest 
estimate of the Department of Finance was £50 million but that his own estimate was for ten 
times that amount. ‘They persuaded me that I would be giving hostages to fortune if I ever 
mentioned that figure in public’. Institutional veto points (Bulmer and Burch, Pierson) in the 
Revenue Commissioners and the Department of Finance were overridden by Mac Sharry 
when he introduced the Tax Amnesty. 
 
Whereas the £500 million was an enormous boost to the state’s finances it made the £225 
million in tax cuts promised in the Programme for National Recovery (PNR) seem paltry. 
There was widespread anger among the PAYE sector at the level of evasion that had gone 
undetected for years.
12
 It seemed, as O’Toole (2003:110) put it, only the little people pay 
taxes. Ferriter (2004: 680), referring to these times says: ‘One could be forgiven for 
wondering whether the Irish Revenue Commissioners actually existed’.   
 
Summary of Tax Reform 
A programme of radical tax reform had been instigated with the beginnings of a move from 
taxing production to taxing consumption.
13
 This was further accelerated in the years following 
the period under review. Table 8:2 shows the main changes in tax receipts over the period. 
 
Table 8.2: Main Tax Receipts (£ billion) 
 1987 1992 %Change 
Income Tax 3,452 4,335 26 
Excise Duties 1,764 2,219 26 
VAT 1,843 2,520 37 
Corporation Tax 325 938 188 
Capital Taxes 47 115 145 
                                                          
12
 After the introduction of self-assessment and the tax amnesty there was a sense among the political and 
administrative elite that the problem of tax evasion had been largely resolved. The reality was somewhat 
different as borne out by subsequent events such as another amnesty in 1993, the DIRT Inquiry, the Ansbacher 
accounts and a tax evasion scheme operated by National Irish Bank. 
13
 Over time this change became more controversial as indirect taxes are much more regressive and take no 
account of ability to pay.  
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As has already been demonstrated there were substantial improvements in take home pay 
arising from the tax reforms introduced. The numbers at work rose by a modest 54,000 
between 1987 and 1992 (Tansey, 1998: 37) and yet as seen in the table above there was a 26 
per cent increase in income tax. This apparent anomaly is accounted for by the rapid growth 
in productivity and GNP over the period – rising from £18.96 billion in 1987 to £26.45 billion 
in 1992, an increase of 40 per cent.  
Tax reform effected institutional change on all levels of Bulmer and Burch’s Template: 
 Systemic – all of the changes required legislative change; 
 Organisational – self-assessment, in particular brought major organisational change 
within the Revenue Commissioners and all bodies dealing with taxation of the self-
employed; 
 Regulative and Procedural – all tax changes involve an element of regulative and 
procedural change but the changes in corporation tax, capital taxes and value added 
taxes involved serious change. 
There was also a cultural shift in relation to taxation generally with much higher (but certainly 
not total) levels of compliance. The ‘idea’ of tax reform moved from an abstraction to a 
reality. Unlike the first critical juncture, where there was political and administrative 
resistance to free trade and foreign direct investment, acceptance of the ‘idea’ of tax reform is 
now portrayed as universal. Yes, everyone was theoretically in favour of reform, particularly 
if it meant they paid less tax, but it could only be delivered as part of a much wider 
programme that addressed the public finances, increased competitiveness, brought industrial 
peace and grew the national economy. Timing and sequencing, as described by Pierson, was 
everything. 
 
Mac Sharry rightly gets the credit for initiating the changes but Reynolds, who presented the 
budget from 1989 to 1991 inclusive, probably made the most symbolic change in 1989 when 
the standard rate of tax was reduced from 35 per cent to 32 per cent. ‘Overall I was pleased 
with the reaction to my first budget, but I also realized that it was just one small piece in the 
overall financial puzzle and a hard task lay ahead’ (Reynolds, 2009: 126). The major 
challenge perceived by him was the lack of competition arising from a cost base that was too 
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high and made the country uncompetitive. He continued the work begun by Mac Sharry and 
when the Progressive Democrats entered coalition the process was further accelerated.
14
    
 
Irish Financial Services Centre (IFSC) 
In his budget speech of 31 March 1987 Mac Sharry had this to say about financial services:  
The growth of the financial services sector internationally, stimulated in large measure 
by advances in technology, has been one of the more significant features of economic 
life in recent years. We must aim to share in the benefits to be derived from this 
growth. Modern communications mean that we are no longer isolated from the main 
financial markets and so now have the capacity to develop here a strong international 
financial services sector if we provide the right conditions and a favourable taxation 
climate. It is the Government's intention to provide incentives to promote this sector. 
There will be considerable benefits to the economy, in particular the creation of well 
paid and highly skilled jobs and increased demand for telecommunications and 
professional services. This development will generate further substantial investment 
opportunities that will attract capital from abroad and give a further welcome impetus 
to the economy (Dáil Debates 31 March 1987).   
  
In assessing the role of the IFSC it is important to do so in the context of the times that it was 
created and to disregard the present banking crisis. All sources consulted attribute the original 
idea to Dermot Desmond of NCB Stockbrokers.
15
 In 1985 he approached Ruairi Quinn, 
Minister for Labour, with the idea for an international financial services centre in Dublin. 
They agreed to jointly fund a feasibility study by PriceWaterhouse who concluded that it 
would never work. In 1986, Haughey, still in opposition, began asking ‘various financial 
houses around Dublin to make presentations to him about the way forward from the 
seemingly terminal mess the public finances were in, and the high level of unemployment’ 
(Buckley, 2006). Buckley, a former senior civil servant was managing director of NCB 
Stockbrokers and later chief executive of AIB, goes on to describe Dermot Desmond leading 
a group from the company into Leinster House to make a presentation to Haughey who 
advised them at the start of the meeting that he hoped they could come up with better ideas 
                                                          
14
 One of the more innovative proposals of Reynolds was to change the VAT regime on alcohol. There was 
widespread tax evasion in the pub industry where people leased premises and did not pay the VAT due on liquor 
sales. Reynolds proposed that VAT would be levied on the breweries and distilleries as product was released to 
the licensed trade. This would have made the collection of VAT extremely simple and guarantee compliance. 
The Revenue Commissioners opposed on the basis that there was a huge differential in prices across the country 
and the Exchequer would lose out on the VAT collected from the up-market, pricier establishments. The counter 
argument was that increased collection would more than compensate for that. The Revenue prevailed as an 
institutional veto point. The above is from a meeting held with Albert Reynolds when he was Minister for 
Finance in the early 1990s. 
 
15
 The relationship between Haughey and Desmond was to be crucial. According to Reddan (2008) the pair first 
met at a business lunch in New York in 1986. Shane Ross, in The Bankers (2010) claims that he introduced them 
through a lunch set up jointly with P.J. Mara, later to be government press secretary under Haughey. 
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than ‘the same old dismal formula that the dogs in the street are barking at me, cut, cut, cut’ 
(ibid.). They gave him the dismal bit but included ten minutes at the end on the financial 
services centre and Haughey was immediately taken with the idea, asked for a fuller paper 
and included the concept in the 1987 election manifesto. This is another example of the 
importance of timing and sequencing described by Pierson.  
 
The core proposal was to build a centre that would house financial services companies and 
offer the latest in communication technology. The Finance Act 1987 set out the broad taxation 
rules that would apply. Central to the concept was that it would be a reputable centre (not just 
a ‘brass-plate operation’) that ensured that companies operating within the centre were ring-
fenced and double taxation did not apply. Deposit taking would not be allowed, ruling out the 
prospects of being used as an offshore banking haven. It would not be orientated to creating a 
tax haven. O hUiginn also succeeded in inserting a catch-all phrase into the legislation which 
allowed for the future inclusion of trading operations which were ancillary to those originally 
envisaged. This enabled a much swifter response to proposals for inclusion that might be 
outside the original specifications.  
 
There was a great deal of scepticism around the original proposal and, as it gained credence, 
suspicion at EU level. In April 1987 Haughey appointed a high-powered committee drawn 
from the great and the good in the public service and the private sector with O hUiginn in the 
chair. The committee met faithfully at 8.30 every Monday morning and a full attendance was 
expected. Initial teething problems were overcome when Haughey advised them that their role 
was not to discuss the merits or otherwise of the scheme but to implement it (Reddan, 2008; 
Buckley, 2006: O hUiginn, 2009). The Department of Finance and the Revenue 
Commissioners for a while offered institutional veto points as described by Bulmer and Burch 
and Pierson but the message from Haughey, conveyed with conviction by O hUiginn ensured 
compliance.   
 
Initially the IDA was charged with the marketing of the IFSC but soon discovered that 
marketing financial services was very different from marketing industry generally. Haughey 
and O hUiginn quickly moved to rectify the deficit by appointing the ‘Three Wise Men’ to 
head up the marketing effort. They were T O Cofaigh recently retired Governor of the Central 
Bank of Ireland, S. Páircéir, Chairman of the Revenue Commissioners and M. Horgan a 
Secretary in the Department of Finance. Together these three men toured the financial capitals 
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of the world selling the project and assuring its bona fides. At interview O Cofaigh offered a 
very useful insight into their efforts. 
 
When he was Governor of the Central Bank of Ireland O Cofaigh, together with the 
Governors of the various European central banks attended a monthly meeting in Basle prior to 
the meeting of the Bank for International Settlements. This was also attended by 
representatives of most of the leading economies in the world. On the Monday night there was 
always a semi-formal dinner at one big table. On entering the dining room each person put 
their hand in a jar and pulled out a number which allocated a place at table. This prevented the 
formation of cliques and also ensured that people got to know one another. English, French 
and German were the norm and O Cofaigh was comfortable in all three. This, allied to a 
natural gregariousness meant that he developed good personal links with his counterparts 
across the world. He contacted them all in relation to the IFSC and they in turn arranged 
meetings with the 100 largest banks in the world, many of whom set up operations in the 
IFSC. In all the ‘Three Wise Men’ visited Germany, the Netherlands, France, Japan, Sweden, 
Finland, Switzerland, America, Canada, Britain and Australia. 
 
The original vision for the IFSC had three main goals: to generate at least 7,500 jobs; to put 
Ireland on the global financial services map: to regenerate a derelict part of Dublin (Reddan, 
2008: 237). Within a year 22 projects had been approved. The numbers employed grew from 
32 in 1987 to 1,210 in 1992. It took until 1998/99 to reach the targeted 7,500 jobs and the 
numbers continued to grow to 25,058 by 2007 (ibid.: 205). As most of these were high paying 
jobs there was a substantial benefit to the state in income tax. The IFSC also became a 
significant contributor of corporation tax – growing from €98.5 million in 1992 to €891.5 
million by 2005. By 2008 the Global Financial Centres Index ranked the IFSC 13
th
 in the 
world (Reddan, 2008: 240). The docklands area was transformed beyond recognition with a 
myriad of new state of the art buildings. All the expectations for the IFSC had been exceeded. 
An enormous urban regeneration programme had been achieved without any direct 
investment or grant aid by the state. It is the most obvious example of how the path-dependent 
nature of institutional life was transformed by a changed approach. State-sponsored bodies 
and state investment in infrastructure were replaced by new thinking on tax reform and 
incentives. The reasons for its success are many and varied – the original vision of Desmond, 
the actions of Haughey and O hUiginn and those who helped them, the Three Wise Men, tax 
incentives, the availability of an educated workforce, the regulatory framework put in place. 
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And it was this very regulatory framework that became highly path dependent as its very 
success offered positive feedback. It became locked-in, as described by Thelen, as light-touch 
regulation and contributed enormously to the present banking crisis. 
 
By any yardstick the IFSC was a success but it also offers a neat illustration of the necessity 
to look at long-term processes as advised by Pierson. The causal chains contributed to slow 
moving outcomes and it took almost ten years for the threshold effects to be felt. On the 
Bulmer and Burch Template it registers systemic, organisational, regulative and procedural 
level change.  For those on the right of the political spectrum it epitomised all that was best 
about the new liberalism while those on the left saw it as pure naked capitalism and greed that 
enriched the few. While it certainly enriched some of its backers one of the most surprising 
findings from the research carried out was the level of pro bono work involved.  Those who 
served on the original steering committee were not paid.
16
 Some of the reports prepared by 
various professional bodies were given (and expected!) freely. It was a time for contributing 
to the national good.  
 
Social Partnership 
The other pillar for the deliverance of economic salvation was to be social partnership, 
specifically the Programme for National Recovery (PNR) launched in October 1987. It had 
the following main aims: 
 Macroeconomic Policies – stabilising the debt/GNP ratio, reducing exchequer 
borrowing requirement to between 5 and 7 per cent, firm adherence to exchange rate 
in the European Monetary System (EMS), pay increases not exceeding 2.5 per cent for 
each of the three years of the agreement; 
 Tax Reform – specific income tax reductions of £225 million and reductions in rates, 
tax deduction at source, improvements in tax administration and collection etc.: 
 Greater Social Equity – commitments on maintaining and improving social welfare 
benefits and the payment of PRSI by farmers;  
 Employment – continuing to attract foreign direct investment, priority to the 
development of an indigenous food industry; 
                                                          
16
 The ‘Three Wise Men’ who worked almost full time for eighteen months were paid £5,000 gross for their 
efforts.  
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 Labour Legislation – a complete review of legislation in relation to unfair dismissals 
and employment equality, worker participation etc.; 
 Review and Monitoring Committee – the setting up of a Central Review Committee 
(under the chairmanship of O hUiginn) which would review and monitor progress in 
implementing the agreement. 
  
In delivering his budget speech on 27 January 1988 Minister Mac Sharry made 10 direct 
references to the PNR and pointed out that it was ‘the basis on which policies for the 
economy will be implemented over the next few years’ (Dáil Debates 27 January 1988). In 
keeping with commitments under social partnership the following changes were made: 
 Those on the lowest rates of social welfare received an increase of 11 per cent (the 
general rate of increase was three per cent; 
 The social insurance scheme extended to the self-employed and farmers; 
 The stimulation of the tourist industry through extension of the business expansion 
scheme; 
 Increases in public sector pay in accordance with the agreement; 
 Undertook to enter negotiations with the unions on the recommendations of The 
Review Body on Higher Remuneration in the Public Sector; 
 A total tax passage which was treble that promised under the agreement for that year; 
 Changes in tax self-assessment as described above. 
(Extracted from Budget Speech in Dáil Debates 27 January 1988). 
 
Commitments on labour legislation were delivered under the Workers Participation (State 
Enterprises) Act 1988, the Safety, Health and Welfare at Work Act 1989 and the Industrial 
Relation Act 1990.  
 
The first social partnership agreement was so successful that all parties readily signed up for a 
second agreement, The Programme for Economic and Social Progress (PESP), finalised in 
January 1991. In the introduction Taoiseach Haughey said: ‘In the PNR and this Programme 
for Economic and Social Progress we have fundamentally changed our approach to managing 
our affairs. Partnership between all the interests in our society is the way forward’ (PESP, 
1991:5). Various farming representative bodies were new partners to the process and 
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submissions from various voluntary bodies in the social/community sector were also 
accepted.
17
  
 
PESP provided a strategic framework for the nineties with specific proposals for:  
 
macroeconomic stability policies - geared to low inflation, low interest rates and a 
reduction of the national debt; and a programme of fundamental structural reforms, 
especially a continuation of the radical tax reform begun under the PNR, a major 
assault on long-term unemployment and a restructuring of our social services, in 
particular social welfare, the health services, education and housing (P.8).  
 
It proposed: 
 A reduction of the Debt/GNP ratio to 100 per cent by 1993 and 75 per cent by 2000 
(the 100 per cent target was achieved in 1992 and the 75 per cent by 1996); 
 Pay increases of 4 per cent in 1991, 3 per cent in 1992 and 3.75 per cent in 1993: 
 Special provision for lower paid workers; 
 The Employer-Labour Conference to consider proposals for the implementation of a 
minimum wage and increased union recognition in the workplace; 
 Recognising that tax savings of £800 million had been delivered under the PNR it 
promised further specific cuts (30 per cent rate to be reduced to 25 per cent by 1993).  
 Continuing broadening of the tax base; 
 Guaranteed inflation proofing of rates of social welfare payments; 
 A range of improvements in education (including the introduction of a six year cycle 
at second level) and health services (including a charter on patient rights). 
In delivering the Budget on 30 January 1991Albert Reynolds, Minister for Finance, 
commented:  
In the new Programme for Economic and Social Progress, what we have done is forge 
a powerful shield to protect us in the difficult days ahead. It is a comprehensive 
charter for our development over the next ten years. Its proposals on pay will help 
keep our costs in line. Its wider social and economic dimension will provide the means 
of growth and the basis for distributing the fruits of economic progress. The 
programme represents the first instalment of a ten year national enterprise. This 
longer-term partnership will enable substantial progress during the nineties towards 
fulfilling our main aspirations (Dáil Debates 30 January 1991) 
  
                                                          
17
 The original social partnership agreement contained 32 pages. Reflecting the broader interests involved PESP 
has a much broader social remit and contains 96 pages. 
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He made nine references to PESP and delivered on tax cuts, social welfare improvements, 
measures for dealing with long-term unemployment, and development of the agricultural and 
food sector. 
 
All published sources on social partnership refer to the key role played by O hUiginn and the 
Central Review Committee (CRC) which he chaired.
18
  
The CRC monitored the agreements and dealt with difficulties as they arose. It was 
regarded as an important innovation in ensuring that commitments made in the 
agreements were tracked. But, in keeping with the nature of social partnership in 
Ireland, the CRC also had a strong degree of informality (Hastings, Sheehan and 
Yates, 2007:50) 
 
And it was this very informal process that played the largest part in delivering industrial 
peace. All those interviewed who were involved in social partnership spoke of the importance 
of ‘the back channels’, the ‘quiet phone call’ and the trade-offs that went on behind the scenes 
with O hUiginn pulling the strings. 
 
Table 8.3: Industrial Peace 
 1969 1979 1989 
Strikes 134 152 38 
Days Lost 935,900 1,427,000 41,000 
(Hasting, Sheehan and Yates, 2007: 70) 
 
All those involved in the early social partnership agreements who were interviewed for this 
thesis were enthusiastic about its success.
19
 From the mid 1990s, with increasing participation 
by what became known as the Social Pillar, criticism of the process began to build. A special 
edition of the Community Development Journal (Vol. 37, no.1, January 2002, Oxford 
University Press), while acknowledging progress on the reduction of absolute poverty, was 
universally critical of the process. From their perspective it accelerated inequality in Irish 
society and widened the gap between the rich and the poor. Kieran Allen subtitled his book on 
the Celtic Tiger ‘the myth of social partnership in Ireland’ and argues that it enabled 
increasing class polarisation at both a political and structural level. 
 
                                                          
18
 From 1994 onwards the CRC published a full formal annual review of the agreements. 
19
 The only dissenting voice was O’Malley who highlighted the lack of democratic accountability. 
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Social partnership became both an enabler of change and the cause of change. The wage 
restraint and industrial peace accepted by the unions in exchange for substantial tax and social 
welfare reform were central to increased productivity and enhanced competitiveness.  
Historical institutionalists are concerned with the asymmetrical nature of power and social 
partnership facilitated a significant shift in how power was exercised in Ireland. The unions 
came very much centre stage and found themselves in a position to influence public policy as   
never before. On the Bulmer and Burch Template PNR and PESP register change at the 
organisational, regulative and procedural levels but not at the systemic level as there was no 
primary legislation involved.  This may very well highlight a shortcoming in Bulmer and 
Burch’s Template as the change that flowed from social partnership was much more seismic 
than many systemic level changes. In effect social partnership bypassed parliament. Its critics 
cite its democratic deficit while its proponents argue that trade unions are among the most 
democratic organisations in the country. In either event the nature of power was changed and 
the benefits that flowed from the process are evident. What also became evident over time, 
and after the period under review, was that the process exhibited positive feedback and 
became locked in and path dependent. As with state-sponsored bodies at the first critical 
juncture social partnership at the second critical juncture became initially the solution and 
later a large part of the problem.  
 
Transformation? 
It will be recalled that the NESC report, A Strategy for Development 1986 -90, was 
underpinned by four major principles which were also incorporated into the PNR and these 
were to be both the enablers and causes of change:  
 An integrated macro-economic policy that addressed the imbalances in the public 
finances while at the same time promoting the development of the traded sector. 
 Fundamental reform of the tax system that enhanced equity and efficiency of the 
present system. 
 Creation of an improved business environment together with improved sectoral 
policies that directed state intervention to structural deficiencies in the productive base 
of the economy. 
 Progressive removal of the major inequities in society. 
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At the first critical juncture a five year view was taken to assess the level of institutional 
change and the achievement of the targets. A similar approach is taken at the Second Critical 
Juncture.  
 
The following tables show the major changes that occurred in the public finances: 
 
Table 8.4: GNP/ Government Debt Ratio 
Year 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
GNP 18.96 19.99 21.93 23.85 25.08 26.45 
Gov. Debt 23.69 24.61 24.83 25.08 25.38 26.34 
GNP/Debt 125% 123% 113% 105% 101% 99% 
 (Source: Compiled from the Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1993)  
 
This was the primary indicator that the public finances were under control as the ratio reduced 
from 125 per cent to 99 per cent over a period of five years through a combination of budget 
cuts, increased productivity and industrial peace all contributing to a major growth in GNP.  
More responsible budgetary policy was also evidenced in the change in short term borrowing 
requirements. 
 
Table 8.5: Changes in Borrowing Requirements 
 Current Budget 
Deficit (%GNP) 
Total Exchequer 
Borrowing (%GNP) 
Public Sector 
Borrowing (%GNP) 
1987 6.2 9.4 10.8 
1988* 1.6 3.1 3.7 
1989 1.2 2.2 3.0 
1990 0.6 1.9 2.4 
1991 1.2 2.0 3.0 
1992 1.7 2.7 3.4 
*Tax Amnesty figures reflected here 
(Source: Statistical Abstract of Ireland 1987: 285) 
 
One of the most surprising aspects of the economic situation is, in spite of the transformation 
of the public finances, that the unemployment situation proved to be quite intractable. It offers 
a good example of Pierson’s slow-moving outcomes, causal chains not running on a straight 
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trajectory, and processes having a negligible impact before achieving threshold effects. The 
numbers unemployed rose further to 220,100 in 1993 and then began a fairly dramatic annual 
decline.  
Table 8.6: Numbers at Work (in ‘000) 
 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
Employed 1,111 1,111 1,111 1,160 1,156 1,165 
Unemployed 226 217 196.8 172.4 198.5 206.6 
(Compiled from Tansey, 1998) 
Perusal of various IDA Annual reports shows that of the 54,000 increase in the numbers at 
work 18,000 of the jobs were in foreign owned companies. 
 
Five years after the adoption of the ‘ideas’ of a low tax economy and social partnership 
substantial transformative change had occurred and this thesis argues that transformation was 
largely attributable to the new ‘ideas’. There were also other factors at play, not least the EU, 
with Ireland receiving large fund transfers under CAP, ESF and ERDF. The rise of 
monetarism in the Anglo-Saxon world impacted on the political and administrative elites and 
when Haughey moved to rein in public expenditure in 1987 he was supported by the ‘Tallaght 
Strategy’ of Fine Gael, and even though fearful of the rise of the Progressive Democrats, went 
into coalition with them in 1989. The 1987 Budget of Mac Sharry; the workings of An Bord 
Snip under Cromien; the centralisation of power in the Department of the Taoiseach, under 
the omnipotent O hUiginn; the introduction of social partnership all enabled economic 
deliverance – and all were predicated on adopting new ideas that punctuated institutional path 
dependency and enabled transformation.   
 
Haughey and O hUiginn, in particular, ably abetted by Mac Sharry and Cromien, (and 
supported by Dukes and O’Malley), favoured monetarism and tax reform as a means of 
addressing the public finances. Social partnership was an acceptable price to pay to achieve 
their aims. These men made things happen. They accepted the economic ideas that emanated 
from the economic theorists. Haughey ensured political acceptability and O hUiginn ensured 
administrative acceptability and in doing so both had to overcome many institutional veto 
points.  They also had to ensure major cultural change to delete the state-sponsored bodies 
solution as a background underlying assumption that was firmly embedded in the public 
sentiment and replace it with the ‘ideas’ of monetarism and neocorporatism. The critical 
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moment that existed after the publication of A Strategy for Economic Development  1986 -90 
and the coming to power of Haughey did transform into a critical juncture as described by 
Bulmer and Burch (2001:81):   
 
A ‘critical moment’ is when an opportunity arises for significant change. Such 
opportunities may not be realised and exploited but, if they are, the outcome is a 
‘critical juncture’ at which there is a clear departure from previously established 
patterns. Critical junctures create branching points at which institutional development 
moves on to a new trajectory or pathway which is then followed incrementally until a 
new critical moment arises and (potentially) a new critical juncture follows and a new 
direction is taken. 
 
Using a combination of tax reform and social partnership Haughey and O hUiginn ensured 
systemic level change primarily through tax reform; organisational level change beginning in 
the Department of the Taoiseach that permeated the entire public service, and regulative and 
procedural level changes that effected business at every level. The changes can be clearly seen 
in the following table. 
 
Table 8.7 Bulmer and Burch Template of Institutional Change 
 Systemic Organisational Regulative Procedural 
Tallaght Strategy X  X  
FF/PD Coalition X  X  
Dept of Taoiseach X    
An Bord Snip X    
Tax Reform     
Self-Assessment     
Tax Amnesty     
IFSC     
PNR X    
PESP X    
CRC X  X  
 
What is evidenced by the above table is a clear departure from previously established patterns 
of institutional behaviour. What also becomes clear is that major change does not always 
require systemic level change as described by Bulmer and Burch. The ‘Tallaght Strategy, 
Fianna Fáil entering coalition government, the enhanced role of the Department of the 
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Taoiseach, did not entail systemic level change nevertheless the change involved was seismic. 
The combination of all the changes listed above punctuated institutional path dependency. 
Political and administrative determination, attitudinal and structural changes, major tax 
reform, all ensured that a critical juncture did occur. Some of the changes involved slow-
moving outcomes (unemployment) and the causal chains did not always follow a straight 
trajectory. But a ‘new idea’, that had gained viability on the economic, political and 
administrative axis (as per Hall’s Framework), moved from being a foreground idea, 
promulgated by ideational actors as an elite prescription, to becoming an elite and background 
underlying assumption that became embedded in the public sentiment. This led to a clear 
critical juncture and in the process transformed Ireland. 
   
 
